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Preface
This thesis is the result of my Ph.D. studies at the Department of Finance, Copenhagen
Business School. The thesis consists of three essays that cover diﬀerent aspects of
correlation modelling in corporate default risk. Each essay is self-contained and can be
read independently.
Structure of the thesis
The common theme across all three essays is the role of correlation in corporate default
risk. While the likelihood for a given ﬁrm to default depends on a number of ﬁrm-
speciﬁc characteristics such as earnings, debt outstanding, cash holdings, total assets,
stock returns etc., there are also cross-sectional comovements in default probabilities that
cannot be explained by idiosyncratic factors. E.g. the general state of the economy, sector-
wide up- or downswings, and the ﬁnancial soundness of competitors and business partners
may all contribute to a clustering of default risk over time.
Accounting for such correlation is important for both pricing and risk management
of portfolios of defaultable assets, and the thesis addresses diﬀerent ways to capture
correlation both in actual default probabilities as well as in prices of defaultable assets and
credit derivatives. The common goal of the thesis is to formulate and estimate quantitative
models of default risk with speciﬁc attention to the importance of default correlation, and
use that to gain further understanding of the nature of correlation in default risk.
In the ﬁrst essay (co-authored with David Lando, Copenhagen Business School), we
investigate statistical techniques for testing the adequacy of “conditional independence”–
based intensity models of default. Previous literature has used a time-change technique
to analyze these models and jointly test the intensity speciﬁcation and the “conditional
independence” assumption. Using 24 years of data of both defaulting and non-defaulting
i
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U.S. industrial ﬁrms, we show that the time-change technique is, however, mainly a test of
the intensity speciﬁcation. We further demonstrate by a simple example how a violation
of the conditional independence assumption may not be captured by the time-change test,
and we give the intuition behind this result. We conclude by proposing alternative tests
that explicitly account for the impact of previous defaults on the default intensity, but we
ﬁnd little evidence of this type of correlation in our empirical sample.
The second essay (co-authored with Peter Feldhütter, London Business School)
addresses the pricing of correlation in CDO tranche spreads, which are essentially call
option spreads on default correlation among a portfolio of defaultable entities. We provide
an intensity-based model that allows us to split the default risk into a systematic
(correlation) and an idiosyncratic component, and we show how to estimate the model
without imposing the restrictive parameter constraints appearing in previous literature.
We ﬁnd that the systematic default component is an explosive process with low volatility,
whereas the idiosyncratic default risk is more volatile but less explosive. We further ﬁnd
that the model is able to capture both the level and time series dynamics of CDO tranche
spreads.
The third and ﬁnal essay concerns time series variation in corporate bond spreads
induced by variation in the state of the economy. The essay documents how the level
and slope of empirical credit spread curves vary with the business cycle, and it develops a
structural credit risk model with jump risk that allows for explicit dependence on the state
of the economy. The model uniﬁes several existing models that focus entirely on either
jump or business cycle risk. Subsequent estimation of the model reveals the importance
of accounting for both jump and business cycle risk in order to capture the time-variation
in empirical credit spread curves. In addition, the model gives predictions for net beneﬁts
to debt and optimal capital structure that are in line with existing literature.
English and Danish summary of each essay is provided below.
Publication details
The ﬁrst essay is an extended version of a paper published in the Journal of Financial
Intermediation, volume 19, page 355–372, and the second essay has been accepted for
publication in the Journal of Financial Econometrics.
ii
Preface
Acknowledgements
The essays in this thesis have beneﬁtted greatly from comments and suggestions from a
number of people, and they are mentioned with each of the essays. However, a few people
deserve a special mention.
First of all, I am deeply indebted to my advisor, professor David Lando, for his constant
encouragement, commitment to, and belief in my work – even at times when little progress
was made. His guidance has been an invaluable source of inspiration and his critical
comments have aﬀected much of the work presented in this thesis. I similarly wish to
thank assistant professor Peter Feldhütter for sharing his previous work on CDO pricing
with me, for his excellent co-authorship on the second essay, and not least for suggesting
me to apply for a Ph.D. scholarship in the ﬁrst place. Furthermore, I thank current and
previous colleagues and fellow Ph.D. students at the Department of Finance, CBS, for
many rewarding discussions as well as for many hours of great fun. In particular, I thank
Claus Bajlum, Jens Dick-Nielsen, Peter Feldhütter, René Kallestrup, and Morten Nalholm
for always taking the time to listen to my ideas and providing me with useful feedback,
and a special thanks to Jens Dick-Nielsen for our many stimulating ﬁve-minute-seminars.
Moreover, I am indebted to Derek Moore for always supplying instant and accurate IT
assistance, and to Peter Raahauge for patiently introducing me to the world of Matlab. In
addition, I wish to thank professor Kristian Miltersen and associate professor Christian
Riis Flor for participating in my pre-defense and for providing me with a range of critical
and useful comments.
Finally, I wish to thank my family and friends for always being there for me and for
their unconditional support and belief in me, without which this thesis would not have
been completed.
Mads Stenbo Nielsen
Copenhagen, August 2011
iii

Summary
Summary
This section contains English and Danish summaries of the three essays that comprise
the thesis.
English summary
Essay I: Correlation in corporate defaults: Contagion or conditional
independence? (co-authored with David Lando, CBS)
The ﬁrst essay studies statistical procedures for testing the validity of intensity-based
models of actual defaults. Such models are often applied under an additional assumption
of conditional independence, whereby the default event is assumed to be conditionally
independent of the factors appearing in the speciﬁcation of the default intensity. Das,
Duﬃe, Kapadia, and Saita (2007) (DDKS) propose a statistical procedure to jointly test
the speciﬁcation of the default intensity and the conditional independence assumption
through time-changing observed defaults into independent Poisson-distributed variables.
In an empirical application to U.S. default data, DDKS strongly reject the validity of the
joint hypothesis of well-speciﬁed intensities and conditional independence.
This leaves open the question of whether their rejection is due to incorrectly speciﬁed
intensities or a violation of the conditional independence assumption. Using an extensive
data set covering 24 years and a total of 2,557 U.S. industrial ﬁrms, we show that the
rejection is likely to be caused by misspeciﬁed default intensities. We ﬁrst conﬁrm the
results obtained by DDKS using their intensity speciﬁcation and subsequently show that
by employing an extended speciﬁcation, we can no longer reject the joint hypothesis of
well-speciﬁed intensities and the conditional independence assumption. To strengthen our
result, we add further Poisson test statistics to those appearing in DDKS, but this does
v
English summary
not change our conclusion.
We subsequently nuance our result by showing that the time-change procedure is, in
fact, unable to capture certain violations of the conditional independence assumption. We
set up a simple example to demonstrate how default contagion that spreads through the
variables in the default intensity speciﬁcation will not be captured by the time-change
approach. We therefore need additional test procedures to account for the presence of
contagion in corporate default data, and we propose to use both regression analysis as
well as a Hawkes speciﬁcation of the intensity. In the latter approach, previous defaults
are allowed to directly impact the likelihood of default for ﬁrms that are still alive. We
apply both types of tests to our empirical data and ﬁnd only limited evidence of default
contagion.
Essay II: Systematic and idiosyncratic default risk in synthetic credit
markets (co-authored with Peter Feldhütter, LBS)
The second essay develops a ﬂexible intensity-based model for pricing correlation-
dependent credit derivatives. The model features both idiosyncratic and systematic default
risk and ensures consistent pricing of single- and multi-name credit derivatives. The key
idea behind the model is to infer term structures of risk-neutral default probabilities from
single-name Credit Default Swaps (CDSs), and use that to estimate the systematic default
component of each ﬁrm’s default probability from tranche spreads of Collateralized Debt
Obligations (CDOs).
The default intensity of each individual ﬁrm is assumed to be a sum of an
idiosyncratic component and a suitable scaling of a systematic component. We show by a
straightforward argument how the scaling of the systematic component may be inferred
from a simple linear regression, and we demonstrate in our empirical application that
this choice of weighting is consistent with the intuitive scaling of systematic default risk
applied in previous literature.
Central to our approach is the fact that we can leave the idiosyncratic default
component unmodelled, and thereby avoid the restrictive parameter contraints imposed in
existing literature. Thus, we are able to specify a highly ﬂexible model, while retaining a
tractable estimation procedure, where only relatively few parameters have to be estimated.
vi
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Furthermore, since our model only relies on liquid, synthetic credit derivatives (CDSs and
CDOs), we are able to base our estimation of the model on a large data set of daily data.
In our implementation we use 90,600 credit spreads covering a total of 120 days.
When estimating the model we ﬁnd that systematic default risk is explosive and has
low volatility, whereas idiosyncratic risk on the other hand is less explosive but has larger
volatility. Finally, we ﬁnd that the model is able to capture both the level and time series
dynamics of the CDO tranche spreads in our sample.
Essay III: Credit spreads across the business cycle
The third essay takes a completely diﬀerent approach to the modelling of default risk
correlation than the ﬁrst two. Instead of using default intensities, the third essay relies
on a structural approach in order to describe business cycle variation in corporate credit
spreads.
I ﬁrst demonstrate how the level and slope of empirical credit spreads are negatively,
respectively positively correlated with consumption growth, and I show that these patterns
are persistent across both investment and speculative grade issuers. In particular, I
document that the credit spread curve is generally upward-sloping in times of high
economic growth, but becomes ﬂat or even inverted as the economy approaches a trough.
I further show that the variation in the slope of the credit spread curve may result
from shifts in the relative distribution between short- and long-term risk. As economic
growth declines, not only does the level of default risk increase, but also the relative
importance of short-term default risk increases. As a proxy for short-term risk, I consider
jumps in equity returns, and I ﬁnd empirically that both positive and negative jumps
covary with the business cycle, with larger jumps in times of low economic growth. I
develop a new technique in order to estimate the jumps, and I show that the detected
jumps are consistent with the common interpretation of jumps as representing the arrival
of new information to the market.
To capture the observed business cycle correlation with both level and slope of
corporate credit spread curves, I formulate a structural credit risk model that takes both
jump and business cycle risk into account. This model is the ﬁrst to consider both risk
factors in a joint framework, and it uniﬁes several existing models that focus entirely on
vii
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just one of these two factors.
I estimate the model on a ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm basis using daily data from 1962 to 2006, and
the estimation shows that the model is able to replicate the observed variation in both
level and slope of corporate credit spreads. In particular, the model-implied credit spread
curves are upward-sloping when economic growth is high, and ﬂat or downward-sloping
when economic growth is low. The ability of the model to generate such curves hinges
crucially on the interplay between jump and business cycle risk, with jump risk increasing
during economic downturns. Moreover, the estimated model yields predictions for net
beneﬁts to debt and optimal capital structure that are in line with results in the existing
literature.
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Essay I: Korrelation blandt virksomheders fallithændelser: Smitte-eﬀekter
eller betinget uafhængighed? (medforfatter David Lando, CBS)
Det første essay undersøger statistiske metoder til at teste brugbarheden af intensitets-
baserede modeller for observerede fallithændelser. Sådanne modeller anvendes ofte
i sammenhæng med en yderligere antagelse om betinget uafhængighed, hvorved
fallithændelsen antages at være betinget uafhængig af de faktorer, der indgår i
speciﬁkationen af fallitintensiteten. Das, Duﬃe, Kapadia, and Saita (2007) (DDKS)
foreslår en statistisk metode til på samme tid at teste både speciﬁkationen af
fallitintensiteten og antagelsen om betinget uafhængighed ved at tidstransformere
observerede fallithændelser til uafhængige Poisson-fordelte variable. I et empirisk studie
af amerikanske fallitdata forkaster DDKS entydigt gyldigheden af den dobbelte hypotese
om korrekt speciﬁcerede intensiteter og betinget uafhængighed.
Det rejser spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt deres resultat skyldes forkert speciﬁcerede
intensiteter eller et fravær af betinget uafhængighed. På baggrund af data for i alt 2.557
amerikanske industrivirksomheder over en 24-årig periode viser vi, at resultatet formentlig
skyldes fejlagtigt speciﬁcerede intensiteter. Vi replikerer først DDKS’ resultat ved at bruge
deres foreslåede intensitetsspeciﬁkation, og vi viser derefter at ved at bruge en udvidet
speciﬁkation, er det ikke længere muligt at forkaste den dobbelte hypotese om korrekt
speciﬁcerede intensiteter og betinget uafhængighed. For at underbygge vores resultat
viii
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tilføjer vi yderligere Poisson-teststørrelser til dem, der allerede optræder i DDKS, men
det ændrer ikke på vores konklusion.
Vi nuancerer herefter vores konklusion ved at vise, at tidstransformationsmetoden
ikke er i stand til at opfange bestemte overtrædelser af antagelsen om betinget
uafhængighed. Vi opstiller et simpelt eksempel, der viser hvorledes smitte-eﬀekter,
der optræder via variablene i speciﬁkationen af fallitintensiteten, ikke fanges af
tidstransformationsmetoden. Det er derfor nødvendigt med yderligere tests for at kunne
opdage smitte-eﬀekter blandt virksomheders fallithændelser. Vi foreslår i den forbindelse
at benytte såvel regressionsmetoder som en Hawkes-speciﬁkation af fallitintensiteten.
Sidstnævnte tillader at forudgående fallithændelser kan have en direkte eﬀekt på
sandsynligheden for fallit blandt de tilbageværende virksomheder. Vi anvender begge typer
af testprocedurer på vores empiriske data, og ﬁnder kun begrænsede tegn på eksistens af
smitte-eﬀekter.
Essay II: Systematisk og idiosynkratisk fallitrisiko i “syntetiske” kreditrisiko-
instrumenter (medforfatter Peter Feldhütter, LBS)
Det andet essay opstiller en ﬂeksibel intensitetsbaseret model til prisfastsættelse af
korrelationsafhængige kreditrisiko-instrumenter. Modellen omfatter både idiosynkratisk
og systematisk fallitrisiko og sikrer en konsistent prisfastsættelse af aﬂedte instrumenter,
der involverer både én enkelt såvel som en hel gruppe af virksomheder. Den grund-
læggende idé bag modellen er at udlede kurver af risiko-neutrale fallitsandsynligheder på
baggrund af handlede Credit Default Swaps (CDS’er), og bruge disse til at estimere den
systematiske del af hver enkelt virksomheds fallitsandsynlighed ved hjælp af Collateralized
Debt Obligation (CDO) tranche-spænd.
Hver enkelt virksomheds fallitintensitet antages at være en sum af en idiosynkratisk
faktor og en passende skalering af en systematisk faktor. Vi viser med et simpelt argument,
hvorledes skaleringen af den systematiske faktor kan udledes fra en almindelig lineær
regression, og viser siden hen i den empiriske del af papiret, hvorledes resultatet af
denne skalering stemmer overens med den ad hoc skalering af systematisk fallitrisiko,
som tidligere studier har anvendt.
Et vigtigt element i vores metode er, at vi ikke behøver modellere den idiosynkratiske
ix
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del af fallitrisikoen, og at vi derved undgår de strenge parameterrestriktioner, der optræder
i den eksisterende litteratur. Vi er således i stand til at speciﬁcere en yderst ﬂeksibel
model, der samtidig er overkommelig at estimere, idet det samlede antal parametre,
der skal estimeres, er forholdsvis begrænset. Eftersom modellen alene bygger på likvide,
“syntetiske” kreditrisiko-instrumenter (CDS’er og CDO’er), er det muligt at basere
estimation af modellen på en stor mængde af daglige data. I vores implementering af
modellen bruger vi 90.600 kreditspænd fordelt over en periode på i alt 120 dage.
Vores estimation af modellen viser, at den systematiske kreditrisiko er “eksplosiv”
omend med lav volatilitet, mens den idiosynkratiske risiko er mindre eksplosiv men mere
volatil. Endelig viser estimationen, at modellen er i stand til at fange både niveauet og
tidsserievariationen i de empiriske CDO tranche-spænd.
Essay III: Konjunkturvariation i virksomheders kreditspænd
Det tredje essay benytter en helt anden tilgang til modellering af korrelation
i virksomheders kreditrisiko end de to første essays. I stedet for at basere
sig på fallitintensiteter anvendes i stedet en strukturel model til at beskrive
konjunkturvariationen i virksomheders kreditspænd.
Indledningsvis viser jeg, hvorledes niveauet og hældningen på empiriske kreditspænds-
kurver er henholdvis negativt og positivt korreleret med væksten i privatforbruget. Mere
speciﬁkt så viser jeg, at kreditspændskurver generelt har positiv hældning i perioder med
høj økonomisk vækst, mens de ﬂader ud og i visse tilfælde ligefrem inverterer i perioder
med lav vækst.
Jeg demonstrerer dernæst, at konjunkturvariationen i kurvernes hældning kan knyttes
til ændringer i den relative fordeling mellem kort- og langsigtet kreditrisiko. I takt med
at den økonomiske vækst aftager, stiger både det absolutte niveau af kreditrisiko såvel
som den relative betydning af kortsigtet kreditrisiko. Som mål for kortsigtet kreditrisiko
anvender jeg spring i realiserede aktieafkast, og jeg bruger det til at dokumentere
konjunkturfølsomhed i størrelsen af både positive og negative aktiespring, hvor springene
generelt er større i perioder med lav økonomisk vækst. Til brug for estimation af
aktiespringene udvikler jeg en ny metode, som jeg påviser er i overensstemmelse med
den traditionelle fortolkning af aktiespring som udtryk for tilgang af ny information til
x
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aktiemarkedet.
Til beskrivelse af den dokumenterede korrelation mellem samfundsøkonomiske
konjunkturer og henholdsvis niveau og hældning på virksomheders kreditspændskurver
opstiller jeg herefter en strukturel kreditrisikomodel, der tager højde for både spring-
og konjunkturrisici. Dette er den første strukturelle model, som tager hensyn til begge
risikofaktorer på samme tid. Som specialtilfælde indeholder den adskillige eksisterende
modeller, der alene fokuserer på den ene af de to faktorer.
Jeg estimerer modellen for en række virksomheder på baggrund af daglige data for
perioden fra 1962 til 2006, og estimationen viser at modellen er i stand til at replikere den
observerede variation i både niveau og hældning på virksomheders kreditspændskurver.
Specielt så har modellens kurver positiv hældning, når den økonomiske vækst er høj,
mens kurverne er ﬂade eller har negativ hældning, når væksten er lav. Modellens evne til
at generere disse kurver er tæt knyttet til samspillet mellem spring- og konjunkturrisici,
der medfører en forøget springrisiko i perioder med lav økonomisk vækst. Den estimerede
model giver desuden anledning til forudsigelser vedrørende nettofordelen ved udstedelse af
gæld samt valget af optimal kapitalstruktur. For begge dele gælder, at disse forudsigelser
er i overensstemmelse med resultater i den eksisterende litteratur.
xi
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Introduction
When a ﬁrm borrows money to ﬁnance its activities, it pays an interest which, among
other things, is inﬂuenced by the ﬁrm’s ability to service its loan. When the lender, say, a
bank, has to determine the appropriate interest rate to charge, it therefore has to assess
the likelihood that the ﬁrm will default on its obligation. If the bank has also granted
loans to other ﬁrms, it likewise has to assess the likelihood of default for each of these
ﬁrms. Hence, it is necessary for the bank to have models that it can use to estimate the
probability of default for each of its borrowers.
There is strong empirical evidence that defaults cluster over time, simply because in
times of low economic growth more ﬁrms struggle to repay their existing loans and/or
experience increasing diﬃculties in obtaining new loans. As a result, the bank is likely to
suﬀer excessive losses in such periods, and it is therefore not enough just to estimate the
probability of default for each individual borrower. It is equally important to also take
into account the correlation between defaults in order to capture the clustering of defaults
(and hence losses) over time.
If we consider a speciﬁc borrower and let τ denote his (stochastic) default time, then the
object of interest is the probability distribution of τ . Default risk models are traditionally
classiﬁed as either intensity models or structural models, depending on the way they model
the distribution of τ . For intensity models, the distribution of τ is described in terms of
its default intensity
lim
dt→0
P (t < τ ≤ t + dt | τ > t)
dt
= λt
that determines the probability of instant default at any time t. Intensity models make
no a priori assumptions about the behaviour of λt and thus provide a highly ﬂexible
framework, which is used both for default probability modelling as well as for pricing of
credit risky securities. The deﬁnition of the default intensity implies that the distribution
1
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of τ has the equivalent representation
P (τ > t) = exp
(
−
∫ t
0
λsds
)
which shows that the mathematical structure of intensity models is closely related to
models of default-free interest rates. This has the obvious advantage that many of the
techniques used to model ﬁxed income instruments can also be used to model default risk
as pointed out e.g. in Lando (1998) and Duﬃe and Singleton (1999).
Intensity models ﬁnd their strength in the ﬂexible speciﬁcation of the default intensity,
whereas structural models take a completely diﬀerent approach. Here, the idea is to set up
speciﬁc economic structures based on underlying factors that are believed to be the drivers
of default risk. Hence, structural models are signiﬁcantly more restrictive in terms of their
modelling ﬂexibility, but oﬀer instead important insights into the economic mechanisms
behind the distribution of the default time τ . The ﬁrst papers along these lines were the
seminal works of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973; 1974) for which the latter
two authors were awarded the Alfred Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 1997.
This thesis contains new results related to both of the classical ﬁelds of default
risk models. Essay I and II contain empirical applications of intensity-based models to
estimation of actual default probabilities and pricing of credit derivatives, respectively,
and Essay III develops a new structural credit risk model. The common theme across
all three essays is the role of correlation between default times for a pool of borrowers,
and how to model and estimate this correlation from observed defaults and from prices
of traded securities.
The ﬁrst essay, Essay I (co-authored with David Lando, CBS), studies various
speciﬁcations of intensity-based models and discuss their ability to match the probability
of default in a large sample of U.S. industrial ﬁrms. The paper builds on earlier work
by Duﬃe, Saita, and Wang (2007) and Das, Duﬃe, Kapadia, and Saita (2007) on
estimation and test of intensity models under an assumption of conditional independence
between default events and default intensities. In this setting default correlation only
enters through cross-correlation among the ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macroeconomic variables
appearing in the speciﬁcation of the default intensities. Das, Duﬃe, Kapadia, and Saita
(2007) suggest a statistical procedure for testing this particular class of models, and in an
empirical application the authors ﬁnd that their proposed test rejects their conditional
2
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independence intensity speciﬁcation.
The ﬁrst contribution of Essay I is to show that a more careful speciﬁcation of the
default intensities, still working under the conditional independence assumption, changes
the conclusion of Das, Duﬃe, Kapadia, and Saita (2007). Hence, it is no longer possible
to reject the validity of intensity models speciﬁed using conditional independence. The
second contribution of Essay I is then to demonstrate that the proposed test procedure is,
in fact, insuﬃcient to test the conditional independence assumption, since the assumption
may be violated without the test procedure being able to detect this.
The third and ﬁnal contribution of Essay I is to propose and apply alternative
tests using regression analysis and Hawkes processes (Hawkes 1971a;b). The latter type
of process has a long-standing history e.g. in studies of earthquakes (see for example
Ogata, Akaike, and Katsura (1982)), but has only recently gained attention in ﬁnancial
applications (see for example Errais, Giesecke, and Goldberg (2010) and Shek (2010)).
In recent work related to Essay I, Duﬃe, Eckner, Horel, and Saita (2009) ﬁnd that
instead of changing the set of observable variables entering the default intensity, it is
also possible to obtain an improved ﬁt to empirical default data by incorporating latent
variables. Unfortunately this approach also implies a signiﬁcant increase in the statistical
estimation uncertainty, and it does not provide any economic interpretation of the added
latent factors.
Essay II (co-authored with Peter Feldhütter, LBS) also applies an intensity-based
model to describe default risk and default correlation among a pool of borrowers. However,
in contrast to Essay I default probabilities are not based on observations of actual defaults
but instead inferred from prices of credit derivatives. The default correlation structure is
again based on a conditional independence assumption and is thus similar to that of Essay
I, except that now both idiosyncratic and systematic default risk are modelled as latent
factors as opposed to observable factors in Essay I.
Although Essay II concerns the estimation of default risk, the estimation methodology
draws heavily on techniques from the literature on default-free term structure modelling.
Speciﬁcally, to infer term structures of default probabilities from prices of Credit Default
Swap (CDS) contracts, we use an approach similar to the derivation of yield curves
from observed bond prices suggested by Nelson and Siegel (1987). Similarly, for the
parametrization of our systematic default component we use an aﬃne jump-diﬀusion
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process in analogy with the extensive literature on aﬃne term structure models (see e.g.
Duﬃe and Kan (1996), Dai and Singleton (2000), Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Jones
(2008)).
The ﬁrst contribution of Essay II is that we exploit the whole term structure of CDS
spreads to infer a corresponding term structure of default probabilities for each ﬁrm in
our sample. This allows us in a novel way to remove the restrictive parameter contraints
enforced in earlier work by Duﬃe and Gârleanu (2001) and Mortensen (2006). Moreover,
our approach enables us to split the total amount of default risk into an idiosyncratic
and a systematic part. This potentially allows for more detailed analyses of the forces
driving market-implied default risk compared e.g. to the papers of Longstaﬀ and Rajan
(2008) and Errais, Giesecke, and Goldberg (2010), where only the aggregate default risk
is considered.
In the second contribution of the paper, we give a theoretical argument for how to
estimate the weight on the systematic default component in each ﬁrm’s default intensity.
We further demonstrate that the resulting empirical estimates are similar to those implied
by the ad hoc method applied in previous literature. Our third and ﬁnal contribution
is to estimate our model on a large empirical data set and thereby show that it is
possible to formulate a default correlation model that can match the level and time series
dynamics of both single-name CDS spreads and correlation-dependent, multi-name CDO
(Collateralized Debt Obligation) spreads at the same time.
The scope of Essay II is to capture the correlation implied by observed market prices
of credit risky securities, and not to determine the fundamental economic sources of
default correlation. This is instead the focal point of Essay III. Here, I apply the idea
that correlation (in actual defaults as well as in prices of credit risky securities) is to some
extent caused by common variation in macroeconomic variables. This is already exploited
in the intensity-model considered in Essay I, and in Essay III it is used to develop a
structural credit risk model with the purpose of explaining business cycle variation in
corporate credit spreads.
The basic setting of the model follows the structural framework introduced in Leland
(1994b), where a ﬁrm’s debt and equity are viewed as claims to underlying assets, and the
default time τ is the ﬁrst time asset value falls below some prespeciﬁed threshold. The
model builds on a large recent literature that has extended Leland’s original model in two
4
Introduction
diﬀerent directions: either to allow for jumps in asset value (Hilberink and Rogers (2002),
Cremers, Driessen, and Maenhout (2008), Chen and Kou (2009)) or to take business cycle
ﬂuctuations in asset value into account (Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006), Bhamra,
Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010a;b), Chen (2010)).
The ﬁrst contribution of Essay III is to document how both level and slope of observed
credit spreads vary with the state of the economy, and to link this to similar ﬂuctuations
in empirical jump behaviour. This suggests that both jumps and business cycle variation
have a role to play in explaining corporate credit spreads, and in the second contribution
of the paper I therefore construct a structural credit risk model that incorporates both risk
factors at the same time. This essentially uniﬁes most of the models mentioned above,
and I demonstrate that despite signiﬁcant additional model complexity, that arises when
both jump and business cycle risk are included, it is still possible to obtain closed-form
expressions for the market values of debt and equity.
The last two contributions of Essay III regard empirical aspects of the formulated
structural model. While there already exists a comprehensive literature on jump parameter
estimation using high-frequency data (see e.g. Barndorﬀ-Nielsen and Shephard (2004;
2006), Huang and Tauchen (2005), Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2007)), it
is not possible to apply these techniques to the estimation of my model, since reliable
estimation of the business cycle related parameters requires a sample period of multiple
decades over which high-frequency data is not available. Instead, I present an alternative
method for estimation of the jump parameters, and I verify that the outcome of this
alternative procedure is consistent with the common perception of jumps as representing
arrival of new information to the market (see e.g. Maheu and McCurdy (2004), Lee and
Mykland (2008)). In the last contribution of the paper, I perform a full ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm
estimation of the model and I show that the resulting model-implied credit spread curves
replicate the previously observed business cycle variation in empirical credit spreads.
Brieﬂy summing up, the overall purpose of this thesis is to gain further understanding
of the importance of and mechanisms behind corporate default correlation, and the three
essays in the thesis describe diﬀerent aspects of this correlation. Essay I looks at correlation
in actual default probabilities, Essay II discusses correlation in market-implied default
probabilities derived from prices of correlation-dependent credit derivatives, and Essay
III discusses business cycle variation in market-implied default probabilities and default
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loss rates with particular focus on the underlying economic mechanisms driving these
ﬂuctuations.
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Abstract
We revisit a method used by Das, Duﬃe, Kapadia, and Saita (2007)
(DDKS) to test the doubly stochastic assumption in intensity models
of default. We show that using a diﬀerent speciﬁcation of the default
intensity, and using the same test as DDKS, we cannot reject using
an almost identical set of default histories recorded by Moody’s in the
period from 1982 to 2006. We propose additions to the procedure as
well as a Hawkes process alternative to test for violations of conditional
independence but cannot detect contagion. We then observe that the
test proposed by DDKS is mainly a misspeciﬁcation test in that it will
not detect contagion eﬀects as long as individual ﬁrms have default
intensities and there are no simultaneous jumps to default. Speciﬁcally,
contagion spread through the explanatory variables (“covariates”) that
determine the default intensities of individual ﬁrms will not be detected.
We therefore perform diﬀerent tests to see if ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables are
aﬀected by occurrences of defaults. Regression tests show that there
is no inﬂuence from defaults on quick ratios, but some inﬂuence on
distance-to-default.
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I.1 Introduction
Can we think of time variation in the frequency of corporate defaults as controlled
by “exogenous” factors with no feedback from actual defaults to these factors? Or can
we statistically document “contagion eﬀects” by which one ﬁrm’s default increases the
likelihood of other ﬁrms defaulting?
In a recent paper Das, Duﬃe, Kapadia, and Saita (2007) (DDKS) test whether default
events in an intensity-based setting can reasonably be modelled as “doubly stochastic”,
i.e. as dependent solely on “exogenous” factors. Their approach is to transform the time
scale using the sum of the default intensities estimated for individual ﬁrms and then test
whether defaults on this transformed time scale behave as a standard Poisson process.
Based on a time series of U.S. corporate defaults, they strongly reject that defaults can
be modelled as doubly stochastic. DDKS view this test as a joint test of the speciﬁcation
of the default intensities of the individual ﬁrms and the doubly stochastic assumption. A
core message of our paper is that the time transformation test should be thought of mainly
as a misspeciﬁcation test. We need – and propose – other tests to look for contagion eﬀects
that violate the doubly stochastic assumption.
Our ﬁrst contribution is to show that a diﬀerent speciﬁcation of the intensity will in fact
make us unable to reject the tests performed by DDKS. That is, using our speciﬁcation
of the intensity there is no excess default clustering. As DDKS we use the sample of ﬁrms
listed in Moody’s default database. To make sure that the diﬀerent conclusion is not
merely a consequence of deviations in the data, we show that specifying the explanatory
variables as in DDKS, we reject the assumption of conditional independence but using
our speciﬁcation, we are not able to reject using a large variety of tests. In essence, our
change in speciﬁcation consists in replacing a measure of the short rate with a measure of
steepness of the term structure, adding industrial production (a variable also examined in
DDKS) and adding the following three ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables: quick ratio, short-to-long
debt and the book value of assets. We will discuss this choice of the explanatory variables
below.
The fact that we are unable to reject the tests performed in DDKS with our covariates
could lead us to conclude, that there are no detectable contagion eﬀects in the data. This
conclusion is premature, however. Our second contribution is to show that when contagion
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takes place through ﬁrm covariates (as opposed to contagion by “domino eﬀects”), this
will not be detected by the test procedure followed in DDKS (and in the ﬁrst part of
our paper). To state this in more economic terms, if default of one ﬁrm causes, say, the
book value of assets of another ﬁrm to fall, and this increases the intensity of default
of the other ﬁrm, then as long as the book asset value is an explanatory variable in our
estimation of default intensities of ﬁrms, we will not detect this as a contagion eﬀect using
the test based on time transformation. To explain the intuition behind this insight, we set
up the simplest structure rich enough to illustrate a contagion eﬀect which occurs through
explanatory variables, but which is not detected by the test.
Our ﬁnal contribution is to analyze contagion eﬀects, both direct and through
explanatory variables, and using both likelihood tests based on Hawkes processes and
regression analysis. Hawkes processes, or self-exciting processes, are a class of counting
processes which allow intensities to depend on the timing of previous events. When we
use ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables in the Cox regressions, the Hawkes speciﬁcation does not add
any explanatory power. If we only condition on macroeconomic variables and look for
contagion by checking through a Hawkes speciﬁcation whether downgrade intensities
increase following a default, then we do detect a contagion eﬀect. Since this eﬀect may be
due to rating agency behaviour, we also perform regression tests to check for contagion
through the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables distance-to-default and the quick ratio to be deﬁned
below. We ﬁnd some support for this.
There is ample evidence that corporate defaults are correlated. For example, Lang
and Stulz (1992) show that bankruptcy announcements signiﬁcantly decrease the value
of a portfolio of competitor stocks. Several empirical studies document a large time
variation in default frequencies and link this variation to, among other variables,
business cycle indicators. Examples of this include Nickell, Perraudin, and Varotto (2000),
Shumway (2001), Duﬃe, Saita, and Wang (2007), and many others. Since such indicators
simultaneously aﬀect the default probabilities of many ﬁrms, their variation induces
correlation between default events just as variation of common factors in asset return
models induce correlation between returns.
We also have indirect evidence that defaults are correlated from market prices of traded
securities. For example, Credit Default Swap premia have signiﬁcant common movements
and prices of tranches of Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) can only be reasonably
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explained if one assumes a signiﬁcant amount of default correlation. Of course, market
prices of these securities reﬂect not only the physical probabilities of defaults but also
contain an adjustment for risk. Still, it is fair to assume that the price patterns we observe
for CDO tranches can at least partially be attributed to correlated default risk.
How to best model the correlation eﬀects is less clear. The most tractable way from an
analytical standpoint is to work under a conditional independence assumption, in which
a common factor structure induces covariation between the default times of diﬀerent
ﬁrms. Conditionally on the evolution of the common factors, defaults are independent.
This formulation is also referred to as a doubly stochastic setting. This is a setting in
which default dependence is captured by business cycle related variables. The conditional
independence structure is analyzed among other places in Jarrow, Lando, and Yu (2005),
and it is applied to CDO modelling for example in Duﬃe and Gârleanu (2001).
A more direct way of inducing dependence between default times is to assume that
there is contagion, i.e. that the actual default event of one ﬁrm either directly triggers the
default of other ﬁrms or causes their default probabilities to increase.1 Some examples of
contagion models include Davis and Lo (2001), Jarrow and Yu (2001), Azizpour and
Giesecke (2008), and Azizpour, Giesecke, and Kim (2011). This type of contagion is
clearly relevant when ﬁrms belong to the same corporate family, for example through
parent-subsidiary relationships, see for example Emery and Cantor (2005). The question
we address here is whether this type of contagion is present even for ﬁrms which do not
belong to the same corporate family.
Note that our focus in this paper is not on “informational” contagion in prices on
equity, corporate bonds or Credit Default Swap premia as studied for example by Collin-
Dufresne, Goldstein, and Helwege (2003) and Jorion and Zhang (2009). Rather, we focus
on methods for testing for conditional independence in actual defaults. Also, our focus is
only on models based on observables. We do not estimate intensity models with frailty
as done for example in Azizpour and Giesecke (2008), Duﬃe, Eckner, Horel, and Saita
(2009), and Chava, Stefanescu, and Turnbull (2011).
Before looking at hard evidence, it is interesting to note that when looking through
the default histories in Moody’s default database, it is almost impossible to locate any
1It is also conceivable that defaults could cause the default probabilities of competing ﬁrms to decrease,
which can also be captured by the model speciﬁcations we consider.
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examples where the brief description of what caused a ﬁrm to default mentions other
ﬁrms outside the corporate family. The vast majority of cases list reasons such as too
much leverage, failing sales in declining markets, and lawsuits – eﬀects that are typically
captured through either ﬁrm-speciﬁc explanatory variables or market-wide conditions.
Indeed, looking at the points in time where the defaults seem to cluster more than what
can be explained by the aggregate intensity in the DDKS speciﬁcation, we ﬁnd that none
of the default stories contains any instances of contagion from other ﬁrms in the sample.
This seems to rule out at least the direct domino eﬀect explanation for clustering of
defaults and also raises doubts that earlier defaults in the sample have any eﬀect.
Prior to our study, we inspected all default explanations in Moody’s Default Risk
Service Database. A typical explanation of a default event (our emphasis added) is as
follows:
Heartland Wireless Communications, Inc., based in Plano, Texas,
develops, owns and operates wireless cable television systems and channel
rights in small to mid-size markets in the central United States. Although
the company has experienced strong revenue growth since its inception,
posting $78.8 million in revenues for 1997 compared to $2.2 million in
its ﬁrst full operating year (1994), substantial start-up capital costs and
an aggressive expansion strategy pursued by management resulted in
consecutive operating losses and built up signiﬁcant amounts of debt. Heartland
Wireless incurred a net loss of $134.6 million for 1997, compared to a
net loss of $61.1 million a year earlier. The technological limitations of
Heartland’s major product (MMDS – multichannel multipoint distribution
service – has a limited number of channels it can disseminate), an inability
to achieve suﬃcient subscriber levels, and intense competition from
traditional hard-wire cable television ﬁrms have applied additional pressure to
the company’s ﬁnancial position. Mounting debt service costs and the need
for additional capital induced the company to hire Wasserstein Perella & Co.,
an investment banking ﬁrm, to analyze all available options to ﬁnance the
company’s business plan and service its existing debt. In consultation with its
ﬁnancial advisor, Heartland Wireless announced that it would not be making
interest payment due April 15, 1998 on its 13% senior notes due 4/15/2003.
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It is clear in this explanation that there is no trace of contagion. What might a contagion
story have looked like in the data? The famous Penn Central default – often mentioned
as a contagious default event – has the following description:
On June 21, 1970, the Penn Central declared bankruptcy and sought
bankruptcy protection. As a result, the Penn Central was relieved of
its obligation to pay fees to various Northeastern railroads – the
Lehigh Valley included – for the use of their railcars and other operations.
Conversely, the other railroads’ obligations to pay those fees to the
Penn Central were not waived. This imbalance in payments would
prove fatal to the ﬁnancially frail Lehigh Valley, and it declared bankruptcy
three days after the Penn Central, on June 24, 1970.
The source of this default history is Wikipedia and if we look in Moody’s database, we
learn that Penn Central was in fact a majority shareholder in Lehigh Valley, and hence
they belonged to the same corporate family by Moody’s deﬁnition. Since we exclude
defaults within the same corporate family which occur less than a month apart, this event
would not have been in our data, even if we had extended back to 1970. We did ﬁnd one
example of a contagion story in the Moody’s data, but here only the company at the
receiving end of the contagion channel shows up as part of our ﬁnal data sample, and
hence this speciﬁc example of a contagion event will not aﬀect our empirical analysis.
The ﬂow of our paper is as follows. We describe our data and set up a proportional
hazard model for default intensities of individual ﬁrms. We then estimate the default
intensities of the individual ﬁrms and show that our speciﬁcation “survives” the time
transformation test used in DDKS. Consistent with DDKS, we ﬁnd that their speciﬁcation
of the intensity leads to rejection of most tests. We also consider a method for testing for
contagion using a Hawkes process alternative. Then we explain why the test in DDKS
is really just a misspeciﬁcation test which will not capture important violations of the
doubly stochastic assumption. Our main example involves contagion through explanatory
variables. This example motivates our extended testing for conditional independence
in which we ﬁrst look for contagion eﬀects through ratings which are used as a one-
dimensional proxy for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc explanatory variables. We then perform regression
tests to see if defaults aﬀect levels of distance-to-default and the quick ratio.
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I.2 Data and model speciﬁcation
Our empirical analysis is based on corporate default data from Moody’s Default Risk
Service Database (DRSD), which essentially covers the period since 1970. However, the
material is sparse until 1982, which we therefore choose as the beginning of our sample
period. Other default studies have used the same data supplemented with additional
defaults from other sources, see e.g. Li and Zhao (2006), DDKS, Le (2007), and Davydenko
(2010).2 We have chosen to rely only on the data in the Moody’s database since these all
have explanatory notes associated with each default allowing us to both screen the default
histories for traces of contagion and for parent-subsidiary relationships. It also has the
advantage of giving us an unambiguous deﬁnition of what constitutes a default event.3
Thus our estimation will comprise all U.S. industrial ﬁrms with a debt issue registered
in Moody’s DRSD, and for which we are able to obtain accompanying stock market data
from CRSP and accounting information from CompuStat. This leaves us for the period
January 1982 to December 2005 with a total of 2,557 ﬁrms comprising 370 defaults, with
an average of 1,142 and a minimum of 1,007 ﬁrms in the model at any time throughout
the sample period, all of which have at least 6 months of available data.
The time change test involves transforming the time by a cumulative intensity, which
is the sum of default intensities estimated for each ﬁrm separately. Therefore, we ﬁrst
need to specify a model for each ﬁrm’s default intensity. Formally, the default of a single
debt-issuing ﬁrm i is described by the default time τi, and we assume that the default
2Le (2007) includes defaults registered in the CompuStat database, which he notes in some instances
implies that a registered default does not correspond to an actual default, but merely reﬂects the timing
of a stock delisting event. To resolve a similar diﬃculty, in the case where the actual default date is known
but delisting occurs prior to default, Davydenko (2010) applies an extrapolation technique to infer values
for the necessary stock market variables at the actual default date, although inspection of the default
data in Moody’s DRSD reveals that this occasionally leads to extended periods of time, where inference
can only be based on imputed data.
3We consider as a default any of the following events classiﬁed in Moody’s DRSD: “Chapter 7”, “Chapter
11”, “Distressed exchange”, “Grace period default”, “Missed interest payment”, “Missed principal payment”,
“Missed principal and interest payments”, “Prepackaged Chapter 11”, and “Suspension of payments”. In
particular, we do not correct the timing of a “Distressed exchange”, which in the DRSD is registered as
the time of completion of the exchange, although as suggested by Davydenko (2010), it would probably
be more appropriate to instead collect separate information on the announcement date of the exchange.
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time can be modelled through its stochastic intensity λi. If the ﬁrm is alive at time t, then
the intensity at time t for ﬁrm i satisﬁes
λi(t) = lim
Δt→0
P (t < τi ≤ t + Δt | τi ≥ t,Ft)
Δt
i.e. the probability of default within a small time period Δt after t is close to λi(t)Δt.
λi depends on information available at time t as represented by Ft. This information
contains all intensities of ﬁrms and all default histories up to time t (see the appendix for
a rigorous formulation). In the intensity setting, modelling the probability of default for
ﬁrm i thus reduces to modelling its default intensity λi.
The critical exercise here is to determine the ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macro variables
which are signiﬁcant explanatory variables in the Cox regressions used to specify the
intensity. In the speciﬁcation of individual default intensities we employ a selection of
four macroeconomic variables collected from CRSP and the U.S. Federal Reserve Board:
• 1-year return on the S&P500 index
• 3-month U.S. Treasury rate
• 1-year percentage change in U.S. industrial production, calculated from monthly
data on the gross value of ﬁnal products and nonindustrial supplies (seasonally
adjusted)
• Spread between the 10-year and 1-year Treasury rate
and ﬁve ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables collected from CRSP and CompuStat:
• 1-year equity return
• 1-year distance-to-default
• Quick ratio, calculated as the sum of cash, short-term investments and total
receivables divided by current liabilities
• Percentage short-term debt, calculated as debt in current liabilities divided by the
sum of debt in current liabilities and long-term debt
• Book asset value (log).
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Table I.1. Descriptive statistics for covariates
The table reports empirical averages and standard deviations (in parenthesis) for the explanatory variables
used in the Cox regressions.
Macro variables:
1-year S&P500 return 0.110 (0.164)
3-month Treasury rate 5.469 (2.671)
Industrial production 0.027 (0.029)
Treasury term spread 1.371 (0.955)
Firm-speciﬁc variables:
Defaulting ﬁrms Non-def. ﬁrms All ﬁrms
1-year equity return 0.044 (0.497) 0.119 (0.526) 0.109 (0.523)
1-year distance-to-default 0.612 (1.356) 2.063 (2.854) 1.867 (2.746)
Quick ratio 0.507 (6.237) 0.682 (3.091) 0.658 (3.677)
Short-to-long term debt 0.057 (0.154) 0.094 (0.185) 0.089 (0.181)
Book asset value (log) 1.835 (2.882) 3.170 (3.582) 2.990 (3.526)
Table I.1 shows descriptive statistics for the variables to guide the interpretation of
the regression coeﬃcients obtained below. We also show average levels of the covariates
for defaulting vs. non-defaulting ﬁrms.
For all balance sheet variables we substitute, if quarterly data are missing, with the
latest yearly observation, and for the calculation of the distance-to-default measure we
follow the iterative approach described in Duﬃe, Saita, and Wang (2007). Moreover,
to comply with the mathematical foundations of our model, we require that the value of
λi(t) is known prior to time t, a phenomenon referred to as “predictability” in the technical
literature, such that e.g. as a proxy for the book value of assets on, say January 1st, we
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use the number reported for December of the previous year.4 Finally, in order to correct
for observations of multiple defaults caused by parent-subsidiary relations, we disregard
all consecutive default events that occur within a 1-month horizon of any previously
registered default ascribed to the same parent company.5
Our speciﬁcation of the individual ﬁrm default intensity is
λi(t) = Rite
β′W Wt+β
′
XXit
where Wt is a vector containing the covariates that are common to all ﬁrms and Xit is
a vector of ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables. Rit is an indicator which is 1 if ﬁrm i is alive and
observable at time t and zero otherwise and Ni(t) is the one-jump process which jumps
to 1 if ﬁrm i defaults at time t. The log (partial) likelihood function takes the form (see
Andersen, Ørnulf Borgan, Gill, and Keiding (1992))6
logL(β) =
n∑
i=1
∫ T
0
(
β′WWt + β
′
XXit
)
dNi(t)−
n∑
i=1
∫ T
0
Rite
β′W Wt+β
′
XXit1(τi≥t)dt
where T is the terminal time point of the estimation and n the total number of ﬁrms.
We can then apply standard maximum likelihood techniques to draw inference about
β = (βW , βX). Table I.2 reports estimates and asymptotic standard errors from two
diﬀerent intensity speciﬁcations: Model I which is the model analyzed in DDKS, and
4The issue of delayed public disclosure leads Carling, Jacobson, Lindé, and Roszbach (2007) to argue that
it is more appropriate to use lagged values for both macroeconomic and accounting variables, although it
is not clear exactly how to choose an appropriate lag length. Similarly, Koopman and Lucas (2005) suggest
that macroeconomic variables could be lagged in order to improve causality of the model, arguing that
to the extent that default events are consequences of (and thus lagged wrt.) macroeconomic ﬂuctuations,
they will appear with a certain time lag which should be corrected for. However, they also demonstrate
how estimation results may be highly vulnerable to the choice of lag length.
5Davydenko (2010) similarly chooses to disregard all subsequent defaults within a 2-year period, which may
be a more appropriate horizon. However, our shorter horizon should make it harder to specify intensities
consistent with an assumption of conditional independence.
6We work under the usual assumption of independent ﬁltering by assuming that the various ﬁltering
mechanisms we employ: left truncation for all ﬁrms operating on January 1st 1982 (beginning of the
estimation period), (temporary) withdrawal of ﬁrms in case of lacking covariates, and right censoring
of all ﬁrms operating on December 31st 2005 (end of the estimation period) do not alter the likelihood
function. For thorough discussions of these issues see Andersen, Ørnulf Borgan, Gill, and Keiding (1992)
and Martinussen and Scheike (2006).
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Model II which is an extension that incorporates a wider selection of variables. The signs
of the various β−coeﬃcients are largely as expected and consistent with the ﬁndings of
DDKS (see Duﬃe, Saita, and Wang (2007) for parameter estimates). The key diﬀerences
are the following: a measure of the short rate is replaced with a measure of steepness of
the term structure, we add growth in industrial production (a variable also examined in
DDKS), and the following three ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables: quick ratio, short-to-long debt and
the logarithm of the book value of assets.
Table I.2 also reveals how both model I and II, somewhat surprisingly but consistent
with for example Duﬃe, Saita, and Wang (2007) and Figlewski, Frydman, and Liang
(2008), show a positive dependence of default intensities on the yearly return on the
S&P500 stock index.7
Figure I.1 shows monthly defaults along with the estimated cumulative default
intensities for both models. Clearly, the estimated default intensities are diﬀerent, but
the graph also shows that it is diﬃcult from visual inspection to tell which model gives
the better ﬁt.
We have examined the inﬂuence of additional economy-wide factors besides those
appearing in Model I and II through proxies for the U.S. unemployment rate, the wages of
U.S. production workers, the U.S. consumer price index, the U.S. gross domestic product in
both real and nominal terms, the price of crude oil, and the spread between Moody’s Aaa-
and Baa-rated corporate bonds, but without ﬁnding any signiﬁcant eﬀects. In a similar
fashion, we have looked at a variety of alternative indicators of ﬁnancial soundness at the
ﬁrm-speciﬁc level including some of the empirical default predictors proposed by Altman
(1968) and Zmijewski (1984), but likewise without ﬁnding support for further expansion
of the set of explanatory variables.
Ideally, we should also take speciﬁc account of debt issue characteristics such as the
time of issuance, maturity, face value, coupon payments including possible step up-clauses
etc. given the empirical evidence presented in Davydenko (2010) who demonstrates the
7Duﬃe, Saita, and Wang (2007) suggest that this may in part reﬂect business cycle eﬀects as well as be a
consequence of correlation with the idiosyncratic stock returns, and perhaps also with other variables.
8Calculations are based on the likelihood ratio test statistic and its asymptotic distribution. However,
the (asymptotically equivalent) Wald and score test statistics yield similar conclusions thus indicating a
limited ﬁnite sample bias in the results.
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Table I.2. Parameter estimates (doubly stochastic models)
The macro variables entering the models are the 1-year return on the S&P500 index, the level of the
3-month U.S. Treasury yield, the 1-year percentage change in U.S. industrial production, and the spread
between the 10-year and 1-year U.S. Treasury yields. The ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables are the 1-year stock
return, the 1-year distance-to-default, the quick ratio, short-term debt as a percentage of total debt,
and (log) book value of assets. Asymptotic standard errors are reported in parenthesis and statistical
signiﬁcance is indicated at 5% (*), 1% (**), and 0.1% (***) levels, respectively.8
Model I Model II
Macro variables:
Constant -3.735 *** -3.480 ***
(0.179) (0.299)
1-year S&P500 return 1.566 *** 1.886 ***
(0.318) (0.353)
3-month Treasury rate -0.040
(0.024)
Industrial production -5.723 **
(1.956)
Treasury term spread 0.209 ***
(0.055)
Firm-speciﬁc variables:
1-year equity return -3.131 *** -3.151 ***
(0.202) (0.213)
1-year distance-to-default -0.841 *** -0.794 ***
(0.039) (0.043)
Quick ratio -0.263 ***
(0.085)
Short-to-long term debt 0.651 ***
(0.177)
Book asset value (log) -0.095 **
(0.031)
inﬂuence of this type of information on the probability of default. Similarly, it could
also be of importance to allow for speciﬁc industry eﬀects given the variation in default
rates across industries documented by Li and Zhao (2006). However, the lack of available
debt issue information and the limited number of defaults unfortunately prevents us from
performing either type of analysis on the current data set. Working with larger data sets
and performing out-of-sample tests would naturally lead us to include more variables but
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Figure I.1. Aggregate default intensity 1982-2005
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
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8
Monthly number of U.S. industrial defaults recorded in Moody’s DRSD in the period 1982-2005
and estimated default intensities for the simple (Model I, dashed) and the expanded (Model
II, solid) model.
as we will see in the next section our speciﬁcation is rich enough to capture the correlation
in the data.
I.3 Testing for conditional independence and contagion
Having estimated the default intensities of each ﬁrm, we now follow DDKS and transform
the time scale using the cumulative intensity and test whether on the new time scale
the default arrivals are a unit rate Poisson process. We also propose and test an extended
version of the default intensity which explicitly models the possibility of contagion through
a Hawkes process speciﬁcation.
I.3.1 The time change test
The doubly stochastic assumption is meant to capture a setup in which probabilities of
default of individual ﬁrms are aﬀected by exogenous “background variables”. The variables
are exogenous in the sense that they are not aﬀected by actual defaults of ﬁrms. A helpful
illustration from medical science could be pollution in a city and onsets of asthma attacks
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among its citizens. When the level of pollution is high, there are more asthma attacks
and hence onsets of these attacks are correlated. However, conditioning on the level of
pollution the onsets are independent (assuming that asthma is non-contagious). Also,
asthma attacks do not aﬀect the level of pollution. For an example with more relevance to
default modelling, it is possible that increasing oil prices will cause more ﬁrms who use oil
as an input in their production to default, but that the defaults will have no eﬀect on oil
prices, so conditionally on the level of oil prices defaults are then uncorrelated. In models
of stock returns, conditional independence is often assumed in factor models where the
residual returns, i.e. the part that is not explained by the factors, are independent across
ﬁrms.
The test procedure used in DDKS is easy to describe in fairly non-technical terms.
First, estimate individual ﬁrm intensities using Cox regressions. Then compute the sum
of these intensities. Under the assumption of orthogonality, i.e. that there are never exact
simultaneous defaults, the sum of the intensities is equal to the aggregate default intensity.
Now, transform time using the aggregate intensity and check whether aggregate defaults
in the new time scale are a unit rate Poisson process. Testing this uses a range of diﬀerent
properties of the Poisson process, such as moment properties and exponential waiting
times between jumps.
To describe the test more rigorously, we ﬁrst recall that default times are said to be
orthogonal if P (τi = τj) = 0 whenever i = j. The cumulative number of defaults among
n ﬁrms is deﬁned as
N(t) =
n∑
i=1
1(τi≤t) t ≥ 0
and, as noted in the appendix, if the default times are orthogonal the cumulative default
process has intensity
λ(t) =
n∑
i=1
λi(t)1(τi≥t) t ≥ 0
and the compensator of the cumulative default process is then the integral of the intensity
Λ(t) =
∫ t
0
λ(s)ds t ≥ 0.
Hence, if we time-change the cumulative default process by the compensator, it follows
from Meyer (1971) that the cumulative default process becomes a unit rate Poisson
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process, i.e. the time-scaled process
J(t) = N
(
Λ−1(t)
)
t ≥ 0
is then a unit Poisson process with jump times Vi = Λ(τ(i)), where 0 ≤ τ(1) ≤ τ(2) ≤ . . .
denotes the ordered default times. A consequence of this is that V1,V2 − V1, . . . are
independent exponentially distributed variables and for any c > 0, the binned jump
times
Zj =
n∑
i=1
1]c(j−1),cj](Vi)
will be independent Poisson(c)−distributed variables. In summary, if default times are
orthogonal, we can transform the time scale of the cumulative default process to obtain
a unit rate Poisson process and we can then use standard properties of this process
for testing. Note that conditional independence or the doubly stochastic assumption
is not needed to have orthogonality of the default times. Thus, we really use the time
transformation test as a misspeciﬁcation test. We return to this point in section I.4.
To test whether the default arrivals on the transformed time scale truly follow a
unit rate Poisson process, we use various theoretical properties of such a process: that the
number of arrivals in a time interval is Poisson distributed with a mean equal to the length
of the time interval, that waiting times between jumps are exponentially distributed, that
arrivals in disjoint time intervals are independent, and some moment properties.
If we split up the entire time period into intervals in each of which the cumulative
intensity increases by an integer c, then the number of arrivals in each of these intervals
are independent and Poisson distributed with mean c. We follow DDKS and refer to c as
the bin size, since it reﬂects the expected number of defaults in each time interval. The
larger c is, the smaller is the total number k of time intervals (and hence Poisson variables)
that we get, thereby weakening the power of our statistical tests. On the other hand, by
increasing c we can hope to get a clearer picture of the presence of heavy tails representing
excess clustering of defaults. We use the same test statistics as those of DDKS, i.e. the
Fisher Dispersion (FD) and the upper tail statistics (UT1, UT2)9, and supplement with
further tests detailed in Karlis and Xekalaki (2000). Since we only have a limited number
9We correct for the apparent misprint in DDKS in the description of the upper tail median statistic by
comparing the simulated median statistics to the sample median (instead of the sample mean). However,
this implies that the median statistic by construction only will be eﬃcient for large bin sizes.
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of observations and some of the asymptotic distributions of the test statistics require a
much larger amount of data (see Karlis and Xekalaki (2000)), we calculate instead for
each statistic the p−value under the null hypothesis from a history of 100,000 simulated
test statistics to improve accuracy.
The tests of the Poisson distribution listed above tend to concentrate on whether the
univariate distribution of recorded defaults for a given bin size is Poisson. They therefore
ignore the time series aspects. If default contagion takes place with a time lag, it is
conceivable that bins with many defaults tend to be followed by bins with many defaults
and vice versa. To account for this possibility we use (as an alternative to the regression
test in DDKS) the additional test statistics SC1 and SC2.
The Fisher and upper tail tests are outlined in DDKS, so we only describe the
remaining statistics, which we deﬁne through the following acronyms:
BD =
1
Z
√
2(k − 1)
k∑
j=1
(
Zj − Z
)2 −√k − 1
2
CVM =
1
k
∞∑
i=0
V 2i with Vi =
i∑
s=0
(|{j | Zj = s}| − Expecteds)
KK =
√
k
φk(t)− exp
(
Z(t− 1))
exp
(
Z(t2 − 1))− exp (2Z(t− 1)) (1 + Z(t− 1)2) with φk(t) = 1k
k∑
j=1
tZj
NPA =
1
k3Z
1.45
(
k∑
i,j,l,m=1
Zi(Zi − Zj − 1)Zl(Zl − Zm − 1)1(Zi+Zj=Zl+Zm)
)
SC1 =
1
k − 1
k−1∑
j=1
(
ZjZj+1 − c2
)2
SC2 =
1
k − 1
k−1∑
j=1
(
Zj − c
)(
Zj+1 − c).
The results of the tests are reported in Table I.3. Model I refers as before to the
intensity speciﬁcation used in DDKS and Model II to our intensity speciﬁcation. All except
one test is rejected at the 5% level using the Model II speciﬁcation, whereas a number
of tests are rejected for the Model I speciﬁcation – predominantly for the large bin sizes.
For bin size 8, for example, Figure I.2 shows that the Model II speciﬁcation has a less
pronounced heaviness in the right tail of the distribution and Figure I.3 shows that it is also
better at eliminating serial dependence. Hence we conclude, that using our speciﬁcation
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of the ﬁrm default intensities, we are not able to reject that the time transformed process
is Poisson. Figure I.4 compares visually the two intensity speciﬁcations around two very
active periods around 1990 and between 1998 and 2002. We show actual defaults, the
ﬁtted intensities and the associated time intervals corresponding to an expected number
of defaults equal to 8. The visual inspection conﬁrms that our model is a better ﬁt around
1990. In the latter period, the DDKS model has a higher spike but may be overshooting
around 2000.
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Figure I.2. Distribution of binned data Zj (c = 8)
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Empirical distribution for c = 8 of the binned data Zj (gray) for the simple (Model I, left) and
the expanded (Model II, right) model against their theoretical counterpart (black).
Figure I.3. Sequence of binned data Zj (c = 8)
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The sequence of binned, centered data Zj − c for c = 8 for the model used in DDKS (Model I,
left) and the our expanded model (Model II, right). The graph shows that model II is better
at removing serial dependence.
It is interesting to note that there is a deviation from the Poisson property which is
not detected by the test. In Figure I.5 we have plotted the distribution of default events
by calendar day and we note that most defaults occur on calendar days 1 and 15. This is
consistent with the frequent use of these days for coupon payments on corporate bonds.
It is not enough, however, to aﬀect our test results since the defaults are spread out over a
24-year period and thus we do not see any large default clusters on any particular calendar
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Figure I.4. Time transformation (c = 8)
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Monthly number of observed defaults (thick gray bars) and estimated aggregate intensities
(thick black line) for Model I (above) and Model II (below), 1988–2002. The thin vertical lines
indicate time periods in which the expected number of defaults is equal to 8 based on the
estimated integrated intensity. Model II (our model) tracks the spike in defaults around 1990
better whereas the period up to 2002 seems to pose problems for both models.
day. Subsequent work by Kramer and Löﬄer (2010) indicates that an improvement in ﬁt
can be obtained by explicitly modelling this eﬀect through a baseline intensity.
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Figure I.5. Calender day eﬀects
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Distribution of defaults on dates: 1982 2005
The distribution of U.S. industrial defaults 1982-2005 on calendar day. Most defaults occur
on calendar days 1 and 15. This is consistent with the frequent use of these days for coupon
payments on corporate bonds. It is not enough, however, to aﬀect our test results since the
defaults are spread out over a 24-year period and thus we do not see any large default clusters
on any particular calendar day.
I.3.2 A contagion alternative
All of the tests performed above rely on transforming the time using the estimated
intensities. We now perform a diﬀerent, likelihood-based test which does not rely on
the time transformation. We use an extended model which explicitly includes a contagion
eﬀect in the intensity speciﬁcation. To be speciﬁc, following Hawkes (1971a;b) we use an
intensity of the form10
λci(t) = Rit
(
eβ
′
W Wt+β
′
XXit +
∫ t
0
(
α0 + α1Ys
)
e−α2(t−s)dNs + δ
)
t ≥ 0 (I.1)
where Ys denotes the log book asset value of the ﬁrm defaulting at time s. The idea
behind the speciﬁcation is to allow the default of a ﬁrm to inﬂuence all other intensities.
The immediate eﬀect is modelled as an aﬃne function of Y thus allowing for larger ﬁrms to
have a higher impact on the individual default intensities. The exponential function makes
the default impact decay exponentially with time at a rate. The log (partial) likelihood
10See Kwiecinski and Szekli (1996) for alternative speciﬁcations.
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function follows from this expression by standard arguments (Rubin (1972), Ogata and
Akaike (1982), Andersen, Ørnulf Borgan, Gill, and Keiding (1992))
logL(α, β) =
n∑
i=1
∫ T
0
log
(
eβ
′
W Wt+β
′
XXit +
∫ t
0
(
α0 + α1Ys
)
e−α2(t−s)dNs + δ
)
dNit
−
n∑
i=1
∫ T
0
Rit
(
eβ
′
W Wt+β
′
XXit +
∫ t
0
(
α0 + α1Ys
)
e−α2(t−s)dNs + δ
)
1(τi≥t)dt
and we can apply maximum likelihood inference as before.11 Note that α2 may be taken
as a measure of the horizon of inﬂuence of a default on the overall default proneness of
remaining ﬁrms (Hawkes (1971b)).
We use the Hawkes speciﬁcation to further test for misspeciﬁcation in the Cox
regression used in Model I and II. Since Model I caused a rejection of the Poisson property,
it is possible that this is caused by a contagion eﬀect which the Hawkes speciﬁcation
might capture. However, as shown in Table I.4, there is no explanatory power added by
this speciﬁcation. This further supports the hypothesis that the reason for the rejection
of Model I is the missing covariates. Even if the Model II speciﬁcation did not reject the
Poisson property of the time-transformed cumulative default process, we use the Hawkes
speciﬁcation as a robustness check. As shown in Table I.5, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcance of this
addition in the contagion related parameters. However, we do ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of
adding a constant term to the default intensities. Thus, there is a “ﬂoor” on all default
intensities of 3.5 basis points arising from the constant term δ. This term may be capturing
a small misspeciﬁcation of the proportional hazard regression or of the functional form
of the hazard function. The functional form (using the exponential function of a linear
function of the covariates) forces intensities to be very small when default covariates are
in very “safe territory” far from values held by risky ﬁrms. It is possible that even if true
intensities are not as small for safe ﬁrms as shown in the proportional hazard regression,
this deviation is not penalized heavily in the likelihood function and therefore does not
aﬀect our time-change test. However, if we allow a constant term in the regression, it does
show up as signiﬁcant, but very small.
11Ogata (1978) gives suﬃcient conditions to ensure consistency and asymptotic normality of the estimators
under an additional assumption of stationarity, and Ozaki (1979) presents simulation results that support
numerical feasibility of maximum likelihood estimation for self-exciting processes.
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I.4 Contagion through covariates
Azizpour and Giesecke (2008) estimate a model which involves both frailty and Hawkes
eﬀects. An important diﬀerence to their paper is that we have included both ﬁrm-speciﬁc
and macro variables that are not part of their intensity speciﬁcation. They use DDKS’
speciﬁcation of macro variables (but do not estimate their inﬂuence), whereas we show
that both the Treasury term spread and growth in industrial production are signiﬁcant
additional variables to those employed by DDKS. This may explain why frailty is needed
in their model whereas we do not need it to pass our misspeciﬁcation tests. Azizpour
and Giesecke (2008) also ﬁnd signiﬁcant Hawkes eﬀects in their analysis, but note here
that they also choose, for example, to include a speciﬁc event involving 24 simultaneous
railroad defaults as part of their data sample (which extends further back than ours).
However, when looking in Moody’s default database, one sees that 22 of these defaults
all have Penn Central as their ultimate parent company. That is, these defaults occur
within the same corporate family, and contrary to Azizpour and Giesecke (2008) we have
chosen in this paper not to think of multiple defaults within the same corporate family
as contagion. Including multiple defaults from the same parent also makes the data set
extremely vulnerable to the exact number of diﬀerent subsidiaries of a ﬁrm that happen
to issue bonds. When we look at contagion through covariates in the next section, we will
see a further possible reason for the diﬀerence between our ﬁndings and those of Azizpour
and Giesecke (2008).
I.4 Contagion through covariates
If defaults of ﬁrms cause intensities of other ﬁrms to rise (but never cause an immediate
default) then we have orthogonality but not conditional independence. This means that
the Poisson property of the transformed process can hold even in cases where there is
not conditional independence. Below, we provide the simplest possible example in which
there is contagion in the model but the transformation test will not capture this.
We have shown that with a diﬀerent speciﬁcation of the explanatory variables in the
Cox regressions, we are not able to reject the hypothesis of conditional independence using
this speciﬁcation, but on the same sample we reject using the DDKS speciﬁcation. It is
thus tempting to conclude that contagion eﬀects are eliminated as long as we specify our
covariates carefully. There are, however, possibilities of contagion eﬀects which are not
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captured by the tests performed here and in DDKS. In essence, the time transformation of
the intensity may not capture contagion eﬀects which occur through the covariates. That
is, if the default of ﬁrm A causes, say, the leverage of ﬁrm B to rise, and subsequently
the increased leverage ratio contributes to the default of ﬁrm B, then we will not see this
as a contagious default eﬀect since the tests we are performing are conditioning on the
evolution of the covariates. The increased leverage will cause the default intensity of ﬁrm
B to rise, and therefore this will not be seen as a contagion eﬀect violating conditional
independence. A full test of contagion should address these “weak” contagion eﬀects as
well. In this section we ﬁrst give a basic illustration of the problem we are addressing
using the simplest possible example which is rich enough to capture the eﬀect. We then
set up tests for contagion using rating as a proxy for quality of covariates, and looking at
covariates directly.
I.4.1 Contagion through covariates – an illustration
It is possible using the language of ﬁltrations to give a rigorous deﬁnition of what we are
trying to capture, but we believe that the example below is more useful as a reference for
the discussion and gives a much clearer illustration of the main point.
Consider a collection of ﬁrms whose default risk is entirely determined by their rating
which can be either A or B. Firms with rating A have a default intensity of 0.001 and ﬁrms
in rating class B have a default intensity of 0.01. Assume that there is a “basic” migration
intensity of 0.1 from A to B and the same intensity from B to A. In addition to this basic
migration, there is a contagion eﬀect in ratings in the following sense: every time a ﬁrm
defaults from rating class B, it implies that 1% of the A-rated ﬁrms are instantaneously
downgraded into B. No A or B-rated ﬁrm is thrown directly into default because of the
default of another ﬁrm, but some downgrades from A to B are due to a contagion eﬀect
from the defaults of B-rated ﬁrms. If we simulate a sample of ﬁrms that follow these
dynamics, we subsequently estimate the default intensities of all ﬁrms as a function of
rating, and ﬁnally we transform the time of default arrivals by the cumulative intensities
of all ﬁrms, then we do not see a violation of the conditional independence assumption.
Yet it is clear that this setup has contagion through the (only) covariate, namely the
rating of the ﬁrms.
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We performed a simulation study based on 1,000 ﬁrms initially rated A and 1,000 ﬁrms
initially rated B, and we ran the experiment for 24 years. The estimated default intensities
from class A and B were very close to the actual intensities (0.01 and 0.001). The plainly
estimated transition intensity from A to B was 0.123, i.e. slightly higher than 0.1 due
to the number of forced downgrades. However, this “distorted” intensity estimate did not
aﬀect our time transformation, since we used instead the true intensity, which is known
to us in this designed experiment. We then performed all of the Poisson distribution tests
for the same bin sizes that we did for our data set in the previous section and not a single
test rejected the Poisson distribution assumption.
The point of this example is to establish that the time transformation test is mostly
a misspeciﬁcation test and not so much a joint test of intensity misspeciﬁcation and the
doubly stochastic assumption. By construction, one of the hypotheses is satisﬁed (the
model is correctly speciﬁed) but the other is not (the model is not doubly stochastic).
We have then shown that the test does not reject. This must mean that it is blind in
one of the directions. In summary, conditioning on ﬁrm-speciﬁc covariates and testing
for conditional independence using the cumulative intensities may not reveal “contagion
through the covariates”. We now address a way of testing for such a contagion eﬀect.
I.4.2 Testing for contagion through covariates
As we have just learned from our simulation experiment, it is perfectly possible that there
are contagion eﬀects in the data in the sense that observed defaults aﬀect the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
variables Xit. As explained above and in the appendix, the Cox regression conditioning
on these variables will not detect this source of contagion. We now wish to address this
issue of contagion through covariates more closely. It is diﬃcult to test for each covariate
whether it is aﬀected by defaults of other ﬁrms. We therefore choose to use rating changes
as a proxy for changes in ﬁrm-speciﬁc covariates. For our total sample of 2,557 ﬁrms over
the period 1982 to 2005, we therefore consider all changes in the rating of their publicly
issued debt as recorded in Moody’s DRSD. Speciﬁcally, we investigate whether defaults
cause an increase in the aggregate number of rating downgrades.
To ensure a reasonable comparison of ratings across ﬁrms, abstracting from diﬀerences
caused by special features of the individual debt contracts, we use the Estimated Senior
34
Correlation in corporate defaults: Contagion or conditional independence?
Rating (ESR) as a measure of the overall default risk of the ﬁrm. For ﬁrms without an
ESR, we complement the ESR data by instead using either an issuer rating if available,
or alternatively a corporate family rating, in compliance with the guidelines set up by
Moody’s for the calculation of ESR, see Hamilton (2005). This procedure reduces the
total set of ﬁrms in our data set from 2,557 to 2,503 of which the 2,434 have an ESR and
the remaining 69 ﬁrms a comparable, inferred rating.
We deﬁne the aggregate downgrade intensity for the ﬁrms as
ηt =
n∑
i=1
Rit1(τi≥t)
(
eβ˜
′
W Wt +
∫ t
0
(α˜0 + α˜1Ys)e
−α˜2(t−s)dNs + δ˜
)
t ≥ 0
with Wt as before representing various macro variables to account for changes in rating
intensities caused by business cycle variations and with Rit, Yt and Nt also as previously
deﬁned. We thus allow for the same type of “contagion mechanism” from observed defaults
to the intensity of (future) rating transitions as we studied in section I.3.2. Note, however,
that we only allow for defaults to aﬀect the future downgrade intensity whereas non-
default downgrades do not cause a Hawkes eﬀect. As shown in Table I.6, we ﬁnd a strongly
signiﬁcant eﬀect in that defaults cause the downgrade intensity to increase. We also ﬁnd
that defaults of larger ﬁrms have a larger eﬀect on the downgrade intensity. The decay rate
is close to 2 which means that the eﬀect tapers oﬀ to roughly 1/8 after one year. In Figure
I.6 we show downgrade occurrences (scaled) and the default events. However, the strong
signiﬁcance of these tests may be diﬃcult to attribute to contagion eﬀects. The problem
is that when we measure contagion through the ratings we may really be capturing the
reactions of rating agencies to corporate defaults. These reactions could potentially reﬂect
revisions of rating policies or extra scrutiny in light of a recent default. This extra scrutiny
could lead to updating of the rating agency’s measurement of critical ﬁrm characteristics
and this in turn cause downgrades. As such, the measurement of contagion would be
consistent with contagion taking place through updating of latent variables. However,
our main focus is on whether actual, measurable key ratios are aﬀected by economy-wide
defaults. We therefore turn to conducting such tests.
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Figure I.6. Rating downgrades vs. observed defaults
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Monthly number of registered U.S. industrial defaults and (scaled) number of rating
downgrades among Moody’s rated U.S. industrial ﬁrms (solid line) for the period 1982-2005.
I.4.3 Eﬀects through quick ratios and distance-to-default
In this section we carry out simple regression tests to see if the average levels of distance-
to-default and quick ratio are aﬀected by corporate defaults. Speciﬁcally, we test whether
changes in quick ratio and distance-to-default react to the number of defaults occurring
in a preceding time window of variable length. At the same time, we control for economy-
wide variables that were signiﬁcant in our Cox regressions. The economic motivation for
considering the distance-to-default variable is that the contagion eﬀect through stock
prices demonstrated in Lang and Stulz (1992) would have implications for individual
ﬁrm’s distance-to-default since this variable is computed using the equity price. Similarly,
if trade credits play an economy-wide role in propagating defaults, as argued for example in
Boissay (2006), then since trade credits are short-term assets for the creditor, an increasing
number of observed defaults could lead to a lower quick ratio.
As a representative example of our regression tests, we consider the following regression
Δ(1-year distance-to-default)t = η0 + η1(1-year S&P500 return)t + η2(Industrial production)t
+η3(Treasury term spread)t + η4(Defaults in k mths.)t
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based on monthly observations. Here, Δ(1-year distance-to-default)t is the diﬀerence
between time t and t+1 in the cross-sectional value of distance-to-default across all ﬁrms
at risk, and (Defaults in k mths.)t is the aggregate number of observed defaults within
the last k months prior to t. We choose the k-month time window to be of length 1, 3,
6, 12 and 24 months, and consider for both the quick ratio and distance-to-default the
median, the 10% quantile and the 90% quantile value. Note that since a low quick ratio
and a low distance-to-default both are indicators of high default risk, the 10% quantile
represents riskier ﬁrms. The median level tests for whether there is an eﬀect of default on
the level of the variables overall, whereas the quantiles are meant to capture eﬀects that
aﬀect the tails – either the more risky ﬁrms or the safer ﬁrms. Ideally, we would want to
look in speciﬁc sectors as well, but our data set is too thin for this purpose.
We are unable to ﬁnd any eﬀects from the number of defaults to quick ratios. As
illustrated in Table I.7–Table I.9 the quick ratio seems unaﬀected by any information
related to the number of defaults, regardless of which quantile we consider and regardless
of the width of the default window. However, this is not true for the distance-to-default.
As shown in Table I.10–Table I.12, we ﬁnd that the number of defaults in the prior 6-
and 12-month period do aﬀect the changes in distance-to-default. There is no eﬀect on
the shorter horizons, and only for the 90% quantile do we see an eﬀect from 24-month
defaults.
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To assess the economic signiﬁcance of this impact on the distance-to-default variable,
we can look at both an aggregate and a marginal eﬀect. By multiplying the average
number of defaults within one year, 15.1 in our data set, with the regression coeﬃcient
(−0.003) from Table 10, we see that the distance-to-default variable for an average
ﬁrm is approximately 0.045 lower due to the impact of other ﬁrms having defaulted
within the last 12 months. This eﬀect approximately transforms into an increase in the
average default intensity by a factor of exp(−0.8 · (−0.045)) = 1.037. Similarly, we ﬁnd
that the marginal eﬀect on the distance-to-default variable and hence on the default
probability of one extra ﬁrm defaulting is an approximate increase in the default intensity
of exp(−0.8 · (−0.003)) = 1.0024. Here, it is important to keep in mind that the average
estimated default intensity (cross-sectionally and across time) in our model is 0.0061,
and hence the eﬀect of contagion through the distance-to-default measure will be small
measured in absolute terms.
With better data on the speciﬁc ﬁnancial interactions between ﬁrms and sectors,
we might be able to explain why the 6-month and 12-month windows turn out to be
signiﬁcant, although the problem of establishing causality is inherently diﬃcult, since one
can imagine that the covariates of a given ﬁrm may be aﬀected already prior to the default
of another ﬁrm. In this context it is worth noting that in our current implementation, the
self-exciting default eﬀect represented by the parameters α0,α1,α2 in the Hawkes process
(I.1) is not signiﬁcant once we control for ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables (see Table I.5). However,
unreported results show that it becomes signiﬁcant at the 1% level, if instead we leave
out the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables and only use macro variables in our speciﬁcation of the
default intensity. This ﬁnding is consistent with the idea that previous defaults do aﬀect
the probability of other ﬁrms defaulting in the future, but that we are able to capture this
eﬀect through the inﬂuence on the ﬁrm-speciﬁc explanatory variables. We leave a more
detailed analysis of this topic for future research.
I.5 Conclusion
In this paper we re-investigate the time-change method used by DDKS for testing whether
company defaults in the U.S. can be viewed as doubly stochastic. While DDKS reject the
statistical tests based on the time transformation, we show (on a slightly smaller data
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set) that if we use a diﬀerent speciﬁcation of ﬁrms’ default intensities we cannot reject
the same tests. To show that this is not due to a lack of power, we show that we do reject
in most tests with the intensity speciﬁcation used in DDKS.
The time-change procedure is based on testing Poisson properties of a time-
transformed process of aggregate defaults. We observe that the Poisson property may be
satisﬁed even if defaults are not doubly stochastic. Thus, the fact that we cannot reject
the Poisson property need not be indicative of conditional independence. The reason for
this is that the time transformation, which the test procedure proposed in DDKS relies
on, in fact works for a very large class of models, and therefore in particular will not
capture contagion through observed covariates. It therefore needs to be adjusted if one
wants to rule out such contagion eﬀects. We provide an illustrative example which conveys
the intuition.
To speciﬁcally test for the possibility of contagion through covariates, we ﬁrst use
rating as a summary statistic for the credit quality of individual ﬁrms. The idea is that
if a default of one ﬁrm signiﬁcantly aﬀects another ﬁrm’s credit quality by changing its
explanatory variables, then this should also be reﬂected in the rating. We therefore test
whether rating downgrade intensities are aﬀected by previous defaults, and we ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant contagion eﬀect. Still, this may be an eﬀect caused by the behaviour of rating
agencies rather than actual default intensity changes alone, so we also perform regression
tests to see if the explanatory variables quick ratio and distance-to-default are aﬀected
by the occurrence of defaults after controlling for macroeconomic variables. We ﬁnd no
eﬀects of previous defaults on quick ratio but do ﬁnd an eﬀect on distance-to-default.
This is consistent with the empirical evidence found in Lang and Stulz (1992) in which
equity prices are negatively aﬀected by bankruptcy announcements. Our ﬁndings suggest
that even if we are able to capture the empirical behaviour of default intensities using
a Cox regression involving ﬁrm-speciﬁc covariates, the fact that defaults have an impact
on covariates means that the doubly stochastic assumption is not satisﬁed. Hence, when
modelling future exposures of a credit portfolio, it is not enough to simulate the evolution
of the covariates and then simulate defaults using a doubly stochastic assumption. One
will also have to model the feedback eﬀects of default on the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables. This
suggests an alternative to frailty modelling in that we are relying exclusively on observable
variables. This is a topic for future research.
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Appendix
There are no new results about counting processes in our paper. In this appendix we
simply restate various theoretical results from standard point process theory that we
need for our exposition in the paper. We explain here why the time transformation used
in the study of DDKS only needs orthogonality of the counting processes, we take care of
a technical problem related to the fact that intensities die out in our model, and ﬁnally we
address an issue related to bias in the empirical application of the transformation result.
Let τi denote the default time of ﬁrm i. For the deﬁnition of the intensity, it is
convenient to work with the single jump counting process Ni which starts at zero and
jumps to one at the time of the default, i.e
Ni(t) = 1(τi≥t).
All of our processes are deﬁned on a probability space (Ω,F ,P ) and information on the
point processes and on their intensities is given by the ﬁltration (Ft)t≥0.
Recall that a counting process Ni is said to have intensity λi with respect to the
ﬁltration (Ft)t≥0 if
Ni(t)−
∫ t
0
λi(s) ds
is an Ft−martingale. In our analysis we study ﬁrms over a time period [0,T ], and for
a ﬁrm that is not under observation at time 0, the intensity is set to 0 until it enters
the sample. Similarly, the intensity again falls to 0, when the company exits the sample
(because of default or for some other reason, e.g. delisting).
Two point processes Ni and Nj are orthogonal if the probability of having simultaneous
jumps is 0, i.e
P
(
ΔNi(t)ΔNj(t)
)
= 0
for all t. If we deﬁne N as the aggregate counting process N(t) =
∑n
i=1 Ni(t), then the
following is immediate: if N1,N2, . . . are pairwise orthogonal and have Ft−intensities
λ1,λ2, . . . , then N is a counting process with Ft−intensity λ =
∑n
i=1 λi. This observation
follows immediately by noting that orthogonality ensures that N jumps at most by 1 and
from the fact that
N(t)−
∫ t
0
λ(s)ds =
n∑
i=1
(
Ni(t)−
∫ t
0
λi(s)
)
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is a sum of martingales and therefore itself a martingale.
A counting process N on the line which has an intensity process can be transformed
into a Poisson process under a very simple condition: let N have intensity λ, deﬁne
Λ(t) =
∫ t
0
λ(s) ds, and assume that Λ(t) →∞ almost surely. Then the process deﬁned as
N˜(t) = N
(
Λ−1(t)
)
is a unit rate Poisson process. This result is usually ascribed to Meyer
(1971) with a multitude of successive variations and extensions in e.g. Papangelou (1972),
Brémaud (Brémaud), Aalen and Hoem (1978), Cocozza and Yor (1980), Brown and Nair
(1988) and Kallenberg (1990).12
The condition in Meyer’s result that the integrated intensity Λ(t) converges to inﬁnity
almost surely merely ensures that the counting process N “does not run out of jumps” to
form the transformed Poisson process N˜ . With several thousand ﬁrms in our sample and
new ﬁrms entering the sample continually, this assumption is harmless for our application.
Even if new ﬁrms do not enter the sample, it is clear that we can alter the process N
ever so slightly by adding a Poisson process with rate 	 > 0 to N . No matter how
small 	 is, this modiﬁed process N  satisﬁes the requirement of Meyer’s theorem, and the
transformation of N  by the cumulated intensity is indistinguishable for 	 very small from
the transformation of N by Λ.
As a ﬁnal remark on the practical implementation of Meyer’s theorem, note that since
we do not know the true integrated intensity Λ, we must use the estimated integrated
intensity resulting from our maximum likelihood estimation. This, in principle, leads to a
minor bias in the time transformation. However, the magnitude of this bias seems to be
of minor importance in our tests. For more details on this problem, we refer the reader to
Schoenberg (2002).
12See Aalen and Hoem (1978) for a brief historical review.
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We present a new estimation approach that allows us to extract from
spreads in synthetic credit markets the contribution of systematic and
idiosyncratic default risk to total default risk. Using an extensive data
set of 90,600 CDS and CDO tranche spreads on the North American
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intensity-based model for correlated defaults. Our results show that
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II.1 Introduction
Campbell and Taksler (2003) show that idiosyncratic ﬁrm-level volatility is a major driver
of corporate bond yield spreads and that there has been an upward trend over time in
idiosyncratic equity volatility in contrast to market-wide volatility. This suggests that in
order to understand changing asset prices over time, it is important to separate out
and understand the dynamics of both idiosyncratic and systematic volatility. In this
paper, we present a new approach to separate out the size and time series behaviour of
idiosyncratic and systematic (default intensity) volatility by using information in synthetic
credit markets.
Markets for credit derivatives have experienced massive growth in recent years (see
Duﬃe (2008)) and numerous models specifying default and correlation dynamics have
been proposed. A good model of multi-name default should ideally have the following
properties (see Collin-Dufresne (2009) for a discussion). First, the model should be able
to match prices consistently such that for a ﬁxed set of model parameters, prices are
matched over a period of time. This is important for pricing non-standard products in
a market where prices are available for standard products. Second, the model should
have parameters that are economically interpretable, such that parameter values can be
discussed and critically evaluated. If a non-standard product needs to be priced and
parameters cannot be inferred from existing market prices, economic interpretability
provides guidance in choosing parameters. Third, credit spreads and their correlation
should be modelled dynamically such that options on multi-name products can be priced.
And fourth, since market makers quote spreads at any given time, pricing formulas should
not be too time-consuming to evaluate.
In single-name default modelling the stochastic intensity-based framework introduced
in Lando (1994) and Duﬃe and Singleton (1999) has proven very successful and is
widely used.1 Default of a ﬁrm in an intensity-based model is determined by the ﬁrst
jump of a pure jump process with a stochastic default intensity. We follow Duﬃe and
Gârleanu (2001) and model the default intensity of a ﬁrm as the sum of an idiosyncratic
and a common component, where the latter aﬀects the default intensity of all ﬁrms in
1Examples of empirical applications are Duﬃe and Singleton (1997), Duﬀee (1999), and Longstaﬀ, Mithal,
and Neis (2005).
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the economy. In this setting, credit spreads are matched, parameters are interpretable,
and pricing of options is possible. But even though the framework has many attractive
properties it has not been used much because estimation poses a challenge.
We present in this paper a new approach to estimate intensity-based models from
spreads observed in synthetic credit markets. The main challenge so far has been that the
estimation of a model based on an index with 125 names requires simultaneous estimation
of a common factor and 125 idiosyncratic factors. The solution has been to impose strong
parameter restrictions on the idiosyncratic factors (see among others Mortensen (2006)
and Eckner (2007; 2009)). We specify the process for systematic default risk and show
how idiosyncratic risk can be left unmodelled. This reduces the problem of estimating 126
factors to estimating one factor. Subsequently, we parameterize and estimate idiosyncratic
default factors one at a time. Thus, our approach reduces the problem of estimating
126 factors simultaneously to 126 single-factor estimations. Furthermore, restrictions on
idiosyncratic factors are not necessary.
We apply our approach to the North American Investment Grade CDX index, and
estimate both systematic and idiosyncratic default risk as aﬃne jump-diﬀusion processes
using CDS and CDO spreads. Papers imposing strong parameter restrictions have found
that intensity-based jump-diﬀusion models can match the levels but not the time series
behaviour of CDO tranche spreads (see Eckner (2007) for a discussion). We ﬁnd that the
models can in fact match not only the levels but also the time series behaviour in tranche
spreads. That is, once parameter restrictions are not imposed, the model gains the ability
to match time series dynamics of systematic and unsystematic default risk. We also ﬁnd
that idiosyncratic default risk is a major driver of total default risk consistent with the
ﬁndings in Campbell and Taksler (2003). Furthermore, we conﬁrm the ﬁnding in Zhang,
Zhou, and Zhu (2009) that both diﬀusion volatility and jumps are important for default
risk. More importantly, our analysis allows us to separate idiosyncratic and systematic
default risk into a diﬀusion and a jump part, and this yields new insights: compared to
systematic default risk, idiosyncratic default risk has a higher diﬀusion volatility, a higher
contribution from jumps, and is less explosive.
An alternative modelling approach to that of ours is to model aggregate portfolio
loss and ﬁt the model to CDO tranche spreads. This is the approach taken in for
example Longstaﬀ and Rajan (2008), Errais, Giesecke, and Goldberg (2010), and Giesecke,
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Goldberg, and Ding (2011). Since the default intensity of individual ﬁrms is not modelled,
this approach is not useful for examining individual default risk, whether it is systematic
or unsystematic.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II.2 formulates the multi-name default
model and derives CDO tranche pricing formulas. Section II.3 explains the estimation
methodology, and section II.4 describes the data. Section II.5 examines the ability of the
model to match CDO tranche spreads and examines the properties of systematic default
risk, while idiosyncratic default risks are examined in section II.6 . Section II.7 concludes.
II.2 Intensity-based default risk model
This section explains the model framework that we employ for pricing single- and
multi-name credit securities. For single-name Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) we use the
intensity-based framework introduced in Lando (1994) and Duﬃe and Singleton (1999).
For multi-name Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) valuation we follow Duﬃe and
Gârleanu (2001) and model the default intensity of each underlying issuer as the sum
of an idiosyncratic and a common process. Default correlation among issuers thus arises
through the joint dependence of individual default intensities on the common factor.
Furthermore, we generalize the model in Duﬃe and Gârleanu (2001) by allowing for
a ﬂexible speciﬁcation of the idiosyncratic processes, while maintaining semi-analytical
calculation of the loss distribution as in Mortensen (2006). This extension allows us to
avoid the ad hoc parameter restrictions that are common in the existing literature.
II.2.1 Default modelling
We assume that the time of default of a single issuer, τ , is modelled through an intensity
(λt)t≥0, which implies that the risk-neutral probability at time t of defaulting within a
short period of time Δt is approximately
Qt(τ ≤ t + Δt|τ > t) ≈ λtΔt.
Unconditional default probabilities are given by
Qt(τ ≤ s) = 1− EQt
[
exp
(
−
∫ s
t
λudu
)]
(II.1)
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which shows that default probabilities in an intensity-based framework can be calculated
using techniques from interest rate modelling.
In our model we consider a total of N diﬀerent issuers. To model correlation between
individual issuers we follow Mortensen (2006) and assume that the intensity of each issuer
is given as the sum of an idiosyncratic component and a scaled common component
λi,t = aiYt + Xi,t (II.2)
where a1, . . . , aN are non-negative constants and Y ,X1,X2, . . . ,XN are independent
stochastic processes. The common factor Y creates dependence in default occurrences
among the N issuers and may be viewed as reﬂecting the overall state of the economy,
while Xi similarly represents the idiosyncratic default risk for ﬁrm i. Thus, ai indicates the
sensitivity of ﬁrm i to the performance of the macroeconomy, and we allow this parameter
to vary across ﬁrms, contrary to Duﬃe and Gârleanu (2001) that assume ai = 1 for all i
and thereby enforce a homogeneous impact of the macroeconomy on all issuers.
We assume that the common factor follows an aﬃne jump diﬀusion under the risk-
neutral measure
dYt = (κ0 + κ1Yt)dt + σ
√
YtdW
Q
t + dJ
Q
t (II.3)
where WQ is a Brownian motion, jump times (independent of WQ) are those of a Poisson
process with intensity l ≥ 0, and jump sizes are independent of the jump times and follow
an exponential distribution with mean μ > 0. This process is well-deﬁned for κ0 > 0. As
a special case, if the jump intensity is equal to zero the default intensity then follows a
CIR process.
We do not impose any distributional assumptions on the evolution of the idiosyncratic
factors X1, ...,XN . In particular, they are not required to be aﬃne jump diﬀusions.
This generalizes the setup in Duﬃe and Gârleanu (2001), Mortensen (2006), and Eckner
(2009), where the idiosyncratic factors are required to be aﬃne jump diﬀusions with very
restrictive assumptions on their parameters.
II.2.2 Risk premium
For the basic aﬃne process in equation (II.3) we assume an essentially aﬃne risk premium
for the diﬀusive risk and constant risk premia for the risk associated with the timing and
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sizes of jumps. Cheridito, Filipovic, and Kimmel (2007) propose an extended aﬃne risk
premium as an alternative to an essentially aﬃne risk premium, which would allow the
parameter κ0 to be adjusted under P in addition to the adjustment of κ1. However,
extended aﬃne models require the Feller condition to hold and since this restriction is
likely to be violated, as discussed in Feldhütter (2008), we choose the more parsimonious
essentially aﬃne risk premium.2
This leads to the following dynamics for the common factor under the historical
measure P
dYt = (κ0 + κ
P
1 Yt)dt + σ
√
YtdW
P
t + dJ
P
t (II.4)
where W P is a Brownian motion, jump times (independent of W P ) are those of a Poisson
process with intensity lP , and jump sizes are independent of the jump times and follow
an exponential distribution with mean μP > 0.
II.2.3 Aggregate default distribution
Our model allows for semi-analytic calculation of the distribution of the aggregate number
of defaults among the N issuers. More speciﬁcally, we can at time t calculate in semi-closed
form the distribution of the aggregate number of defaults at time s ≥ t by conditioning
on the common factor. If we let
Zt,s =
∫ s
t
Yudu
denote the integrated common factor, then it follows from (II.1) and (II.2) that conditional
on Zt,s, defaults are independent and the conditional default probabilities given as
pi,t(s|z) := Qt(τi ≤ s|Zt,s = z) = 1− exp(−aiz)EQt
[
exp
(
−
∫ s
t
Xi,udu
)]
. (II.5)
The total number of defaults at time s among the N issuers, DNs , is then found by the
recursive algorithm3
Qt(D
N
s = j|z) = Qt(DN−1s = j|z)(1− pN ,t(s|z)) + Qt(DN−1s = j − 1|z)pN ,t(s|z)
2To illustrate why the Feller condition is necessary in extended aﬃne models consider the simple diﬀusion
case, dYt = (κ
Q
0 + κ
Q
1 Yt)dt + σ
√
YtdW
Q. The risk premium Λt = λ0√Yt + λ1
√
Yt keeps the process aﬃne
under P but the risk premium explodes if Yt = 0. To avoid this, the Feller restriction κ0 > σ
2
2 under both
P and Q ensures that Yt is strictly positive.
3The last term disappears if j = 0.
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due to Andersen, Sidenius, and Basu (2003). The unconditional default distribution is
therefore given as
Qt(D
N
s = j) =
∫ ∞
0
Qt(D
N
s = j|z)ft,s(z)dz (II.6)
where ft,s is the density function for Zt,s. Finally, ft,s can be determined by Fourier
inversion of the characteristic function φZt,s for Zt,s as
ft,s(z) =
1
2π
∫ ∞
−∞
exp(−iuz)φZt,s(u)du (II.7)
where we apply the closed-form expression for φZt,s derived in Duﬃe and Gârleanu (2001).4
II.2.4 Synthetic CDO pricing
CDOs began to trade frequently in the mid-nineties and in the last decade issuance of
CDOs has experienced massive growth, see BIS (2007). In a CDO the credit risk of a
portfolio of debt securities is passed on to investors by issuing CDO tranches written
on the portfolio. The tranches have varying risk proﬁles according to their seniority. A
synthetic CDO is written on CDS contracts instead of actual debt securities. To illustrate
the cash ﬂows in a synthetic CDO an example that reﬂects the data used in this paper is
useful.
Consider a CDO issuer, called A, who sells credit protection with notional $0.8 million
in 125 5-year CDS contracts for a total notional of $100 million. Each CDS contract is
written on a speciﬁc corporate bond, and agent A receives quarterly a CDS premium until
the CDS contract expires or the bond defaults. In case of default, agent A receives the
defaulted bond in exchange for face value. The loss is therefore the diﬀerence between
face value and market value of the bond.5
Agent A at the same time issues a CDO tranche on the ﬁrst 3% of losses in his CDS
portfolio and agent B "buys" this tranche, which has a principal of $3 million. No money
is exchanged at time 0, when the tranche is sold. If the premium on the tranche is, say,
2,000 basis points, agent A pays a quarterly premium of 500 basis points to agent B on
the remaining principal. If a default occurs on any of the underlying CDS contracts, the
4Duﬃe and Gârleanu (2001) derive an explicit solution for EQt [exp(q
∫ s
t
Yudu)] when q is a real number,
but as noted by Eckner (2009) the formula works equally well for q complex.
5Pricing CDS contracts is explained in Appendix II.A.
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loss is covered by agent B and his principal is reduced accordingly. Agent B continues to
receive the premium on the remaining principal until either the CDO contract matures or
the remaining principal is exhausted. Since the ﬁrst 3% of portfolio losses are covered by
this tranche it is called the 0%− 3% tranche. Agent A similarly sells 3%− 7%, 7%− 10%,
10% − 15%, 15% − 30%, and 30% − 100% tranches such that the total principal equals
the principal in the CDS contracts. For a tranche covering losses between K1 and K2, K1
is called the attachment point and K2 the exhaustion point.
Next, we ﬁnd the fair spread at time t on a speciﬁc CDO tranche. Consider a tranche
that covers portfolio losses between K1 and K2 from time t0 = t to tM = T , and assume
that the tranche has quarterly payments at time t1, . . . , tM . The tranche premium is
found by equating the value of the protection and premium payments. We denote the
total portfolio loss in percent at time s as Ls, i.e. the percentage number of defaults
DNs /N times 1− δ, where δ is the recovery rate, which we assume to be constant at 40%.
The tranche loss is then given as
TK1,K2(Ls) = max{min{Ls,K2} −K1, 0}
and the value of the protection payment in a CDO tranche with maturity T is therefore
Prot(t,T ) = EQt
[∫ T
t
exp
(
−
∫ s
t
rudu
)
dTK1,K2(Ls)
]
while the value of the premium payments is the annual tranche premium S(t,T ) times
Prem(t,T )
= EQt
[
M∑
j=1
exp
(
−
∫ tj
t
rudu
)
(tj − tj−1)
∫ tj
tj−1
K2 −K1 − TK1,K2(Ls)
tj − tj−1 ds
]
where ru is the riskfree interest rate and
∫ tj
tj−1
K2−K1−TK1,K2 (Ls)
tj−tj−1 ds is the remaining principal
during the period tj−1 to tj. The CDO tranche premium at time t is thus given as
S(t,T ) = Prot(t,T )
Prem(t,T )
.
We follow Mortensen (2006) and discretize the integrals appearing in Prot(t,T ) and
Prem(t,T ) at premium payment dates, we assume that the riskfree rate is uncorrelated
with portfolio losses, and that defaults occur halfway between premium payments. Under
these assumptions the value of the protection payment is
Prot(t,T ) =
M∑
j=1
P
(
t,
tj + tj−1
2
)(
EQt [TK1,K2(Ltj)]− EQt [TK1,K2(Ltj−1)]
)
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while the expression for the premium payments reduces to
Prem(t,T )
=
M∑
j=1
(tj − tj−1)P (t, tj)
(
K2 −K1 −
EQt [TK1,K2(Ltj−1)] + E
Q
t [TK1,K2(Ltj)]
2
)
where P (t, s) = EQt [exp(−
∫ s
t
rudu)] is the price at time t of a riskless zero coupon bond
maturing at time s.
II.3 Estimation
The parameters in our intensity model are estimated in three separate steps. First
we imply out ﬁrm-speciﬁc term structures of risk-neutral survival probabilities from
daily observations of CDS spreads, second, we use the inferred survival probabilities to
estimate each issuer’s sensitivity ai to the economy-wide common factor Y , and ﬁnally
we estimate the parameters and the path of the common factor using a Bayesian MCMC
approach.6 An important ingredient in the third step is our explicit use of the calibrated
survival probabilities, which implies that we do not need to impose any structure on the
idiosyncratic factors Xi.
In other words, we can estimate the model without putting speciﬁc structure on the
idiosyncratic factors and this has several advantages, which we discuss in section II.3.1.
Note also that our estimation approach is consistent with the common view that CDS
contracts may be used to read oﬀ market views of marginal default probabilities, whereas
basket credit derivatives instead reﬂect the correlation patterns among the underlying
entities, see e.g. Mortensen (2006).
In an additional fourth step of the estimation procedure, we take in section II.6 a closer
look at the cross-section of the idiosyncratic factors implicitly given by the inferred survival
probabilities and the estimated common factor. Here, we impose a dynamic structure on
each Xi and then estimate the parameters for each idiosyncratic factor separately, again
using MCMC methods.
6For a general introduction to MCMC see Robert and Casella (2004) and for a survey of MCMC methods
in ﬁnancial econometrics see Johannes and Polson (2006).
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II.3.1 A General Estimation Approach
For each day in our data sample we observe 5 CDO tranche spreads as well as CDS
spreads for a range of maturities for each of the 125 ﬁrms underlying the CDO tranches.
Previous literature on CDO pricing has also studied models of the form (II.2), but only by
imposing strong assumptions on the parameters of the idiosyncratic factors Xi, as well as
by disregarding the information in the term structure of CDS spreads (Mortensen (2006),
Eckner (2007; 2009)). In this paper, we remove both of these shortcomings by allowing
the idiosyncratic factors to be of a very general form, while we at the same time use all
the available information from each issuer’s term structure of CDS spreads.
Theoretically, if we had CDS contracts for any maturity we could extract survival
probabilities for any future time-horizon, but in practice CDS contracts are only traded for
a limited range of maturities. To circumvent this problem we assume a ﬂexible parametric
form for the term structure of risk-neutral survival probabilities, and use that to infer
survival probabilities from the observed CDS spreads.7 That is, on any given day t and
for any given ﬁrm i we extract from the observed term structure of CDS spreads the term
structure of marginal survival probabilities s 
→ qi,t(s), where
qi,t(s) = Qt(τi > s) = E
Q
t
[
exp
(
−
∫ s
t
(aiYu + Xi,u)du
)]
,
see appendix II.B for details. Once we condition on the value of the common factor, this
directly gives us the idiosyncratic component
EQt
[
exp
(
−
∫ s
t
Xi,udu
)]
of the risk-neutral survival probability. Thus, we can use observed CDS spreads to derive
values of the function s 
→ EQt [exp(−
∫ s
t
Xi,udu)], which is all we need to calculate the
aggregate default distribution (and hence compute CDO tranche spreads) using equation
(II.5). Therefore, we do not need to explicitly model the stochastic behaviour of each Xi
in order to price CDO tranches.
For each ﬁrm i in our sample, the parameter ai measures that ﬁrm’s sensitivity to
the overall state of the economy, and this parameter can be estimated directly from
the inferred term structures of survival probabilities s 
→ qi,t(s). Intuitively, ai measures
7This procedure is essentially similar to the well-known technique for inferring a term structure of interest
rates from observed prices of coupon bonds, see Nelson and Siegel (1987).
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to what extent the default probability of ﬁrm i is correlated with the average default
probability (since this average mainly reﬂects exposure to the systematic risk factor Y ),
and therefore a consistent estimate of ai is given by the slope coeﬃcient in the regression
of ﬁrm i’s short-term default probability on the average short-term default probability of
all 125 issuers.8 Appendix II.C provides the technical details.
Once we have inferred marginal default probabilities from CDS spreads and estimated
common factor loadings ai, we can then, given the parameters and current value of the
common factor Y , price CDO tranches.
II.3.2 MCMC Methodology
In order to write the CDO pricing model on state space form, the continuous-time
speciﬁcation in equation (II.4) is approximated using an Euler scheme
Yt+1 − Yt = (κ0 + κP1 Yt)Δt + σ
√
ΔtYt	
Y
t+1 + Jt+1Zt+1 (II.8)
where Δt is the time between two observations and
	Yt+1 ∼ N(0, 1)
Zt+1 ∼ exp(μP )
P (Jt+1 = 1) = l
PΔt.
To simplify notation in the following, we let ΘQ = (κ0,κ1, l,μ,σ), ΘP = (κP1 , lP ,μP ), and
Θ = (ΘQ, ΘP ).
On each day t = 1, ...,T , 5 CDO tranche spreads are recorded and stacked in the 5×1
vector St, and we let S denote the 5×T matrix with St in the t’th column. The logarithm
of the observed CDO spreads are assumed to be observed with measurement error, so the
observation equation is
log(St) = log(f(Θ
Q,Yt)) + 	t, 	t ∼ N(0, Σ) (II.9)
where f is the CDO pricing formula. Appendix II.D gives details on how to calculate f
in the estimation of the common factor Y . For the estimation of each of the idiosyncratic
factors Xi in section II.6, Y is replaced by Xi and f is instead the model-implied
8The average of the a′is are without loss of generality normalized to 1.
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idiosyncratic part of the survival probability, i.e. EQt [exp(−
∫ t+s
t
Xi,udu)], calculated for
each of the time horizons s = 0.5, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 years.
The interest lies in samples from the target distribution p(Θ,Σ,Y , J ,Z|S). The
Hammersley-Cliﬀord Theorem (Hammersley and Cliﬀord (1970), Besag (1974)) implies
that samples are obtained from the target distribution by sampling from a number
of conditional distributions. Eﬀectively, MCMC solves the problem of simulating from
a complicated target distribution by simulating from simpler conditional distributions.
If one samples directly from a full conditional the resulting algorithm is the Gibbs
sampler (Geman and Geman (1984)). If it is not possible to sample directly from the
full conditional distribution one can sample by using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm
(Metropolis, Rosenbluth, Rosenbluth, Teller, and Teller (1953)). We use a hybrid MCMC
algorithm that combines the two since not all conditional distributions are known.
Speciﬁcally, the MCMC algorithm is given by (where Θ\θi is deﬁned as the parameter
vector Θ without parameter θi)9
p(θi|ΘQ\θi , ΘP , Σ,Y , J ,Z,S) ∼ Metropolis-Hastings
p(κP1 |ΘQ, ΘP\κP1 , Σ,Y , J ,Z,S) ∼ Normal
p(lP |ΘQ, ΘP\lP , Σ,Y , J ,Z,S) ∼ Beta
p(μP |ΘQ, ΘP\μP , Σ,Y , J ,Z,S) ∼ Inverse Gamma
p(Σ|Θ,Y , J ,Z,S) ∼ Inverse Wishart
p(Y |Θ,Σ, J ,Z,S) ∼ Metropolis-Hastings
p(J |Θ,Σ,Y ,Z,S) ∼ Bernoulli
p(Z|Θ,Σ,Y , J ,S) ∼ Exponential or Restricted Normal
Details of the derivations of the conditional and proposal distributions in the Metropolis-
Hastings steps are given in Appendix II.E. Both the parameters and the latent processes
are subject to constraints and if a draw is violating a constraint it can simply be discarded
(Gelfand, Smith, and Lee (1992)).
9All random numbers in the estimation are draws from Matlab 7.0’s generator which is based on Marsaglia
and Zaman (1991)’s algorithm. The generator has a period of almost 21430 and therefore the number of
random draws in the estimation is not anywhere near the period of the random number generator.
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II.4 Data
In our estimation we use daily CDS and CDO quotes from MarkIt Group Limited. MarkIt
receives data from more than 50 global banks and each contributor provides pricing data
from its books of record and from feeds to automated trading systems. These data are
aggregated into composite numbers after ﬁltering out outliers and stale data and a price
is published only if a minimum of three contributors provide data.
We focus in this paper on CDS and CDO prices (i.e. spreads) for defaultable entities
in the Dow Jones CDX North America Investment Grade (NA IG) index. The index
contains 125 North American investment grade entities and is updated semi-annually. For
our sample period March 21, 2006 to September 20, 2006, the latest version of the index
is CDX NA IG Series 6. We speciﬁcally select the most liquid CDO tranches, the 5-year
tranches, with CDX NA IG 6 as the underlying pool of reference CDSs. These tranches
mature on June 20, 2011. Daily spreads of the ﬁve CDO tranches we consider: 0%− 3%,
3%− 7%, 7%− 10%, 10%− 15%, and 15%− 30%, are not available for the ﬁrst 7 days of
the period, so the data we use in the estimation covers the period from March 30, 2006
to September 20, 2006. There are holidays on April 14, April 21, June 3, July 4, and
September 4, thus leaving a total of 120 days with spreads available.
The quoting convention for the equity tranche (i.e. the 0%− 3% tranche) diﬀers from
that of the other tranches. Instead of quoting a running premium, the equity tranche
is quoted in terms of an upfront fee. Speciﬁcally, an upfront fee of 30% means that the
investor receives 30% of the tranche notional at time 0 plus a ﬁxed running premium of
500 basis points per year, paid quarterly.10
In addition to the CDO tranche spreads, we also use 0.5-, 1-, 2-, 3-, 4-, and 5-year
10Upfront payments may be converted to running spreads using so-called “risky duration”, see e.g. Amato
and Gyntelberg (2005). This calculation requires a fully parametric model, and hence is not possible
within our modelling framework. Instead we use the original upfront payment quotes available from
MarkIt for the equity tranche.
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CDS spreads for each of the 125 index constituents.11 The total number of observations in
the estimation of the multi-name default model is therefore 90,600: 125×6 CDS spreads
and 5 CDO tranche spreads observed on 120 days. Table II.1 shows summary statistics
of the CDS and CDO data.
As a proxy for riskless rates we use LIBOR and swap rates since Feldhütter and
Lando (2008) show that swap rates are a more accurate proxy for riskless rates than
Treasury yields. Thus, prices of riskless zero coupon bonds with maturities up to 1 year
are calculated from 1-12 month LIBOR rates (taking into account money market quoting
conventions), and for longer maturities are bootstrapped from 1-, 2-, 3-, 4-, and 5-year
swap rates (using cubic spline to infer swap rates for semi-annual maturities). This gives
a total of 20 zero coupon bond prices on any given day (maturities of 1-12 months, 1.5, 2,
2.5, . . ., 5 years) from which zero coupon bond prices at any maturity up to 5 years can
be found by interpolation (again using cubic spline).
II.5 Results
II.5.1 Marginal Default Probabilities
As the ﬁrst step in the estimation of the multi-name default model, we calibrate for
each ﬁrm daily term structures of risk-neutral default probabilities using all the available
information from CDS contracts with maturities up to 5 years. With 125 ﬁrms and a
sample period of 120 days, we calibrate a total of 125×120=15,000 term structures of
default probabilities, with each term structure based on 6 CDS contracts.
Figure II.1 plots for each day in the sample the average term structure of default
probabilities across the 125 ﬁrms. By deﬁnition, the term structures are upward sloping
since the probability of defaulting increases as maturity increases. Also, the graph shows
11The 5-year CDS contracts for the period March 21, 2006 to June 19, 2006 mature on June 20, 2011,
consistent with the maturity of the 5-year CDO tranches, but for the period June 20 to September 19,
2006, the maturity of the 5-year CDS contracts is September 20, 2011 (and the maturity of the other CDS
contracts are similarly shifted forward by 3 months from June 20 and onwards). However, this maturity
mismatch between the CDS and CDO contracts in the latter part of our sample period is automatically
corrected for, when we imply out the term structures of ﬁrm-speciﬁc survival probabilities from observed
CDS spreads (see appendix II.B), and hence poses no problem to the estimation of the model.
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Table II.1. Summary statistics
Panel A reports summary statistics for CDS spreads of the 125 constituents of the CDX NA IG 6 index
over the period March 30, 2006 to September 20, 2006. Panel B reports summary statistics for the ﬁve
CDO tranches: 0%− 3%, 3%− 7%, 7%− 10%, 10%− 15%, and 15%− 30% of the CDX NA IG 6 index
over the same period.
Panel A: CDS spreads for CDX NA IG 6 constituents
Maturity 0.5 yr 1 yr 2 yrs 3 yrs 4 yrs 5 yrs
(in bps) (in bps) (in bps) (in bps) (in bps) (in bps)
Mean 6.78 8.75 14.58 21.52 30.52 39.14
Std. 5.77 6.62 11.25 16.74 23.44 29.82
Median 4.86 6.56 10.72 16.07 22.51 29.03
Min. 0.41 1.73 2.65 2.94 3.99 5.45
Max. 56.46 59.82 103.73 140.48 181.60 222.19
Observations 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000
Panel B: CDO tranche spreads for CDX NA IG 6 tranches
Tranche 0%− 3% 3%− 7% 7%− 10% 10%− 15% 15%− 30%
(in %) (in bps) (in bps) (in bps) (in bps)
Mean 29.95 91.83 20.43 9.33 5.13
Std. 2.92 15.37 4.27 1.58 0.74
Median 30.29 92.48 20.31 9.06 5.17
Min. 21.97 65.52 13.96 6.40 3.54
Max. 35.75 125.02 28.97 13.02 6.84
Observations 120 120 120 120 120
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that on average the ﬁrst derivative with respect to maturity is increasing.12 Thus, forward
default probabilities ∂Qt(τ≤s)
∂s
, which measure the probability of defaulting at time s given
that the ﬁrm has not yet defaulted, are upward-sloping. Hence, the market expects the
marginal probability of default to increase over time for the average ﬁrm. This is likely
caused by the fact that the CDX NA IG index consists of solid investment grade ﬁrms
with low short-term default probabilities, and it is therefore more probable that credit
conditions worsen for a given ﬁrm than improve.
Figure II.1. Default probabilities
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The ﬁgure shows the average calibrated term structure of risk-neutral default probabilities for
0 to 5 years over the period March 30, 2006 to September 20, 2006, averaging across all 125
constituents of the CDX NA IG 6 index. Default probabilities are calibrated on a ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm
basis following the procedure outlined in appendix II.B.
The sensitivity of each ﬁrm’s default probability to the economy-wide factor Y is
captured in the parameter ai, which is estimated model-independently through the
covariance between ﬁrm-speciﬁc instantaneous default probabilities and market-wide
instantaneous default probabilities. Figure II.2 shows the distribution of ai’s across ﬁrms
(remember that the ai’s are normalized such that the average across ﬁrms is 1). There
is a signiﬁcant amount of variation in the ai’s, and for a large fraction of the ﬁrms the
default probabilities are quite insensitive to market-wide ﬂuctuations in credit risk. This
12This observation is apparent from a visual inspection of the graph, and quantitative estimates are available
upon request.
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suggests that the assumption in Duﬃe and Gârleanu (2001) to let all ﬁrms have the same
sensitivity through identical ai’s is not supported by the data.
Figure II.2. Common factor sensitivities
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The ﬁgure shows the distribution of the estimated common factor sensitivities ai for the 125
constituents of the CDX NA IG 6 index. The sensitivities are estimated following the procedure
outlined in appendix II.C.
To examine whether the subset of ﬁrms with large ai’s have common characteristics,
we split the index into its ﬁve subindices (fraction of total index in parenthesis):
Energy (11%), Financials (19%), Basic Industrials (23%), Telecommunications, Media
and Technology (18%), Consumer Products and Retail (29%), and we ﬁnd that ﬁrms
with large ai’s are fairly evenly distributed across these ﬁve sectors.13
The correlation between ai’s and the average 5-year CDS spread for ﬁrm i (averaging
across the 120 days) is 0.78 across the 125 ﬁrms. This strong positive correlation indicates
that the ad hoc assumption in Mortensen (2006) and Eckner (2007; 2009), where ai is
exogenously set based on the ﬁrm-speciﬁc 5-year CDS spread, is reasonable.14
13The distribution on sectors of the ﬁrms with the 20% largest market sensitivities ai is: Energy (8%),
Financials (8%), Basic Industrials (16%), Telecommunications, Media and Technology (28%), Consumer
Products and Retail (40%).
14Mortensen (2006) ﬁxes ai implicitly through a parameter restriction but notes that it eﬀectively
corresponds to setting ai equal to the fraction of ﬁrm-speciﬁc to average (across all ﬁrms) 5-year CDS
spread.
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II.5.2 CDO Parameter Estimates and Pricing Results
The multi-name default model is estimated on the basis of a panel data set of daily
CDS and CDO tranche spreads as described in section II.3, and we assume that the
measurement error matrix Σ in (II.9) is diagonal and use diﬀuse priors. We run the
MCMC estimation routine using a burn-in period of 20,000 simulations and a subsequent
estimation period of another 10,000 simulations, where we use every 10th simulation to
calculate parameter estimates.
The parameter estimates are given in Table II.2, and the ﬁrst thing we note is that
the volatility of the common factor is σ = 0.0166, which is low compared to estimates in
the previous literature: Duﬀee (1999) ﬁts CIR processes to ﬁrm default intensities using
corporate bond data and ﬁnds an average σ of 0.074, and Eckner (2009) uses a panel
data set of CDS and CDO spreads similar to the data set used here and estimates σ to
be 0.103. An important factor in explaining this diﬀerence in the estimated size of σ is
the extent to which systematic and idiosyncratic default risk is separated. Duﬀee (1999)
is not concerned with such a subdivision of the default risk and therefore estimates a
factor that includes both systematic and unsystematic risk. Eckner (2009) has a model
that is similar to ours, but when estimating the model he imposes strong restrictions on
the parameters of the systematic and idiosyncratic factors. For example, he requires σ2
of the common factor to be equal to the average σ2i of the idiosyncratic factors.
Our results suggest that separating default risk into an idiosyncratic and a common
component, and letting these factors be fully ﬂexible during the estimation, reveals that
the common factor is "slow-moving" in the sense that the volatility is low. In addition,
we estimate the total contribution of jumps l × μ to be 6 · 10−5 which is lower than
the estimate of 3 · 10−3 in Eckner (2009), further underlining that the total volatility of
the common factor is low when properly estimated.15 Finally, we note that although the
common factor is not very volatile, it is explosive with a mean reversion coeﬃcient of
0.94 under the risk-neutral measure. Under the actual measure, the factor is estimated to
be mean-reverting, although the mean-reversion coeﬃcient is hard to pin down with any
precision due to the relatively short time span of our data sample.
15In a previous version of this paper, we imposed parameter restrictions similar to Eckner (2009), which
resulted in parameter estimates consistent with those that he reports.
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Table II.2. Parameter estimates (common factor)
The table reports point estimates and 95% conﬁdence intervals (in parenthesis) for the parameters of the
multi-name default model outlined in section II.2.
κ0 (×105) κ1 σ (×102)
2.32 0.94 1.66
(2.15, 2.58) (0.90, 0.99) (1.48, 1.81)
l (×103) μ (×102)
3.74 1.59
(2.54, 4.59) (1.11, 2.12)
κP1 l
P (×102) μP (×1010)
-3.45 2.54 8.34
(-15.09, 5.08)(3.40 · 10−13, 2.18 · 104)(8.19, 1.57 · 108)
√
Σ11
√
Σ22
√
Σ33
0.11 0.19 0.16
(0.10, 0.33) (0.15, 0.43) (0.11, 0.51)
√
Σ44
√
Σ55
0.35 0.38
(0.30, 0.64) (0.28, 0.67)
We now examine the pricing ability of our model by considering the average pricing
errors and RMSEs (Root-Mean-Squared-Errors) given in Table II.3. We see that on
average the model underestimates spreads for the 3% − 7% tranche by 7 basis points
and overestimates the 10%− 15% tranche by 4 basis points. For comparison, Mortensen
(2006) reports average bid-ask spreads for the 3%−7% tranche to be 10.9 basis points and
for the 10%− 15% to be 5 basis points. In both cases, average pricing errors are smaller
than the bid-ask spread. The RMSEs of the model are larger than the average pricing
errors, so the model errors are not consistently within the bid-ask spread, but RMSEs
and pricing errors do suggest a good overall ﬁt.
Figure II.3 shows the observed and ﬁtted CDO tranche spreads over time, and the
graphs conﬁrm a reasonable ﬁt to all tranches apart from a slight underestimation of
the 3% − 7% tranche and overestimation of the 15% − 30% tranche. It is particularly
noteworthy that the time series variation in the most senior tranches – especially the
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Table II.3. CDO pricing errors
The table reports mean and standard deviation of the daily pricing errors for each of the ﬁve CDO
tranches: 0%− 3%, 3%− 7%, 7%− 10%, 10%− 15%, and 15%− 30% of the CDX NA IG 6 index over the
period March 30, 2006 to September 20, 2006. The pricing errors are calculated as model-implied minus
observed tranche spreads, and the model spreads are based on the parameter point estimates in Table
II.2.
Tranche 0%− 3% 3%− 7% 7%− 10% 10%− 15% 15%− 30%
(in %) (in bps) (in bps) (in bps) (in bps)
Mean – 0.7888 – 6.93 0.55 3.96 – 1.12
RMSE 1.7907 14.31 2.94 4.42 1.31
15% − 30% tranche – is well matched. This is surprising because both the level and the
time series variation of the 15% − 30% tranche have been diﬃcult to capture by models
in the previous literature. Mortensen (2006) ﬁnds that jumps in the common factor are
necessary to generate suﬃciently high senior tranche spreads, but even with jumps it has
been diﬃcult to reproduce the observed time series variation in senior tranche spreads,
as argued by Eckner (2009) and in a previous version of this paper.16 What enables
our model to ﬁt the time series variation of senior tranche spreads well is that we have
not imposed the usual set of strong assumptions on the parameters of the common and
idiosyncratic factors as done in Mortensen (2006), Eckner (2009), and in a previous version
of this paper. Thus, a careful implementation of the multi-name default model frees up
the model’s ability to ﬁt tranche spreads in important dimensions.
To examine the contribution of systematic default risk to the total default risk across
diﬀerent maturities, we calculate the following: for each maturity, date, and ﬁrm we use
the estimated sensitivities ai and the path and parameters of the common factor Y to
calculate the systematic part of the risk-neutral default probability according to equation
(II.1) and (II.2). We then ﬁnd an average term-structure of systematic default risk by
averaging across ﬁrms and dates and plot the result in Figure II.4 together with the
average total default risk inferred from observed CDS spreads. The ﬁgure shows that
16The previous version of the paper entitled "An empirical investigation of an intensity-based model for
pricing CDO tranches" is available upon request.
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Figure II.3. CDO tranche spreads
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The graphs show the observed (solid black) and model-implied (dashed gray) CDO tranche
spreads for the ﬁve CDX NA IG 6 tranches: 0%− 3%, 3%− 7%, 7%− 10%, 10%− 15%, and
15%− 30% over the period March 30, 2006 to September 20, 2006. The model-implied spreads
are based on the parameter estimates reported in Table II.2.
the systematic contribution to the overall default risk is small for short maturities but
increases with maturity. As shown in Table II.4 the average exposure to systematic default
risk on a 6-month horizon is merely 0.003% and constitutes only 6% of the overall default
risk, but increases to 0.874% and a fraction of 26% of the total default risk for a 5-year
horizon. Hence, out of the total average 5-year default probability of 3.309%, 0.874% is
systematic and non-diversiﬁable.
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Figure II.4. Average default probabilities
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The ﬁgure shows the average term structure of risk-neutral default probabilities, averaging
across all 125 constituents of the CDX NA IG 6 index and across all trading days in the period
March 30, 2006 to September 20, 2006. The default probabilities are decomposed into their
common (dark gray) and idiosyncratic (light gray) parts. The total default probabilities (dark
and light gray) are calibrated from CDS spreads (see appendix II.B), and the common part is
calculated using the parameter estimates reported in Table II.2.
Table II.4. Average default probabilities
The table reports average risk-neutral default probabilities (DP), averaging across all 125 constituents of
the CDX NA IG 6 index and across all trading days in the period March 30, 2006 to September, 2006.
“Total DP” reports the total default probability and corresponds to the total gray area (light and dark)
in Figure II.4. “Common part of total DP” similarly expresses the common factor part of the total default
probability corresponding to the dark gray area in Figure II.4.
Maturity 0.5 yr 1 yr 2 yrs 3 yrs 4 yrs 5 yrs
Total DP 0,051% 0,134% 0,460% 1,080% 2,042% 3,309%
Common part
of total DP 0,003% 0,010% 0,048% 0,147% 0,376% 0,874%
Common part
in % of total DP 5,88% 7,64% 10,40% 13,59% 18,42% 26,41%
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II.6 Idiosyncratic default risk
So far in the estimation we have put structure on the systematic part of default risk
through the speciﬁcation of the common factor, while total default risk has been estimated
model-independently. Combining the two elements gives us for each ﬁrm and each date
a term structure of idiosyncratic default risk calculated as the “diﬀerence” between total
default risk and its systematic component.17 Thus, for each ﬁrm we have a data set
consisting of the idiosyncratic part of the survival probability EQt [exp(−
∫ t+s
t
Xi,udu)] for
maturities of s = 0.5, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 years and for each of the 120 days in the sample. Given
this panel data set we can now put structure on the idiosyncratic default risk and estimate
the parameters of this structural form.
We can allow idiosyncratic default risk to be the sum of several factors and the factors
can be of any distributional form subject only to the requirements of non-negativity and
that we can calculate the expectation
EQt
[
exp
(
−
∫ s
t
Xi,udu
)]
.
We choose to let the idiosyncratic factors have the same functional form as the common
factor, namely be a one-factor aﬃne jump-diﬀusion
dXi,t = (κi,0 + κi,1Xi,t)dt + σi
√
Xi,tdW
Q
i,t + dJ
Q
i,t
with an essentially aﬃne risk premium for diﬀusive risk and constant risk premium for
the jump risk. This allows us to compare the results of our general estimation approach
with those in previous literature, where a number of restrictions are placed jointly on
the common and idiosyncratic factors. Thus, for each of the 125 ﬁrms in the sample, we
estimate by MCMC the parameters of the idiosyncratic factor in the same way as the
parameters of the common factor, but in the estimation we now use a panel data set of
the idiosyncratic part of default probabilities instead of CDO prices. Note that structural
assumptions on the idiosyncratic risk were not necessary in order to price CDOs in the
17More speciﬁcally, the relation
Qt(τi > s) = E
Q
t
[(
−ai
∫ s
t
Yudu
)]
· EQt
[(
−
∫ s
t
Xi,udu
)]
allows us to infer the idiosyncratic survival probabilities directly from the estimated common and total
survival probabilities EQt
[(−ai ∫ st Yudu)] and Qt(τi > s), respectively.
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previous section, but adding structure here enables us to gain further understanding of
the nature of the idiosyncratic default risk.
The results from the estimation of the idiosyncratic default factors are given in Table
II.5. We see that the average volatility across all ﬁrms is σ = 0.14, almost 10 times higher
than the volatility estimate of 0.017 for the common factor. Combined with the parameter
estimates discussed in the previous section, this shows that the idiosyncratic factors are
more volatile than the systematic factor. The fact that the volatility of our systematic
factor is lower than that reported in previous papers reﬂects that our estimation procedure
allows us to fully separate the dynamics of the systematic factor from the dynamics of the
idiosyncratic factors. This leads to a low-volatility systematic factor and high-volatility
idiosyncratic factors, while previous research ﬁnds something in-between. In addition, we
see that the average total (risk-neutral) contribution from jumps is l×μ = 4 ·10−2, which
is higher than the total jump contribution in the systematic factor of 6 · 10−5, reinforcing
the conclusion that volatilities of the idiosyncratic factors are higher than that of the
systematic factor.
We see that κ1 is positive on average, so the idiosyncratic factors are on average
explosive under the risk-neutral measure. However, they are less explosive than the
systematic factor, implying that when pricing securities sensitive to default risk, the
relative importance of systematic risk increases as maturity increases in accordance with
our observations in Figure II.4.
II.7 Conclusion
We present a new approach to estimate the relative contributions of systematic and
idiosyncratic default risks in an intensity-based model. Based on a large data set of CDS
and CDO tranche spreads on the North American Investment Grade CDX index, we
ﬁnd that our model is able to capture both the level and time series dynamics of CDO
tranche spreads. We then go on and split the total default risk of a given entity into its
idiosyncratic and systematic part. We ﬁnd that the systematic default risk is explosive
but has low volatility and that the relative contribution of systematic default risk is small
for short maturities, but of growing importance as maturity increases. Our subsequent
parametric estimation of the idiosyncratic default risks shows that idiosyncratic risk is
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Table II.5. Parameter estimates (idiosyncratic factors)
The table reports mean, median and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of the 125 parameter point
estimates resulting from the idiosyncratic factor estimations in the multi-name default model outlined in
section II.2.
κ0 (×106) κ1 σ
9.08 0.80 0.14
0.41 0.87 0.16
(36.61) (0.24) (0.08)
l (×103) μ
4.48 8.93
2.68 0.30
(6.05) (59.12)
κP1 l
P (×10−2) μP (×109)
0.14 1.31 1.66
-0.60 1.30 1.66
(5.79) (0.34) (0.07)
√
Σ11 (×104)
√
Σ22 (×104)
√
Σ33 (×104)
1.10 1.19 1.37
1.01 1.04 1.18
(0.26) (0.42) (0.52)
√
Σ44 (×104)
√
Σ55 (×104)
1.40 1.66
1.23 1.09
(0.69) (2.55)
more volatile and less explosive than systematic risk.
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Appendix
II.A CDS pricing
This section brieﬂy explains how to price Credit Default Swaps (CDSs). More thorough
introductions are given in Duﬃe (1999) and O’Kane (2008).
A CDS contract is an insurance agreement between two counterparties written on the
default event of a speciﬁc underlying reference obligation. The protection buyer pays ﬁxed
premium payments periodically until a default occurs or the contract expires, whichever
happens ﬁrst. If default occurs, the protection buyer delivers the reference obligation to
the protection seller in exchange for face value.
For a CDS contract covering default risk between time t0 = t and tM = T and with
premium payment dates t1, . . . , tM , the value of the protection payment is given as
Prot(t,T ) = EQt
[
(1− δ) exp
(
−
∫ τ
t
rudu
)
1(τ≤T )
]
where δ is the recovery rate, while the value of the premium payment stream is
S · Prem(t,T ), where S is the annual CDS premium and
Prem(t,T ) = EQt
[
M∑
j=1
exp
(
−
∫ min{tj ,τ}
t
rudu
)∫ tj
tj−1
1(τ>s)ds
]
.
The CDS premium at time t is settled such that it equates the two payment streams, i.e.
S(t,T ) = Prot(t,T )
Prem(t,T )
.
In order to calculate the CDS premium S(t,T ) we make the simplifying assumptions
that the recovery rate δ is constant at 40%, that the riskfree interest rate is independent
of the default time τ , and ﬁnally that default, if it occurs, will occur halfway between
two premium payment dates. With these assumptions we can rewrite the two expressions
above as
Prot(t,T ) = (1− δ)
M∑
j=1
P
(
t,
tj−1+tj
2
)
· (Qt(τ > tj−1)−Qt(τ > tj)) (II.10)
Prem(t,T ) =
M∑
j=1
P
(
t,
tj−1+tj
2
)
· tj − tj−1
2
· (Qt(τ > tj−1)−Qt(τ > tj))
+
M∑
j=1
P (t, tj) ·
(
tj − tj−1
) ·Qt(τ > tj). (II.11)
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II.B Calibration of survival probabilities
For the calibration of ﬁrm-speciﬁc survival probabilities from observed CDS spreads we
assume that risk-neutral probabilities take the ﬂexible form
Qt(τ > s) =
1
1 + α2 + α4
(
e−α1(s−t) + α2e−α3(s−t)
2
+ α4e
−α5(s−t)3
)
s ≥ t (II.12)
with all αj ≥ 0. The calibrated survival probabilities s 
→ Qt(τ > s) for a given ﬁrm at
time t are then calculated by minimizing relative pricing errors using (II.10)–(II.12)
∑
T
(
Prot(t,T )/Prem(t,T ) − Sobs(t,T )
Sobs(t,T )
)2
where Sobs(t,T ) is the empirically observed CDS spread at time t on a contract with
maturity T . The calibration is based on observed CDS spreads for maturities of T =
0.5, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 years and is carried out separately for each ﬁrm, at each time t, and results
in a very accurate ﬁt to the observed CDS term structure.18
II.C Estimation of common factor sensitivities
The common factor sensitivities ai appearing in the speciﬁcation (II.2) of individual
default intensities can be estimated by ordinary linear regression, and without exploiting
speciﬁc assumptions on the dynamic evolution of the processes Y ,X1, . . . ,XN except
for a mild stationarity condition. As we argue in the following, this model-independent
technique only relies on the availability of term structures of risk-neutral survival
probabilities for each of the N issuers in the portfolio.
The simple idea that we build upon is the fact that (II.1) and (II.2) imply
− lim
s↘0
∂
∂s
Qt(τi > t + s) = λi,t = aiYt + Xi,t
and that we can calculate this quantity simply by inserting the calibrated survival
probabilities on the left-hand-side of this expression.
If we now for ﬁxed i consider the regression
Wi,t = β0,i + β1,i(Vt − V¯ ) + εt t = 1, . . . ,T
18This calibration approach is close to the industry benchmark of ﬁtting the observed CDS term structure
perfectly using piecewise constant intensities, see O’Kane (2008).
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where
Wi,t = aiYt + Xi,t
W¯i =
1
T
T∑
t=1
Wi,t
Vt =
1
N
N∑
j=1
Wj,t
V¯ =
1
T
T∑
t=1
Vt
and εt is a Gaussian noise term, then it follows by standard estimation theory that
βˆ1,i =
∑
t
(
Wi,t − W¯i)(Vt − V¯
)∑
t
(
Vt − V¯
)2 .
Under the assumption of stationarity of each of the processes X1, . . . ,XN ,Y (and hence
also of Wi and V ), we can rewrite the estimated regression coeﬃcient as
βˆ1,i =
̂Cov(Wi,V )
̂V ar(V )
. (II.13)
Since X1, . . . ,XN ,Y are mutually independent then for suﬃciently large N
Cov(Wi,V ) =
1
N
V ar(Xi) + aiV ar(Y ) ≈ aiV ar(Y ) (II.14)
and similarly
V ar(V ) =
1
N2
N∑
j=1
V ar(Xj) + V ar(Y ) ≈ V ar(Y ) (II.15)
where we have applied the normalization 1
N
∑
i ai = 1. By combining (II.13), (II.14)
and (II.15) it is now straightforward to see that βˆ1,i is an approximate estimator of the
unknown sensitivity ai.
To increase numerical robustness of the calculations, we make a small approximation
and replace everywhere the derivative
− lim
s↘0
∂
∂s
Qt(τi > t + s)
with the one-year default probability
1−Qt(τi > t + 1) = −Qt(τi > t + 1)−Qt(τi > t)
1− 0 ≈ − lims↘0
∂
∂s
Qt(τi > t + s)
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since our calibration of the term structure of survival probabilities uses CDS contracts
with maturities from 0.5 to 5 years, which results in minor numerical instabilities (across
calendar time) in the very short end of the term structure.
II.D Estimation of common factor
Once we have inferred marginal risk-neutral survival probabilities s 
→ qi,t(s) from CDS
spreads and estimated the common factor sensitivities ai, we are ready to estimate the
parameters and the path of the common factor process Y . Throughout the estimation of
the common factor process, all qi,t(s) and all ai are taken as given (and thus held ﬁxed).
Given an initial path of Y and initial values of the common factor parameters, the
estimation procedure runs as follows:
(i) Calculate the common factor component of survival probabilities
EQt
[(
−ai
∫ s
t
Yudu
)]
for all ﬁrms i, all dates t and all maturities s.
(ii) Use the common factor components EQt [(−ai
∫ s
t
Yudu)] from (i) and the calibrated
term structures of survival probabilities qi,t(s) to determine the idiosyncratic
component of survival probabilities
EQt
[(
−
∫ s
t
Xi,udu
)]
for all ﬁrms i, all dates t and all maturities s using the relation
qi,t(s) = E
Q
t
[(
−ai
∫ s
t
Yudu
)]
· EQt
[(
−
∫ s
t
Xi,udu
)]
(iii) Use the idiosyncratic components EQt [(−
∫ s
t
Xi,udu)] from (ii) as input to equation
(II.5) and calculate spreads for the 5 CDO tranches for all dates t (this is what is
referred to as the “pricing formula” f in section II.3.2).
(iv) Use the MCMC estimation routine to update the parameters and the path of the
common factor Y , and repeat steps (i)-(iv) until convergence.
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II.E Conditional posteriors in MCMC estimation
In this section the conditional posteriors stated in the main text and used in the MCMC
estimation are derived. Bayes’ rule
p(X|Y ) ∝ p(Y |X)p(X)
is used repeatedly in the calculations.
II.E.1 Conditionals of S,Y , J, and Z
The conditional posteriors of S,Y , J , and Z are used in most of the conditional posteriors
for the parameters and are therefore derived in this subsection.
p(Y |Θ,Σ, J ,Z) and p(S|Θ,Σ,Y , J ,Z)
With the discretization in (II.8) we have that
p(Y |Θ,Σ,J ,Z) =
( T∏
t=1
p(Yt|Yt−1, Θ,Σ,J ,Z)
)
p(Y0)
= p(Y0)
T∏
t=1
1
σ
√
ΔtYt−1
exp
(
− 1
2
[Yt − (κ0Δt + (κP1 Δt + 1)Yt−1 + JtZt)]2
σ2ΔtYt−1
)
∝ p(Y0)σ−TY −
1
2
x exp
(
− 1
2
T∑
t=1
[Yt − (κ0Δt + (κP1 Δt + 1)Yt−1 + JtZt)]2
σ2ΔtYt−1
)
(II.16)
where Yx =
∏T
t=1 Yt−1. Note that the posterior p(Y |Θ,Σ, J ,Z) diﬀers from
p(Y |Θ,Σ, J ,Z,S).
The conditional posterior of S is found as
p(S|Θ,Σ,Y , J ,Z) =
T∏
t=1
|Σ|− 12 exp
(
− 1
2
[St − f(ΘQ,Yt)]′Σ−1 [St − f(ΘQ,Yt)]
)
= |Σ|−T2 exp
(
− 1
2
T∑
t=1
eˆ′tΣ
−1
 eˆt)
)
, (II.17)
where eˆt = St − f(ΘQ,Yt). If Σ is diagonal this simpliﬁes to
p(S|Θ,Σ,Y , J ,Z) ∝
N∏
i=1
Σ
−T
2
,ii exp
(
− 1
2Σ,ii
T∑
t=1
eˆ2t,i
)
.
This posterior does not depend on J ,Z,κP0 , and κP1 .
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p(Z|Θ,Σ,Y , J ,S) and p(J |Θ,Σ,Y ,Z,S)
Since Zt is exponentially distributed we have that
p(Z|Θ,Σ,Y , J ,S) ∝ p(S|Θ,Σ,Y , J ,Z)p(Z|Θ,Σ,Y , J) (II.18)
∝ p(Y |Θ,Σ, J ,Z)p(Z|Θ,Σ, J)
∝ p(Y |Θ,Σ, J ,Z)
T∏
t=1
1
μP
exp(− Zt
μP
)
∝ p(Y |Θ,Σ, J ,Z)(μP )−T exp(−Z•
μP
) (II.19)
where Z• =
∑T
t=1 Zt.
The jump time Jt can only take on two values so the conditional posterior for Jt is
Bernoulli. The Bernoulli probabilities are given as
p(J |Θ,Σ,Y ,Z,S) ∝ p(S|Θ,Σ,Y , J ,Z)p(J |Θ,Σ,Y ,Z) (II.20)
∝ p(Y |Θ,Σ, J ,Z)p(J |Θ,Σ,Z)
∝ p(Y |Θ,Σ, J ,Z)p(J |Θ)
∝ p(Y |Θ,Σ, J ,Z)
T∏
t=1
(
(lPΔt)
Jt(1− lPΔt)1−Jt
)
∝ p(Y |Θ,Σ, J ,Z)(lPΔt)J•(1− lPΔt)T−J• (II.21)
with J• =
∑T
t=1 Jt
II.E.2 Conditional Posteriors
The conditional posteriors are derived and the choice of priors for the posteriors are
discussed in this subsection.
(i) The conditional posterior of the error matrix Σ is given as
p(Σ|Θ,Y , J ,Z,S) ∝ p(S|Θ,Σ,Y , J ,Z)p(Σ|Θ,Y , J ,Z)
∝ p(S|Θ,Σ,Y , J ,Z)p(Σ|Θ)
∝ |Σ|−T2 exp
(
− 1
2
T∑
t=1
eˆ′tΣ
−1
 eˆt
)
p(Σ|Θ)
= |Σ|−T2 exp
(
− 1
2
tr(Σ−1
T∑
t=1
eˆteˆ
′
t)
)
p(Σ|Θ).
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The last line follows because −1
2
∑T
t=1 eˆ
′
tΣ
−1
 eˆt = −12
∑T
t=1 tr(eˆ
′
tΣ
−1
 eˆt) =
−1
2
∑T
t=1 tr(Σ
−1
 eˆteˆ
′
t) = −12tr(
∑T
t=1 Σ
−1
 eˆteˆ
′
t) = −12tr(Σ−1
∑T
t=1 eˆteˆ
′
t). If the prior on
Σ is independent of the other parameters and has an inverse Wishart distribution
with parameters V and m then p(Σ|...) is inverse Wishart distributed with
parameters V +
∑T
t=1 eˆteˆ
′
t and T + m. The special case of V equal to the zero
matrix and m = 0 corresponds to a ﬂat prior.
(ii) The conditional posterior of κP1 is found as
p(κP1 |Θ\κP1 , Σ,Y , J ,Z,S) ∝ p(S|Θ,Σ,Y , J ,Z)p(κP1 |Θ\κP1 , Σ,Y , J ,Z)
∝ p(κP1 |Θ\κP1 , Σ,Y , J ,Z)
∝ p(Y |Θ,Σ, J ,Z)p(κP1 |Θ\κP1 , Σ).
According to equation (II.16) we have
p(κP1 |...) ∝ exp
(
− 1
2
T∑
t=1
[Yt − (κ0Δt + (κP1 Δt + 1)Yt−1 + JtZt)]2
σ2ΔtYt−1
)
p(κP1 |Θ\κP1 , Σ)
so
p(κP1 |...) ∝ exp
(
− 1
2
T∑
t=1
[atκ
P
1 − bt]2
σ2ΔtYt−1
)
p(κP1 |Θ\κP1 , Σ)
where
at = −ΔtYt−1
bt = κ0Δt + Yt−1 + JtZt − Yt.
Using the result in Frühwirth-Schnatter and Geyer (1998, p.10) and assuming ﬂat
priors we have that κP1 ∼ N(Qm,Q) where
m =
T∑
t=1
atbt
σ2ΔtYt−1
Q−1 =
T∑
t=1
a2t
σ2ΔtYt−1
.
(iii) For the jump size parameter μP the conditional posterior is found as
p(μP |Θ\μP , Σ,Y , J ,Z,S) ∝ p(S|Θ,Σ,Y , J ,Z)p(μP |Θ\μP , Σ,Y , J ,Z)
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∝ p(Y |Θ,Σ, J ,Z)p(μP |Θ\μP , Σ, J ,Z)
∝ p(Z|Θ,Σ, J)p(μP |Θ\μP , Σ, J)
∝ p(Z|Θ)p(μP |Θ\μP , Σ)
∝ (μP )−T exp(−Z•
μP
)p(μP |Θ\μP , Σ).
If the prior on μP is ﬂat then the conditional posterior is inverse gamma distributed
with parameters Z• and T − 1.
(iv) The same calculations as for the jump-size parameter μP yields the conditional
posterior of the jump-time parameter lP as
p(lP |Θ\lP , Σ,Y , J ,Z,S) ∝ p(J |Θ)p(lP |Θ\lP , Σ)
∝
(
(lPΔt)
J•(1− lPΔt)T−J•
)
p(lP |Θ\lP , Σ).
Assuming a ﬂat prior on lP the conditional posterior of lPΔt is beta distributed,
lPΔt ∼ B(J• + 1,T − J• + 1).
(v) The parameters σ and κ0 are sampled by Metropolis-Hastings since the conditional
distributions are not known. Denoting any of the two parameters θi, the conditional
distribution is found as
p(θi|Θ\θi , Σ,Y , J ,Z,S) ∝ p(S|Θ,Σ,Y , J ,Z)p(θi|Θ\θi , Σ,Y , J ,Z)
∝ p(S|Θ,Σ,Y , J ,Z)p(Y |Θ,Σ, J ,Z)p(θi|Θ\θi , Σ, J ,Z)
∝ p(S|Θ,Σ,Y , J ,Z)p(Y |Θ,Σ, J ,Z)p(θi|Θ\θi , Σ).
Flat priors on both parameters are assumed.
(vi) The parameters κQ1 , lQ, and μQ are sampled by Metropolis-Hastings. The only
diﬀerence in the derivation of their conditional distributions compared to derivation
of the distributions of σ and κ0 is that the distribution of Y does not depend on these
three parameters. Letting θi represent any of the three parameters, the conditional
distribution is found as
p(θi|Θ\θi , Σ,Y , J ,Z,S) ∝ p(S|Θ,Σ,Y , J ,Z)p(θi|Θ\θi , Σ,Y , J ,Z)
∝ p(S|Θ,Σ,Y , J ,Z)p(Y |Θ,Σ, J ,Z)p(θi|Θ\θi , Σ, J ,Z)
∝ p(S|Θ,Σ,Y , J ,Z)p(θi|Θ\θi , Σ).
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Flat priors on all three parameters are assumed.
(vii) The latent jump indicators Jt’s are sampled individually from Bernoulli
distributions. To see this, note that equation (II.21) implies that
p(J |Θ,Σ,Y ,Z,S)
∝
T∏
t=1
exp
(
− 1
2
[Yt − (κ0Δt + (κP1 Δt + 1)Yt−1 + JtZt)]2
σ2ΔtYt−1
)( lPΔt
1− lPΔt
)Jt
.
In the actual implementation we use
p(J |Θ,Σ,Y ,Z,S)
∝
T∏
t=1
exp
(
− 1
2
(−2[Yt − (κ0Δt + (κP1 Δt + 1)Yt−1)] + JtZt)JtZt
σ2ΔtYt−1
)( lPΔt
1− lPΔt
)Jt
since this is numerically more robust.
(viii) For the latent jump sizes Zt we have according to equation (II.19) that
p(Z|Θ,Σ,Y , J ,S) ∝
T∏
t=1
exp
(
− 1
2
[Yt − (κ0Δt + (κP1 Δt + 1)Yt−1 + JtZt)]2
σ2ΔtYt−1
− Zt
μP
)
so the Zts are conditionally independent and are sampled individually. If Jt = 0
then Zt is sampled from an exponential distribution with mean μP . If Jt = 1 tedious
calculations show that
p(Zt|Θ,Σ,Y , J ,Z\Zt ,S) ∝
[((κP1 + μ
Pσ2)Δt + 1)Yt−1 − (Yt − κ0Δt) + Zt]2
σ2ΔtYt−1
)
,
where Zt ≥ 0. Therefore, Zt is drawn from a N((Yt − κ0Δt) − ((κP1 + μPσ2)Δt +
1)Yt−1,σ2ΔtYt−1) distribution and the draw is rejected if Zt < 0. In practice the
number of rejections are small.19
(ix) The latent Yts are sampled individually by Metropolis-Hastings and for t = 1, ...,T−
1 the conditional posterior is
p(Yt|Θ,Σ,Y\Yt , J ,Z,S) ∝ p(S|Θ,Σ,Y , J ,Z,S)p(Yt|Θ,Σ,Y\Yt , J ,Z)
∝ p(St|Θ,Σ,Yt, J ,Z,S)p(Yt|Θ,Σ,Yt−1,Yt+1, J ,Z)
∝ p(St|Θ,Σ,Yt, J ,Z,S)
×p(Yt|Θ,Σ,Yt−1, J ,Z)p(Yt+1|Θ,Σ,Yt, J ,Z)
19If the draws were frequently rejected the method in Gelfand, Smith, and Lee (1992) could be used.
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For YT the conditional posterior is
p(YT |Θ,Σ,Y\YT , J ,Z,S) ∝ p(YT |Θ,Σ,YT−1, J ,Z,S)
∝ p(ST |Θ,Σ,YT , J ,Z,S)p(YT |Θ,Σ,YT−1, J ,Z)
while for Y0 it is
p(Y0|Θ,Σ,Y\Y0 , J ,Z,S) ∝ p(Y0|Θ,Σ,Y1, J ,Z)
∝ p(Y1|Θ,Σ,Y0, J ,Z)p(Y0).
II.E.3 Implementation Details
In the RW-MH steps of the MCMC sample, the proposal density is chosen to be Gaussian,
and the eﬃciency of the RW-MH algorithm depends crucially on the variance of the
proposal normal distribution. If the variance is too low, the Markov chain will accept
nearly every draw and converge very slowly while it will reject a too high portion of the
draws if the variance is too high. We therefore do an algorithm calibration and adjust
the variance in the ﬁrst half of the burn-in period in the MCMC algorithm. Roberts,
Gelman, and Gilks (1997) recommend acceptance rates close to 1
4
and therefore the
standard deviation during the algorithm calibration is chosen as follows: every 100’th
draw the acceptance ratio of each parameter is evaluated. If it is less than 10 % the
standard deviation is doubled while if it is more than 50 % it is cut in half. This step is
prior to the second half of the burn-in period since the convergence results of RW-MH
only applies if the variance is constant (otherwise the Markov property of the chain is
lost).
The Fourier inversion in equation (II.7) is calculated by using Fast Fourier Transform
and the number of points used in FFT is 218. We use Simpson’s rule in the Fast Fourier
Transform routine as suggested by Carr and Madan (1999), and our results show that
this gives a signiﬁcant improvement in overall accuracy. The characteristic function is
not evaluated in every Fourier transform point. Instead, since the characteristic function
is exponentially aﬃne with aﬃne coeﬃcient functions A and B, the functions A and B
are splined from a lower number of points. The spline uses a total number of 60 points.
Also, the integration in (II.6) is done using Gauss-Legendre integration and the number
of integration points is 60.
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Essay III
Credit spreads across the business cycle∗
Abstract
This paper studies how corporate bond spreads vary with the business
cycle. I show that both level and slope of empirical credit spread
curves are correlated with the state of the economy and I link this
to idiosyncratic jump risk. I develop a structural credit risk model
that accounts for both business cycle and jump risk, and show by
estimation that the model captures the counter-cyclical level and pro-
cyclical slope of empirical credit spread curves. In addition, I provide
a new procedure for estimation of idiosyncratic jump risk, which is
consistent with observed shocks to ﬁrm fundamentals.
∗The author would like to thank Christian Riis Flor, René Kallestrup, David Lando, and Kristian Miltersen
for helpful comments, and Moody’s for providing historical bond recovery data.
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III.1 Introduction
The yield on a corporate bond exceeds the risk-free rate by a spread, which is commonly
linked to the credit riskiness and liquidity of the bond (Duﬀee (1999), Longstaﬀ, Mithal,
and Neis (2005), Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007)). Since the liquidity premium is
moderate for most bonds (Dick-Nielsen, Feldhütter, and Lando (2011)), spreads move
counter-cyclically with the state of the economy to reﬂect that default risk is larger when
economic growth is low (Fama and French (1989), Chen (1991), Amato and Luisi (2006)).1
In this paper, I demonstrate that short-term spreads move relatively more than long-
term spreads as the distribution between short- and long-term risk is shifted to put more
weight on imminent default risk during economic downturns. Speciﬁcally, I ﬁnd that
credit spreads are low and the credit spread curve upward-sloping when economic growth
is high, and conversely that spreads are high and the spread curve ﬂat or downward-
sloping when growth is low. These movements are persistent across both investment and
speculative grade bonds, and I further ﬁnd that the variation in level and slope is related
to changes in idiosyncratic jump risk, as shocks to ﬁrm fundamentals are larger during
periods of economic slowdown. Based on this link I formulate a structural credit risk model
that allows for interaction between business cycle and jump risk in order to capture the
observed variation in empirical credit spreads. The model extends previous literature that
has focused solely on either business cycle or jump risk, with no attention to the intrinsic
relation between the two risk factors.
The structural model in this paper is founded on a relation between business cycle and
jump risk, and this aligns well with the common interpretation of jumps as the market
reaction to arrival of new information. When the economy is near a trough, ﬁrms are
believably more vulnerable and their market values therefore react more strongly to new
information. Following this line of reasoning Maheu and McCurdy (2004) interpret jumps
in equity returns as a consequence of the arrival of unexpected information, and Lee and
Mykland (2008) show that the vast majority of jumps in equity returns can be linked to
company-speciﬁc news about earnings, sales, strategic decisions, etc. Jiang and Yao (2009)
1Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) show that leverage is a signiﬁcant determinant of credit
spread changes but ﬁnd little explanatory power in macroeconomic variables. This may be explained by
the fact that leverage itself has strong cyclical patterns as pointed out by Korajczyk and Levy (2003).
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similarly show that jumps relate to news and that the frequency of jumps is related to ﬁrm
characteristics. Furthermore, Andersen, Bollerslev, and Diebold (2007) and Bollerslev,
Law, and Tauchen (2008) ﬁnd evidence of jumps associated with macroeconomic news
announcements, and Andersen, Bollerslev, and Diebold (2007) document considerable
time variation in the intensity and size of jumps.
While the structural credit risk model in this paper centers around the importance of
jump risk, the inclusion of jumps in models of debt and equity returns is not new, but dates
back at least to Press (1967) and Merton (1976). Since then many papers have documented
the relevance of jumps in equity returns e.g. for capturing the distributional properties
of returns (Ball and Torous (1983), Jorion (1988), Eraker, Johannes, and Polson (2003)),
pricing equity options (Bakshi, Cao, and Chen (1997), Andersen, Benzoni, and Lund
(2002), Eraker (2004)), and forecasting equity volatility (Maheu and McCurdy (2004),
Andersen, Bollerslev, and Diebold (2007)). Similarly, a related line of papers has focused
on the impact of jump risk in explaining credit spreads (Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and
Martin (2001), Cremers, Driessen, and Maenhout (2008)), and more recently on how
jumps in equity returns can help predict credit spreads (Zhang, Zhou, and Zhu (2009),
Tauchen and Zhou (2010)). Hence, a structural credit risk model that includes jump risk
uniﬁes several strands of literature by creating an explicit link between debt and equity
returns through the value of the ﬁrm’s assets, while at the same time also taking jump
risk into account.2
The structural framework was initiated with the seminal work of Black and Scholes
(1973) and Merton (1974), and since then a vast literature has extended the original model
in multiple directions (see Leland (2009) for a survey). Recently, particular attention has
been paid to the inclusion of jumps in asset value (Merton (1990), Zhou (2001), Hilberink
and Rogers (2002), Cremers, Driessen, and Maenhout (2008), Chen and Kou (2009),
Gorbenko and Strebulaev (2010)), and to the integration of business cycle risk (Hackbarth,
Miao, and Morellec (2006), David (2008), Chen, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein (2009),
Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010a;b), Chen (2010)). The former series of papers
2Several empirical papers have similarly tried to search for common factors driving both debt and equity
returns, but with no particular attention to jump risk. These include Campbell and Ammer (1993), Fama
and French (1993), Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2001), Campbell and Taksler (2003), Vassalou
and Xing (2004), and Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam (2005) among others.
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is motivated by the inability of previous models to generate empirically plausible credit
spreads (Jones, Mason, and Rosenfeld (1984), Huang and Huang (2003)), and the latter
by how the state of the economy inﬂuences ﬁrms’ operating conditions and thus also
their likelihood of default and loss rate given default occurs (Chen (2010), Tang and Yan
(2010), Doshi (2011)). The structural model in this paper diﬀers from previous literature
by incorporating both jumps and macroeconomic variation, consistent with the empirical
evidence that short-term risk (as modelled by jumps) varies with the business cycle. The
model is most closely related to the papers of Chen (2010) and Bhamra, Kuehn, and
Strebulaev (2010a;b) in terms of the modelling of business cycle risk, but can at the same
time also be viewed as extending the jump models of Cremers, Driessen, and Maenhout
(2008) and Chen and Kou (2009).
I demonstrate that despite the additional complexity that results from combining two
inherently diﬀerent model extensions (jump and business cycle risk), it is still possible
to derive closed-form expressions for the value of debt and equity while allowing for an
arbitrary (ﬁnite) number of future states of the economy. The closed-form solution of the
model, which relies on a technique developed in Jiang and Pistorius (2008), facilitates a
detailed ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm estimation of the model with particular attention to the identiﬁcation
of the jump parameters. To this end, I develop a new procedure for estimating jump
parameters from daily equity returns, and I show empirically that the resulting estimates
are consistent with the interpretation of jumps as the market reaction to new and mainly
ﬁrm-speciﬁc information. This paper thus provides evidence that not only are jumps
connected to information dissemination, but jump sizes are also related to general market
conditions.
The estimated model delivers a series of promising results. First and foremost, the
model captures well the observed variation in empirical credit spreads with low levels
and upward-sloping curves in good times, and high levels and ﬂat to downward-sloping
curves during recessions. Second, utilizing a simple Markov structure the model is able
to accurately describe historical business cycle variation and of particular importance, to
ﬁt the time the economy spends in recession (as deﬁned by NBER). Third, the model
provides estimates of both realized and optimal net beneﬁts to debt that are comparable
to those found in existing literature, and it reveals an interesting implication for optimal
capital structure. Although business cycle variation is essential to accurately capture
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credit spreads, the optimal capital structure turns out to be largely a-cyclical. This is a
consequence of the fact that the model takes the expected future business cycle variation
into account, and incorporates this into the choice of capital structure. As the economy
moves through periods of both high and low growth on a regular basis, this implies
that optimal capital structure decisions display low sensitivity to the current state of the
economy.
In summary, the contributions of the paper are fourfold: it documents the business
cycle variation in level and slope of empirical credit spreads and links that to jump risk;
it develops a structural credit risk model that takes both business cycle and jump risk
into account; it demonstrates how to estimate the model including consistent estimation
of jump parameters; and ﬁnally, it shows that the estimated model captures the observed
variation in credit spreads well and gives predictions for capital structure that align with
the existing literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section III.2 contains the empirical
analysis of historical credit spreads. Section III.3 formulates the structural credit risk
model. Section III.4 describes the estimation methodology including the procedure for
identifying jump parameters. Section III.5 reports the results of the estimation, and section
III.6 concludes. Appendices III.A-III.C contain details on data, estimation, and the model
expressions for debt and equity.
III.2 Empirical evidence
In this section I document two stylized facts about business cycle variation in corporate
credit spreads: as economic growth declines, the level of credit spreads increases, and at
the same time the credit spread curve shifts from upward-sloping to ﬂat or downward-
sloping. Moreover, both eﬀects reverse when growth starts to increase again. Thus,
not only do credit spreads increase during economic downturns, but equally important
short-term spreads increase signiﬁcantly more than their long-term counterparts. These
characteristics are persistent across both investment and speculative grade bonds, and I
show that time variation in the growth of ﬁrm debt is too small to be the only source of
explanation. I further present empirical evidence suggesting that business cycle variation
in the occurrence of shocks to ﬁrm fundamentals is an important factor in explaining
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changes in both level and slope of the credit spread curve.
III.2.1 Level and slope of credit spreads
To explore business cycle variation in corporate credit spreads I use time series of yield to
maturity on Merrill Lynch U.S. Corporate Investment Grade and High Yield bond indices
and subtract corresponding U.S. Treasury rates to obtain historical spreads. As a proxy
for economic growth I use monthly data on the U.S. real personal consumption growth
rate. From the monthly time series I construct a trailing 1-year growth rate covering the
period from January 1962 to December 2006, and I interpret variation in this rate as
“business cycle variation” in agreement with existing literature.3
Figure III.1 shows how consumption growth exhibits a negative covariation with the
level of both AAA/AA and A/BBB credit spreads, while the slopes of the AAA/AA
and A/BBB credit spread curves at the same time display a distinct positive relation
with consumption growth. These patterns are even more pronounced for the speculative
grade yields in Figure III.2, so both investment and speculative grade credit spreads tend
to be high and decreasing with maturity, when consumption growth is low, and low and
increasing with maturity, when consumption growth is high. This ﬁnding may help explain
the mixed results in previous literature that speculative grade yield curves can be both
up- and downward-sloping (Sarig and Warga (1989), Helwege and Turner (1999), Lando
and Mortensen (2005)). In particular, Helwege and Turner (1999) ﬁnd most curves to
be upward-sloping and argue that earlier ﬁndings of downward-sloping curves suﬀer from
sample selection bias as relatively safer ﬁrms tend to issue longer maturity bonds. While
this may be the case, it is less clear that such maturity bias should be changing over time,
and hence this cannot explain the ﬁnding in this paper of both up- and downward-sloping
curves for both speculative and investment grade issuers. Moreover, previous studies do
not explicitly account for business cycle eﬀects, but as Figure III.2 shows such eﬀects are
particularly important for spreads on low credit quality bonds. This is further conﬁrmed
by the fact that both the negative correlation between consumption growth and credit
spread level, and the positive correlation between consumption growth and the credit
3In related work, Chen (2010) relies on consumption and dividend growth to determine the dynamics of
the business cycle, while Lettau, Ludvigson, and Wachter (2008) in a diﬀerent setting use volatility of
consumption growth to proxy for macroeconomic risk.
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spread slope, are almost monotone with respect to bond rating.4
Figure III.1.
Investment grade credit spreads and consumption growth
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Trailing 1-year U.S. real personal consumption growth rate (blue) versus level and slope of
AAA/AA and A/BBB credit spreads (gray). The upper (lower) left graph displays the credit
spread on 3–5 year maturity bonds in the Merrill Lynch U.S. Corporate AAA/AA (A/BBB)
index. The upper (lower) right graph similarly displays the diﬀerence between credit spreads
on 10–15 year and 1–3 year maturity bonds in the same index. The vertical bars (light gray)
indicate the oﬃcial NBER recession periods.
4The time series correlations between consumption growth and credit spread levels range from –6.8% for
AAA/AA credit spreads to –28.8% for B spreads, and the similar correlations for credit spread slopes
from 12.1% for AAA/AA spreads to 41.3% for B spreads.
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Figure III.2.
Speculative grade credit spreads and consumption growth
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Trailing 1-year U.S. real personal consumption growth rate (blue) versus level and slope of BB
and B credit spreads (gray). The upper (lower) left graph displays the credit spread on 3–5
year maturity bonds in the Merrill Lynch U.S. Corporate BB (B) index. The upper (lower)
right graph similarly displays the diﬀerence between credit spreads on 10–15 year and 1–3 year
maturity bonds in the same index. The vertical bars (light gray) indicate the oﬃcial NBER
recession periods.
III.2.2 Leverage
In the extensive theoretical literature on structural credit risk modelling (see e.g. Merton
(1974), Leland (1994b), Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001)) ﬁrm leverage is a main
determinant of credit spreads, and this link is conﬁrmed in several empirical studies
(Campbell and Taksler (2003), Ericsson, Jacobs, and Oviedo (2009), Tang and Yan
(2010)). To investigate the causes of business cycle variation in credit spreads it is therefore
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natural to look at variation in ﬁrm leverage using a standard deﬁnition of leverage as the
ratio of book value of debt to the sum of book value of debt and market value of equity (see
e.g. Welch (2004), Leary and Roberts (2005), Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010b)).
To study the time series behaviour of ﬁrm leverage I collect market values of equity and
book values of debt for ﬁrms that were in the S&P 500 Industrials stock index as of January
1962.5 See appendix III.A for a complete description of the data. The data sample consists
of 170 ﬁrms for which the necessary data is available, and for these ﬁrms there is a time
series correlation between consumption growth and cross-sectional average ﬁrm leverage of
–54.1%. When paired with the similarly strong correlation between consumption growth
and credit spreads observed in the previous section, this lends further empirical support
to a strong link between credit spreads and leverage.6 Moreover, the ﬁnding that ﬁrm
leverage is strongly inﬂuenced by the business cycle is consistent with existing evidence
that ﬁrms adjust their leverage towards time-varying targets (Korajczyk and Levy (2003),
Leary and Roberts (2005)).7
Fluctuations in leverage are by deﬁnition related to changes in either debt or equity
growth. Figure III.3 shows the time variation for both growth rates and reveals two notable
facts. First, debt growth displays signs of both positive and negative comovement with
consumption growth throughout the sample period, and therefore cannot be the main
factor driving the cyclical leverage ratio. Second, equity growth is strongly pro-cyclical
and therefore, when combined with the slower-moving debt growth, is what eﬀectively
leads to the observed counter-cyclical leverage ratio (see also Welch (2004)).8
III.2.3 Jumps in equity returns
51962 is the ﬁrst year with information available in Compustat about the constituents of the major S&P
indices.
6In the absence of reliable credit spread data at the ﬁrm-level dating back as far as 1962, establishing a link
between credit spreads and leverage via their common business cycle variation provides an alternative
approach.
7In a recent study, Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) ﬁnd that leverage is largely time-invariant, but
this conclusion is based on a static “event time” sorting technique that eﬀectively prevents the authors
from drawing conclusions about calendar time variation in leverage ratios.
8Consumption growth has a time series correlation with debt growth of 4.7%, and with equity growth of
36.3%.
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Figure III.3. Consumption vs. debt and equity growth
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Trailing 1-year U.S. real personal consumption growth rate (blue) versus debt and equity
growth rate (gray). Debt and equity rates are cross-sectional average 1-year trailing rates
based on the 170 ﬁrms in the data sample. The vertical bars (light gray) indicate the oﬃcial
NBER recession periods.
The empirical evidence above suggests that both credit spreads and equity returns are
strongly correlated with the business cycle, indicating that these ﬂuctuations may be
driven by business cycle variation in their common underlying factor: ﬁrm fundamentals.
In particular, in times of low economic growth the levels of credit spreads increase, the
slopes of credit spread curves decrease, and equity growth drops dramatically. The former
may simply be a consequence of an increase in volatility, but a higher volatility cannot
explain the relative shift towards more short-term ﬁrm risk that changes the credit spread
curve from upward- to downward-sloping, nor can it explain the downward spikes in equity
growth. Instead, both of these eﬀects could be related to large and sudden shocks to ﬁrm
fundamentals. To investigate this hypothesis I show in Figure III.4 the average size of large
daily changes – i.e. jumps – in equity value over the sample period 1962–2006. The size of
both positive and negative shocks display a distinct covariation with the business cycle,
with larger jumps mainly occuring in times of low economic growth, thereby conﬁrming
the ﬁndings of Tauchen and Zhou (2010) that jumps in equity returns are time-varying
both with respect to frequency and size.9 To the extent that jumps in equity value proxy
for large sudden changes in the value of ﬁrm fundamentals, the larger negative shocks in
9Consumption growth has a time series correlation with positive jumps of –23.0%, and with negative jumps
of 24.4%.
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economic downturns provide an explanation for both the spikes in equity growth as well
as the declining slope of the credit spread curve.
Figure III.4. Consumption vs. size of equity jumps
Positive jumps
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
−4%
−2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
  7%
  8%
  9%
10%
11%
12%
13%
14%
Negative jumps
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
4%
2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
16%
15%
14%
13%
12%
11%
10%
  9%
  8%
  7%
Trailing 1-year U.S. real personal consumption growth rate (blue) versus size of daily jumps in
equity returns (gray). Jump sizes are cross-sectional average 1-year trailing sizes based on the
170 ﬁrms in the data sample. The vertical bars (light gray) indicate the oﬃcial NBER recession
periods.
The jumps in equity returns reported in Figure III.4 are calculated using a novel
procedure developed in section III.4.3. To investigate whether the detected jumps relate to
company speciﬁc events or instead are results of general market turmoil, trading patterns,
or other non-ﬁrm factors, I list for one of the 170 ﬁrms in the sample, Eastman Kodak
Company, all daily jumps in equity returns that exceed 10% in absolute value. Table
III.1 shows that by searching in Bloomberg for corporate news related to Eastman Kodak
Company, all identiﬁed jumps since 1990 can be directly linked to the dissemination
of company-speciﬁc news. This relation between jumps in equity and arrival of corporate
news is consistent with similar ﬁndings in Lee and Mykland (2008), and provides evidence
that jumps are a natural component of any ﬁrm value model, and with a straightforward
interpretation as the market reaction to the arrival of new information. While jumps in
equity value do not necessarily correspond to jumps in total ﬁrm value, as a jump in
equity value could, in principle, be oﬀset by a simultaneous, opposite jump in debt value,
the results in Table III.1 show that this is rarely the case, as almost all jumps can be
linked to genuine information about ﬁrm fundamentals.
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Thus, jumps in equity value generally reﬂect substantial changes to the value of ﬁrm
fundamentals, and the occurence of these jumps are closely linked to variation in the
overall growth of the economy. Similar patterns are observed in the level and slope of
ﬁrms’ credit spreads, which leads to the conjecture that jump risk may be an important
driver of ﬁrms’ credit spread curves. Any reasonable model of equity and debt value should
take this into account, and the next section shows how to do that in a structural credit
risk framework.
III.3 Model
The empirical results in section III.2 show that accounting for the time-varying nature of
jumps has the potential to explain business cycle variation in the level and slope of the
credit spread curve. Moreover, it is well-documented that credit spreads also depend on
volatility (Campbell and Taksler (2003), Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout, and Weinbaum
(2008), Zhang, Zhou, and Zhu (2009)), and that volatility displays signiﬁcant cyclical
behaviour (Christie (1982), Schwert (1989), Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001)).
In this section I formulate a theoretical model that accommodates all of these features by
developing a structural credit risk model that allows for business cycle variation in both
expected growth rate, volatility and jump behaviour of ﬁrm fundamentals.
III.3.1 Model speciﬁcation
The setting of the model follows the classical framework of Leland (1994a;b) and concerns
a ﬁrm with debt and equity, both modelled as claims to the ﬁrm’s underlying assets. The
ﬁrm has an incentive to issue debt to secure a tax beneﬁt from its coupon payments, and
balances this beneﬁt against the potential deadweight costs it incurs in case of bankruptcy.
The market value Vt of the ﬁrm’s assets is assumed to evolve according to
d(log Vt) = θ
P(Zt)dt + σ(Zt)dW
P
t + dJ
P
t (III.1)
under the physical measure P, with all θPi non-zero and all σi > 0.10 Here, (Zt)t≥0 is an
n−state Markov chain with intensity matrix Ξ that describes the state of the economy,
(W Pt )t≥0 is a standard Brownian motion, and (JPt )t≥0 is a regime-switching jump process
10I use interchangeably the notation x(i) and xi for the ith element of a vector (x1, . . . ,xn).
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JPt =
∑n
i=1 1(Zt=i)J
P
i,t. The processes (Zt)t≥0, (W Pt )t≥0, (JP1,t)t≥0, . . . , (JPn,t)t≥0 are mutually
independent, and each (JPi,t)t≥0 is a compound Poisson process with jump intensity λPi and
jump size density
αPi κ
+,P
i e
−κ+,Pi y1(y>0) + (1− αPi )κ−,Pi eκ
−,P
i y1(y<0)
with κ+,Pi > 1,κ
−,P
i > 0 and 0 ≤ αPi ≤ 1. For ease of interpretation I will assume that the
n macroeconomic states are ordered according to the growth of the economy, with state
1 being the highest and state n the lowest state of growth.
The ﬁrm asset dynamics (III.1) allow for both positive and negative jumps to occur
as well as for the macroeconomy to impact asset value in multiple ways: through the
expected growth rate, the asset volatility, and via both the intensity and magnitude
of jumps. The model thereby extends the work of Chen and Kou (2009) to include
macroeconomic variation, and that of David (2008), Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev
(2010a;b), and Chen (2010) to allow for jumps in asset value. The latter string of papers all
give detailed accounts of how such models can be motivated by fundamental assumptions
about a utility-maximizing representative agent or a stochastic discount factor linked
to the dynamic evolution of prices and aggregate output. While these are important
considerations for understanding the theoretical background of the structural modelling
framework, I focus in this paper on the empirical implications for the valuation of equity
and debt without specifying a similar set of underlying economic assumptions, but merely
note that this can be done (see also Kou (2002)).
Apart from the extended generality in the speciﬁcation (III.1) of the asset dynamics,
the model aligns with several of the above-mentioned papers in the sense that the
shareholder-owned ﬁrm is assumed to continuously issue bonds to enjoy a tax shield
to operating income caused by the bond coupon payments. The tax advantage to debt is
balanced against the bankruptcy costs lost in case of default, and shareholders initially
guarantee the coupon payments to bond holders (if necessary by issuing additional shares).
However, due to their limited liability they will stop disbursements, if the total market
value of assets falls below some threshold b(Zs) that depends on the state of the economy.
Firm default thus occurs at time
τ = inf{s ≥ t |Vs < b(Zs)}
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at which point bond holders take over the ﬁrm after paying liquidation and reorganization
costs amounting to a fraction l(Zτ ) of the remaining asset value. I speciﬁcally require
the default boundaries to be counter-cyclical, i.e. b1 < . . . < bn, consistent with the
interpretation of the n macroeconomic states as representing high to low growth (going
from state 1 to state n). As argued in Chen (2010), the economic intuition behind this is
that the more favourable a state the economy is in, the more willing are shareholders to
accept a low current asset value and still keep the ﬁrm as a going concern.11
To have a tractable modelling of the maturity of issued debt I impose the “roll-over”
debt structure suggested by Leland (1994a) and further detailed in Hilberink and Rogers
(2002), which involves a constant retirement of old debt and simultaneous reissuance
of new. Thus, the ﬁrm is assumed to constantly issue debt with a face value of p and
corresponding coupon rate c, and the redemption of each issuance is determined by the
maturity proﬁle φ(·) ≥ 0 satisfying ∫∞
0
φ(s)ds = 1, i.e. pφ(s) is the amount of face value
issued at time t which will be retired s periods later. Consequently, at time t the total
face value of previously issued debt to be redeemed at time s ≥ t is
pt(s) =
∫ t
−∞
pφ(s− u)du
and hence in particular the amount maturing at time t is
pt(t) =
∫ t
−∞
pφ(t− u)du = p
which equals the face value of the simultaneously issued new debt. This implies that the
total face value of outstanding debt
P =
∫ ∞
t
pt(s)ds = p
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
s
φ(u)duds
is constant through time and therefore results in a constant total coupon payment of
C = cP . Recent models by Chen (2010) and Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010b)
allow the ﬁrm to pursue a dynamic reﬁnancing policy by taking into account the possibility
of issuing further debt in the future. However, the numbers reported in Bhamra, Kuehn,
and Strebulaev (2010b) show that allowing for future debt restructuring has little impact
11Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010b) similarly impose a counter-cyclical default boundary by
placing restrictions on the ﬁrst and second moments of the growth rate of ﬁrm earnings and aggregate
consumption.
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on the model-implied credit spreads, and Chen (2010) similarly ﬁnds that the average
ﬁrm restructures only once every 20 years. Based on these results I prefer to keep a
parsimonious modelling of the capital structure and not model the possibility to relever.
I assume that operating assets generate a continuous payout to bond- and shareholders
at a state-dependent rate β(Zs), which reﬂects that payouts may vary over time in response
to variation in ﬁrm growth. Thus, at any point in time s ≥ t the ﬁrm’s net debt service
payment equals the sum of coupon payments (C) and principal retirement (p) less the
tax beneﬁts to debt, modelled as a constant inﬂow of ζC, asset payouts (at rate β(Zs)),
and the market value of newly issued debt.12
To ease notation, I henceforth let t = 0 and take V0 = v,Z0 = i. The market value of
ﬁrm debt is now given as
Debt(v, i) = EQv,i
[∫ ∞
0
(∫ τ∧s
0
e−ruc p0(s)du
)
ds
]
+EQv,i
[∫ τ
0
e−rsp0(s)ds + e−rτ
(
1− l(Zτ )
)
Vτ
∫∞
τ
p0(s)ds
P
1(τ<∞)
]
where the two terms cover the value of coupon payments and the value of repaid principal,
respectively. Here, r > 0 is the riskless rate, which I assume to be constant for parsimony,
and Q is a risk-neutral pricing measure speciﬁed below. The trade-oﬀ between tax beneﬁts
and bankruptcy costs determines total ﬁrm value as
Firm(v, i) = v + EQv,i
[∫ τ
0
e−rsζC ds
]
− EQv,i
[
e−rτ l(Zτ )Vτ1(τ<∞)
]
and the market value of equity is therefore given as the residual claim
Equity(v, i) = Firm(v, i)−Debt(v, i). (III.2)
To facilitate explicit calculations I consider the speciﬁc debt maturity proﬁle φ(s) =
me−ms, where 1/m is the average maturity of outstanding debt, and the above expressions
then reduce to
Debt(v, i) =
(
C + p
)
EQv,i
[
1− e−(m+r)τ
m + r
]
+ EQv,i
[
e−(m+r)τ
(
1− l(Zτ )
)
Vτ1(τ<∞)
]
(III.3)
Firm(v, i) = v + ζC EQv,i
[
1− e−rτ
r
]
− EQv,i
[
e−rτ l(Zτ )Vτ1(τ<∞)
]
. (III.4)
12Here, I follow Leland (1994a) in assuming that if debt is issued below par, new shares are simultaneously
issued to cover the diﬀerence from par value, and conversely, that ﬁrm payouts in excess of the net debt
service payment are paid out to shareholders as dividends.
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The default triggering exit levels (bi)i=1,...,n are set in order to maximize total ﬁrm value
subject to shareholders’ limited liability. This implies that exit levels are set according to
the n smooth pasting conditions13
lim
v→bi+
∂Equity
∂v
(
v, i
)
= 0 i = 1, . . . ,n.
III.3.2 Risk premia
The structural model is incomplete due to the presence of jumps and regime-switching
behaviour and consequently has no uniquely deﬁned risk premia. I therefore ﬁx a speciﬁc
risk-neutral pricing measure Q, and for reasons of tractability I choose Q such that it
leads to the same type of dynamics for Vt under Q as in (III.1). Cremers, Driessen,
and Maenhout (2008) consider a model with both idiosyncratic and systematic jumps in
asset value, and only attach a jump risk premium to the latter. In my model there is no
distinction between the two types of jumps, and I therefore allow all jumps to carry a risk
premium although some of the jump risk may, in fact, be diversiﬁable. Chen (2010) does
not consider asset jump risk but focuses instead on the importance of business ﬂuctuations
and thus attaches risk premia to the macroeconomic regime shifts, which, in principle, is
also possible within my model. However, as outlined in section III.4, the way I estimate
the model is to take the historical path of the business cycle process (Zt)t≥0 as given,
and then estimate the model on a ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm basis. This approach makes it diﬃcult
to estimate aggregate macroeconomic jump risk premia, since the estimation procedure
would dictate them to vary from ﬁrm to ﬁrm, and I therefore choose to only allow for risk
premia on the diﬀusion and jump risk factors.
I link the pricing measure Q to the physical probability measure P through the nominal
stochastic discount factor (Mt)t≥0
d(logMt) = θM(Zt)dt + σM(Zt)dW
P
t + γM(Zt)dJ
P
t .
This speciﬁc choice of (Mt)t≥0 can be motivated by equilibrium considerations based on the
existence of a utility-maximizing representative agent (see Kou (2002)), and furthermore
13The optimality of these conditions is veriﬁed in Chen and Kou (2009) for the special case with only
one regime. However, for more general types of asset dynamics than those considered in this paper,
Boyarchenko and Levendorskii (2002) and Kyprianou and Surya (2007) show that smooth pasting is not
necessarily the appropriate criterion.
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has the beneﬁt of preserving the dynamic structure of the asset value process (Vt)t≥0
under Q. Hence, under the pricing measure (Vt)t≥0 is still a state-dependent jump-diﬀusion
process with double-exponential log jump sizes
d(log Vt) = θ
Q(Zt)dt + σ(Zt)dW
Q
t + dJ
Q
t (III.5)
with parameters (state-dependent subscript i is suppressed for notational convenience)
θQ = r − β − λQ (δQ − 1)− σ2
2
λQ = λP · δP
αQ =
αPκ+,P
(κ+,P − γM) δP
κ+,Q = κ+,P − γM
κ−,Q = κ−,P + γM
where
δP =
αPκ+,P
κ+,P − γM +
(1− αP)κ−,P
κ−,P + γM
δQ =
αQκ+,Q
κ+,Q − 1 +
(1− αQ)κ−,Q
κ−,Q + 1
and subject to the parameter restrictions κ+,Q > 1,κ−,Q > 0, γM < 0.14 Absence of
arbitrage determines the parameters θM ,σM of the stochastic discount factor through the
conditions
θM +
σ2M
2
= −r − λP ·
(
δP − 1
)
σ · σM = r − β − θP − λQ ·
(
δQ − 1)− σ2
2
and thus there is eﬀectively only one parameter γM to control asset risk premia in each of
the n macroeconomic states. Following Cremers, Driessen, and Maenhout (2008) I deﬁne
the total asset risk premium η as the diﬀerence in drift rates under the physical and
risk-neutral measure
η = ηW + ηJ =
(
θP − θQ)+ (λPζP − λQζQ)
14γM < 0 comes out as a natural condition in case the stochastic discount factor (Mt)t≥0 is motivated by
the existence of a representative power-utility agent (see Kou (2002)).
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and I split it into separate risk premia related to diﬀusion (ηW ) and to jump (ηJ) risk.
Here
ζP =
αPκ+,P
κ+,P − 1 +
(1− αP)κ−,P
κ−,P + 1
− 1, ζQ = α
Qκ+,Q
κ+,Q − 1 +
(1− αQ)κ−,Q
κ−,Q + 1
− 1
are the expected jump sizes under the physical and risk-neutral measure, and the
parameter restriction γM < 0 implies that ηJ ≥ 0 always, see Appendix III.B.4 for details.
III.3.3 Calculation of equity and debt
The market values of equity and debt in equations (III.2)–(III.4) are calculated by
evaluating expectations of the form
EQv,i
[
e−
∫ τ
0 r(Zs)ds (Vτ )
a f(Zτ )1(τ<∞)
]
a ≥ 0 (III.6)
where
τ = inf
{
s ≥ 0 | Vs < b(Zs)
}
with b1 < . . . < bn, and log asset value has the dynamics
d(log Vt) = θ
Q(Zt)dt + σ(Zt)dW
Q
t + dJ
Q
t
detailed in the previous section.15 Compared to existing credit risk models with business
cycle eﬀects, the calculation of (III.6) is complicated by the fact that the model allows for
jumps in asset value, which implies non-continuous sample paths of the asset value process.
While this is an important feature to ﬁt observed credit spreads, as the analysis in section
III.5 will show, it also turns the solution of the model into a non-trivial mathematical
problem. Previous literature has shown how to handle models without jumps in asset value
(Jobert and Rogers (2006), Chen (2010), Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010a;b)), and
the basic idea behind the solution of the current model is to use a state space expansion to
circumvent the discontinuity problem, and thereby be able to exploit the same approach
as in models without jumps. Jiang and Pistorius (2008) develop these ideas and show
in a general framework that the expectation in (III.6) has a representation in terms of
15For reasons of generality the risk-free rate r appearing in (III.6) is allowed to depend on the state of
the economy, although the model speciﬁed in section III.3.1 does not exploit this features but instead
assumes the risk-free rate to be constant.
103
III.4 Estimation methodology
solutions to a series of matrix equations, but they do not consider how to solve the
equations. For the model in this paper I solve the relevant equations in closed form using
an eigenvalue approach similar to Jobert and Rogers (2006). Appendix III.B.1 gives the
solution to the matrix equations, and appendix III.B.2 derives the resulting closed-form
expression for the expectation in (III.6). Despite the substantial complexity of the current
model compared to existing models, the results in the appendices show that it is possible
to obtain closed-form expressions for the values of equity and debt with an arbitrary
number of macroeconomic states n even in the presence of jumps in asset value. The
expressions in appendix III.B.2 deviate slightly from those found in Jiang and Pistorius
(2008) as I correct for an error appearing in one of their main theorems. In the interest
of completeness, I show in appendix III.B.3 how to correct this error in the full generality
of their framework.
III.4 Estimation methodology
Estimation of the structural credit risk model from section III.3 requires separate
identiﬁcation of its two diﬀerent sources of risk: jump and diﬀusion. The estimation
procedure must take into account that both sources are allowed to vary with the state of
the economy, and that the asset value process (Vt)t≥0 is unobservable. These issues are
solved in a series of steps. First, I determine the parameters of the Markov chain (Zt)t≥0
in a way that is consistent with the interpretation of (Zt)t≥0 as describing the state of the
business cycle. Next, I calibrate all directly observable model parameters before I turn
to estimation of the asset process parameters. Here, I ﬁrst develop a new technique for
identifying the parameters of the asset jump process (JPt )t≥0, and then I combine two
well-known estimation procedures to estimate all remaining parameters.
III.4.1 Business cycle
The estimation of business cycle variation is based on the trailing 1-year U.S. real personal
consumption growth rate discussed in section III.2.1. The time series covers the period
January 1962 to December 2006, and following the approach of Tauchen and Hussey (1991)
I split the range of observed 1-year growth rates into four diﬀerent regions, spanning from
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a state 1 of high growth (above 5.43%) over states 2 and 3 of high-to-medium and medium-
to-low growth (3.39%–5.43% and 1.34%–3.39%) to a state 4 of low growth (below 1.34%).16
Figure III.5 shows the variation over time in the 1-year consumption growth rate together
with the four calibrated states of the economy, and we see how all of the oﬃcial NBER
recession periods correspond to periods of medium-to-low or low consumption growth
(state 3 or 4) in the calibration.
Figure III.5. Consumption growth and the state of the economy
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
4%
2%
0%
2%
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6%
8%
10%
State 4
State 3
State 2
State 1
Trailing 1-year U.S. real personal consumption growth rate (blue) and the resulting four regions
(black horizontal lines) that describe the state of the business cycle. The vertical bars (light
gray) indicate the oﬃcial NBER recession periods.
The time series of calibrated states gives the evolution of the Markov chain (Zt)t≥0 over
the sample period, and based on this it is straightforward to estimate the intensity matrix
Ξ. Details on the calibration of the four states and estimation of the intensity matrix
are given in appendix III.C.1. Table III.2 contains the estimated transition intensities
and reveals that the average duration of a period of high growth is 1/1.66 = 0.60 years,
whereas the average duration of a period of low growth is 1/0.87 = 1.15 years, almost
two-times as long. In particular, the latter is consistent with the average time span of 0.90
years of the 6 NBER recession periods occurring throughout the sample period.
16The calibration technique of Tauchen and Hussey (1991) is used to determine four levels of annual
consumption growth: 0.46%, 2.23%, 4.55%, 6.32%, from which the boundaries of the four regions of
consumption growth are found by calculating the midpoints.
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Table III.2. Shifts between macroeconomic states
Estimated intensity matrix for changes in the state of the U.S. economy. The estimation is based on the
calibrated path of the macroeconomic state process (Zt)t≥0 in Figure III.5. Asymptotic standard errors
are calculated by outer product and reported in parenthesis.
State 1 State 2 State 3 State 4
State 1 (high growth) 1.66
(0.48)
State 2 0.63 0.80
(0.19) (0.21)
State 3 0.99 0.30
(0.27) (0.15)
State 4 (low growth) 0.87
(0.44)
To further evaluate the ﬁt of the calibrated Markov chain (Zt)t≥0 to the observed time
series of consumption growth rates, I compare in Table III.3 the estimated stationary
distribution for (Zt)t≥0 with its empirical counterpart. Looking at both the distribution
across states as well as at the ﬁrst four standardized moments supports the impression that
the Markov chain gives a satisfactory description of historical business cycle behaviour.
Furthermore, the agreement between the Markov chain and the oﬃcial NBER recession
periods is once again conﬁrmed by noting that the total part of the estimation period
January 1962 to December 2006 spent in any of the NBER recession periods amounts to
12.0%, which is close to the estimated probability of 11.4% of being in the low growth
state (state 4).
The above results show that a model with four macroeconomic states captures the
observed business cycle variation well. David (2008) similarly considers a four-state model
based on inﬂation and earnings growth, whereas Chen (2010) uses nine states to obtain
even richer dynamics by calibrating to the consumption and dividend growth model of
Bansal and Yaron (2004). A model with just two states is, in fact, suﬃcient to demonstrate
the qualitative implications of business cycle variation for credit risk in a single-ﬁrm
setting, and it may also be enough to capture the eﬀects at the aggregate level (Hackbarth,
Miao, and Morellec (2006), Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010a;b)). However, as seen
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Table III.3. Distribution of macroeconomic states
Panel A displays the average time spent in each of the four macroeconomic states. The occupation time
is calculated from the empirically calibrated path for the Markov chain (Zt)t≥0 (the black horizontal
lines in Figure III.5) and from the stationary distribution for (Zt)t≥0 (corresponding to the estimated
transition intensities in Table III.2). Panel B displays the ﬁrst four standardized moments of the observed
consumption growth rate (the blue line in Figure III.5) and the stationary distribution for (Zt)t≥0. The
stationary distribution is distributed on the following consumption growth rate levels (the y-axis in Figure
III.5): 0.46% (State 4), 2.23% (State 3), 4.55% (State 2), 6.32% (State 1).
Panel A: Occupation time
Macroeconomic state Empirical Stationary
State 1 (high) 17.2% 15.3%
State 2 41.3% 40.5%
State 3 30.9% 32.7%
State 4 (low) 10.6% 11.4%
Panel B: Moments
Empirical Stationary
Mean (×102) 3.69 3.18
Variance (×104) 3.65 3.24
Skewness –0.35 0.15
Kurtosis 3.21 2.00
for example in Figure III.5, capturing empirical business cycle variation using only two
states provides a very coarse approximation in a quantitative, ﬁrm-level analysis.
To ensure consistent estimation of the credit risk model on a ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm basis, I take
the evolution of the business cycle process (Zt)t≥0 as given by ﬁxing it to its historical path
shown in Figure III.5. This implies that exactly the same time periods are taken as states
of high/medium/low growth for all ﬁrms, which is necessary to facilitate a meaningful
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comparison of estimated model parameters across ﬁrms. In addition, this also simpliﬁes
the estimation procedure, which would otherwise have to involve the state of the business
cycle as an additional, latent variable (David (2008)).
III.4.2 Observable parameters
The credit risk model employs several parameters that are directly observable: the average
maturity of outstanding debt 1/m, the asset payout rate β, the coupon rate c, the
corporate tax rate ζ, the risk-free rate r, and the corporate bond loss rate l. For each
ﬁrm the average debt maturity 1/m is ﬁxed at its time series average, and the state-
dependent payout rate β is calibrated to a time series of observed payout rates by OLS to
give a ﬁxed payout rate within each of the four macroeconomic states. Calculations of the
time series of debt maturity and payout rate are detailed in appendix III.A.1. Although
the bond coupon rate c could be observed directly from coupon rates on outstanding
bonds, I prefer instead to set it by requiring initial debt value to equal the debt principal
P . This avoids subtle considerations about exactly which bond to use for ﬁxing the coupon
rate, and also ensures that the coupon rate is set in accordance with empirical evidence
showing that most bond issues are oﬀered at or close to par.17
For the corporate tax rate I follow existing literature and set ζ = 35% (Leland and
Toft (1996), Graham (2000), Chen (2010)), and the risk-free rate is ﬁxed at r = 6.18%,
the mean of the 1-year U.S. Treasury rate over the period January 1962 to December
2006. Throughout the sample the 1-year U.S. Treasury rate does show some signs of
counter-cyclicality wrt. consumption growth, but the correlation is heavily ﬂuctuating
over time.18 In addition, there is little consensus in existing literature on the importance
of non-constant interest rates for structural credit risk models (Kim, Ramaswamy, and
Sundaresan (1993), Longstaﬀ and Schwartz (1995)), so since the focus in this paper is
on modelling credit spreads, keeping the interest rate constant seems like a reasonable
17In an empirical study of corporate bond issues, Fung and Rudd (1986) ﬁnd that the oﬀer yield generally lies
very close to the coupon rate. Similar evidence is found by studying all corporate bond issues registered in
Moody’s Default Risk database. Among all issues with an oﬀer price available, 95.1% of the observations
lie within ±2% of par value.
18The 5-year rolling window correlation between consumption growth and the 1-year Treasury rate ranges
from –74.3% to 85.1% during the sample period.
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approximation.
There is on the other hand substantial empirical evidence that the corporate bond
recovery rate 1−l is varying with the business cycle (Duﬃe and Singleton (1999), Altman,
Brady, Resti, and Sironi (2005), Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan (2007)), although as
noted by Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010b) numerical estimates are subject to
considerable uncertainty. In the theoretical model, 1− l speciﬁes the recovery rate of ﬁrm
asset value in case of default, which is diﬃcult to observe empirically, and I therefore
follow existing literature (Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010b), Chen (2010)) and
estimate 1 − l by looking at recovery of par values instead. The recovery rate data are
taken from Moody’s Default Risk Service database, where I compute a trailing 1-year
recovery rate compounded from recovery rates on the most frequent debt classes and
debt seniorities and weigh by the amount outstanding at default. Details are in appendix
III.A.2. I subsequently use OLS to convert the time series of recovery rates into estimates
of the state-dependent recovery rates 1− l, subject to the condition that recovery should
be decreasing with the state of the economy as indicated by empirical evidence. This leads
the recovery rates for state 1 and 2, and similarly the rates for state 3 and 4, to collapse
and results in recovery levels of 1−l(1) = 1−l(2) = 36.5% and 1−l(3) = 1−l(4) = 23.7%.
III.4.3 Jumps
Since the asset value process (Vt)t≥0 is unobservable, it is necessary to use time series of
either debt or equity to identify the asset process parameters, but the presence of jumps
in the asset value dynamics (III.1) puts certain requirements on these time series. In
section III.3.1 both equity and debt are modelled as continuous functions of Vt, and this
implies a one-to-one relation between jumps in asset value and jumps in debt and equity
value. A historical time series of debt or equity returns should therefore be suﬃcient
to infer distributional characteristics about jumps in asset value. However, to be able
to discriminate between diﬀusion (θP,σ) and jump parameters (λP,αP,κ+,P,κ−,P), it is
crucial that the time series is sampled at a suﬃciently high frequency19, which eﬀectively
means at least at a daily frequency (Aït-Sahalia (2004), Johannes, Polson, and Stroud
19Jorion (1988) studies jumps and diﬀusive heteroscedasticity in equity and exchange rate returns and ﬁnds
that a weekly and a monthly sampling frequency give considerably diﬀerent results.
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(2009)). Furthermore, because a sudden, abnormally large positive or negative return
is a rare event, it requires a long estimation period to accurately estimate the jump
distribution parameters (Maheu and McCurdy (2004)). Altogether, this creates a “curse
of frequency” problem: the combination of high-frequency (daily) observations with low-
frequency shifts in the state of the economy implies that estimation of the model has to
involve a substantial amount of data to ensure parameter identiﬁcation. I therefore only
consider ﬁrms with at least 20 years of data available, which results in a total sample of
170 ﬁrms from the S&P 500 Industrials index.20 From the state occupation times reported
in Panel A of Table III.3 this implies that there are at least two years of daily observations
available for the estimation within each of the four macroeconomic states.
The absence of long time series of daily market prices of debt on a ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm basis
means that jump identiﬁcation in practice has to be based on daily equity returns. Several
recent studies of jumps in equity returns even use intra-daily data together with so-called
“realized variation” estimation techniques (see e.g. Huang and Tauchen (2005), Andersen,
Bollerslev, and Diebold (2007), Bollerslev, Law, and Tauchen (2008), Lee and Mykland
(2008)). While it is in general suﬃcient for jump detection to use daily data, it is crucial
for the “realized variation” methodology that it is applied to intra-daily data, and such
data have only recently become available. Instead, I estimate the parameters of the jump
distribution from daily equity returns by developing a simple explorative technique that
relies on the same basic intuition as the “realized variation” statistics, but does not require
the availability of intra-daily data.
Since a jump represents a large and instant change in equity value, I classify a daily
equity return as containing at least one jump, if the observed return is “suﬃciently far”
away from the return I would expect to see in the absence of jumps. In addition, I follow
existing literature and assume that due to the infrequency of jumps there can be at most
one jump on any given day, and that a jump always dominates any other shock to the
stock price on that day (see e.g. Eraker, Johannes, and Polson (2003), Tauchen and Zhou
(2010)). I can therefore use the entire daily return as a measure of the size of the jump,
20Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) similarly impose a lower bound of 20 years of available data in their
study of ﬁrm leverage, Maheu and McCurdy (2004) use 17 to 38 years of daily data to study jumps in
equity returns, and Bollerslev and Todorov (2011) use 19 years of intra-daily data to study the importance
of jumps for equity and variance risk premia.
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and thus estimate the jump intensity as the average number of jumps per year, and the
jump size as the average return on days with jumps.
More speciﬁcally, for a given ﬁrm and in a given macroeconomic state, I identify daily
return observations containing a jump by ﬁrst determining the expected range of the non-
jump returns. Using only return observations in the 5% to 95% percentile range of the
distribution of all daily returns within that state, I calculate the empirical mean μ5/95 and
standard deviation σ5/95 and take these as measures of the mean and standard deviation of
non-jump returns. Jump-returns are then identiﬁed as those observations in the sample of
all daily returns that lie more than 5 standard deviations σ5/95 away from the expectation
μ5/95.21
This simple procedure, that only uses the center part of the return distribution to
characterize non-jump returns, eﬀectively mitigates possibly deceptive eﬀects from a jump
detection procedure that uses the entire return distribution, where a few abnormally large
return observations could potentially distort the inference.22 Figure III.6 exempliﬁes the
procedure for one of the 170 ﬁrms in the data sample, Eastman Kodak Company, by
showing the distribution of all daily equity returns split across the four macroeconomic
states. The dashed vertical lines indicate the 5% and 95% percentile cutoﬀ points used
to calculate the mean μ5/95 and standard deviation σ5/95 within each state, and the solid
line marks the average return in the 5%–95%-percentile truncated distribution.
III.4.4 Asset value parameters
To complete the estimation of the model, it remains to estimate the parameters of the
asset value process (Vt)t≥0. All parameters could, in principle, be determined in a joint
maximum likelihood estimation, but it is well-known that jump distribution parameters
are diﬃcult to estimate accurately regardless of the type of estimation procedure (Lee and
Mykland (2008)). To reduce this fundamental estimation inaccuracy I employ a two-stage
21Aït-Sahalia (2004) shows that a distance of more than 4 standard deviations from the mean is required
to reliably disentangle the jump component from its non-jump part.
22I choose a cutoﬀ level of 5% to single out parts of the return distribution that are very unlikely to be
aﬀected by jumps. Applying the procedure with either 1% or 0.1% changes both the estimated frequency
and size of jumps, but leaves the relative jump pattern across the four macroeconomic states essentially
unaltered.
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Figure III.6. Equity returns, Eastman Kodak Co.
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Distribution of daily equity returns for Eastman Kodak Co. in the four macroeconomic states
over the period January 2, 1962 to December 29, 2006. Returns are continuously compounded
and in percentages. The dashed vertical lines indicate 5% and 95% percentiles in the state-
dependent return distributions, and the solid lines indicate the mean return in the 5%–95%
range of the distributions.
estimation procedure, where I ﬁrst determine the jump intensity λP and the proportion
of positive jumps αP using the jump detection procedure in section III.4.3, and then
subsequently estimate the remaining parameters by maximum likelihood.23 An additional
outcome of the jump detection procedure is that positive and negative jumps appear to be
23Ericsson and Reneby (2005) show that maximum likelihood is suitable for estimating a variety of structural
credit risk models.
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of approximately the same size, and I therefore set κ+,P = κ−,P in the estimation below.24
While the jump identiﬁcation procedure could be used to estimate both the jump
intensity λP and all the jump size parameters (αP,κ+,P,κ−,P), I only use it to determine
λP and αP for two reasons. First, using estimates of κ+,P and κ−,P obtained from the
procedure in section III.4.3 means that the estimation will be based on the implausible
assumption that jumps in asset and equity value are always of the same magnitude.
Secondly, separate estimation of all jump parameters (λP,αP,κ+,P,κ−,P) without taking
the diﬀusive parameters (θP,σP) into account, severely weakens the possibilities of the
model to ﬁt the data. Note, namely, that estimating the diﬀusion growth rate θP while
keeping all jump parameters ﬁxed would set strong bounds on θP, since it would then
have to be set to match both the empirical growth rates of equity and debt as well as
the (ﬁxed) jump growth rate. Unreported results show that for some ﬁrms this becomes a
severe restriction, whereas allowing κ+,P and κ−,P to be estimated jointly with the diﬀusion
parameters signiﬁcantly increases the ﬁt of the model.
Having estimated (λP,αP) the remaining parameters (κ+,P,κ−,P, θP,σ, γM) are found
by combining ordinary maximum likelihood estimation (Duan (1994; 2000)) based on time
series of debt and equity with an extension of the iterative approach suggested by Vassalou
and Xing (2004). The data requirement of at least 20 years of daily data implies that
estimation for a single ﬁrm involves between 5,000 and 11,000 daily observations which,
in combination with the numerical complexity of the expressions (III.2)-(III.4) for equity
and debt, renders standard maximum likelihood estimation infeasible.25 I circumvent this
problem by splitting the likelihood estimation into a two-step iterative procedure: ﬁrst,
estimation of parameters (κ+,P,κ−,P, θP,σ, γM) conditional on time series of implied asset
value V , debt coupon C, and default boundaries b, and next a recalculation of implied
asset values, debt coupon and default boundaries conditional on the updated parameter
estimates. The two steps are then repeated until parameter estimates converge. Splitting
the estimation into a parameter estimation and a time series calibration part makes a
24For most ﬁrms the estimated value of αP lies around 0.5–0.6. In those cases setting κ+,P = κ−,P essentially
corresponds to requiring the expected contribution from jumps to asset returns to be close to zero, which
is consistent with similar results for equity returns in Maheu and McCurdy (2004).
25Standard maximum likelihood estimation requires inversion of the expression for the market price of
equity as part of the parameter optimization, and this becomes numerically intractable for large data
sets.
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huge diﬀerence from a computational perspective, and as noted in Lando (2004) such
an approach is closely related to ordinary maximum likelihood estimation and has rapid
numerical convergence. Details on the implementation are given in appendix III.C.2.
III.5 Results
I consider in this section the results of an empirical estimation of the structural credit
risk model following the procedure outlined in section III.4. I compare estimated model
parameters to the existing literature and analyze implications of the estimated model for
credit spreads, net beneﬁts to debt, and optimal leverage.
III.5.1 Model parameters
Estimation of the credit risk model is computationally challenging since it is based on
daily data spanning multiple decades as discussed in section III.4. I therefore focus the
ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm estimation on the 15 largest ﬁrms in the sample (as measured by market
capitalization on January 2nd, 1962), and Table III.4 reports the cross-sectional average
parameter estimates.
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Table III.4. Model parameters
Cross-sectional average parameter values from estimation of the structural credit risk model on the 15
largest ﬁrms in the S&P 500 Industrials index as of January 1962. Panel A lists cross-sectional parameter
estimates, and Panel B lists asset growth rates and risk premia.
Panel A: Parameter estimates
State 1 State 2 State 3 State 4
λP 2.25 2.04 2.48 1.41
κ+,P 31.85 24.79 22.53 24.18
κ−,P 31.85 24.79 22.53 24.18
αP 0.63 0.53 0.51 0.64
θP 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.01
σ 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.17
γM –6.79 –1.83 –1.57 –4.21
β 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06
Panel B: Asset growth rates and risk premia
State 1 State 2 State 3 State 4
Asset growth rate (θP + λPζP) 6.84% 7.98% 4.08% 4.32%
Diﬀusion (θP) 3.58% 6.61% 3.43% 1.06%
Jump (λPζP) 3.26% 1.36% 0.65% 3.26%
Asset risk premium (η) 7.89% 10.31% 7.34% 8.08%
Diﬀusion (ηW ) 1.26% 3.11% –0.84% 0.68%
Jump (ηJ) 6.63% 7.20% 8.18% 7.40%
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The table shows that if we for a moment disregard the jumps, then the asset growth
rate (θP) is pro-cyclical and the asset volatility (σ) counter-cyclical. Both ﬁndings are
consistent with similar results about business cycle patterns in the expected value and
volatility of stock returns in e.g. Fama and French (1989) and Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel,
and Xu (2001). If we now consider the jumps, then it is surprising to note that the jump
parameters do not display particular signs of business cycle variation, despite the evidence
in Andersen, Bollerslev, and Diebold (2007) and Bollerslev, Law, and Tauchen (2008) that
large jumps may be related to macroeconomic news. An average of 0.9–1.4 positive jumps
(αPλP) and 0.5–1.2 negative jumps ((1−αP)λP) occur each year, and both the proportion
of positive jumps (αP) and the jump sizes (κP) are remarkably stable across the four
macroeconomic states. The estimated number of jumps are comparable to those reported
in Ball and Torous (1983), Honoré (1998), and Eraker (2004), but in general smaller than
those found in Maheu and McCurdy (2004) and Lee and Mykland (2008). Table III.4 also
shows that although the parameter restriction κ+,P = κ−,P was motivated by empirical
evidence in section III.4.4, it appears to be a constraint in the actual estimation and most
likely the main reason for the relatively small and almost a-cyclical asset jump sizes of
3%-4% (1/κP), which contrast the observed equity jump sizes of 7%-15% in Figure III.4.
The ﬁrm payout rate is slightly counter-cyclical and hence in line with numbers
reported in Lettau and Ludvigson (2005) showing that consumption and dividend growth
display minor negative correlation, and the total asset growth rate is strongly pro-cyclical,
which by looking at the data appears to be mainly due to large increases in debt ﬁnancing
in the high growth states.
The results regarding risk premia are less encouraging albeit largely consistent with
those found in Cremers, Driessen, and Maenhout (2008). Structural credit risk models
that include jump risk tend to favour jump over diﬀusive risk, and jumps therefore easily
become the main driver of risk premia. In one of the states this even leads to a negative
diﬀusion risk premium similar to the result in Cremers, Driessen, and Maenhout (2008).
However, although jump risk is the main determinant of the total asset risk premium,
I do not ﬁnd that it completely drives out the diﬀusive risk premium as in Cremers,
Driessen, and Maenhout (2008). The estimated risk premia display a surprising lack of
business cycle variation, and there may be at least two reasons that can help explain
this. First of all, the risk premium speciﬁcation I employ in this model corresponds to
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assuming a representative agent with constant relative risk aversion within each of the four
macroeconomic states (Kou (2002)), and this is likely to be too simple to match observed
risk premia (Cremers, Driessen, and Maenhout (2008)). Secondly, the estimation in Table
III.4 is only based on a selection of the largest U.S. industrial ﬁrms, but as shown in
Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000) business cycle variation in ﬁrm risk is in general
more pronounced for small ﬁrms e.g. due to tighter credit market conditions.
III.5.2 Credit spreads
The introduction of time-varying jumps in asset value was motivated in section III.2
by the substantial business cycle variation in level and slope of empirical credit spread
curves. To examine if the theoretical model is able to capture these stylized facts, I graph
in Figure III.7 model-implied credit spread curves for diﬀerent levels of leverage based on
the parameter estimates in Panel A of Table III.4.
It is evident that both level and slope of the credit spread curve are strongly dependent
on ﬁrm leverage and the state of the economy. The model generates credit spreads close
to zero for ﬁrms with leverage below 20%, and credit spreads increase to several hundred
basis points as the amount of debt ﬁnancing increases. The importance of leverage for
the level of credit spreads is not surprising given the empirical evidence in e.g. Campbell
and Taksler (2003) and Ericsson, Jacobs, and Oviedo (2009), but Figure III.7 shows that
leverage is also an important determinant of the slope of the credit spread curve, with
the curve being mainly upward-sloping for ﬁrms with low to moderate levels of leverage
and downward-sloping for more levered ﬁrms. For the latter group, keeping leverage ﬁxed
while changing the state of the economy also leads to substantial changes in the short
end of the curve, with spreads almost tripling from the best to the worst state of the
economy. However, state-dependence only plays a role for short-term spreads since they
are mainly determined by the current state of the economy, as opposed to spreads on
longer term debt issues that are essentially weighted averages across all states of the
economy. The latter is a consequence of the estimated state transition intensities from
Table III.2, since they imply that the probability of remaining within any given state
until maturity vanishes as debt maturity increases. This contrasts results in Chen (2010),
where the 10-year credit spread varies substantially across diﬀerent states of the economy,
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Figure III.7. Credit spread
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Model-implied credit spread as function of average debt maturity for leverage ratios between
20% and 50%.
which is due to considerably diﬀerent state transition dynamics that cause the economy
to spend most of its time in a limited part of the state space. Therefore, in his model,
long-term spreads cannot be viewed as weighted averages across all possible states of the
economy, and this introduces state-dependence also in long-term credit spreads.
It may appear from Figure III.7 as if credit spreads are mostly determined by leverage
and only to a minor extent by the state of the economy, but empirical leverage ratios
are highly state-dependent as mentioned in section III.2.2, and this has to be taken
into consideration when accounting for the aggregate eﬀect of state-dependence in credit
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spreads.26 The increase in level and decrease in slope of empirical credit spread curves
when economic conditions deteriorate, as observed in Figure III.1 and III.2, are therefore
consequences of two eﬀects. There is a direct eﬀect through a change in the expected
growth, volatility, and jump behaviour of the ﬁrm’s assets, and there is an indirect eﬀect
through an increase in the ﬁrm’s leverage. Figure III.7 only focuses on the former but
nevertheless indicates that the estimated model captures the changes in both level and
slope well for medium and highly levered ﬁrms. For low-leverage ﬁrms it is the magnitude
of the indirect eﬀect via leverage that for any given ﬁrm determines, whether the model
is able to give an appropriate description of short- and long-term credit spreads.
III.5.3 Implied asset values, default barriers, and coupon rates
Although the model does not per se allow debt coupon C and default barriers b to be
time-varying, time series of both variables appear as natural biproducts of the estimation.
They are both set on a daily basis to ensure that debt always trades at par (see section
III.4.2) and the smooth pasting conditions are satisﬁed, and Table III.5 give their time
series averages relative to model-implied asset value V . Despite the fact that the debt
coupon C is implicitly determined from the par value of debt and not inferred from
observed bond coupon rates, the model is still able to generate economically plausible
values. The model-implied interest expense C/P increases from 7.23% in the high growth
state to 8.39% in the low growth state, and these numbers lie close to the sample averages
of 6.44% and 9.60%, respectively.
While the default barriers b do not have obvious empirical counterparts, their range of
13% to 23% of asset value aligns well with similar numbers reported for the median default
boundary in Chen (2010). Note also that within any given state, all default boundaries
b1, . . . , b4 lie close together. This indicates that the jump risk mechanism employed in
Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010a;b) and Chen (2010), which is the instant change
of default barrier resulting from a sudden shift in the prevailing economic regime, is of
minor importance once the model is extended to allow for jumps in asset value.
The trade-oﬀ between tax beneﬁts and bankruptcy costs generates counter-cyclical
26For the full data sample of 170 ﬁrms, the 1st (3rd) quartile in the cross-sectional distribution of leverage
is 11.7% (31.4%) in state 1 and increases to 22.4% (48.8%) in state 4.
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Table III.5. Asset value, debt coupon, and exit levels
Cross-sectional average statistics based on time series of unlevered asset value V , total coupon C, and
default barriers b1, . . . , b4. All time series are implied from the estimation of the structural credit risk
model on the 15 largest ﬁrms in the S&P 500 Industrials index as of January 1962.
Macroeconomic state C
V
C
P
b1
V
b4
V
Firm− V
V
State 1 (high) 1.41% 7.23% 12.95% 13.58% 2.60%
State 2 2.12% 7.85% 18.35% 19.14% 3.16%
State 3 2.38% 8.16% 19.58% 20.58% 3.30%
State 4 (low) 2.69% 8.39% 21.97% 22.88% 3.36%
All states 2.14% 7.90% 18.19% 19.02% 3.13%
net tax beneﬁts to debt of 2.60% to 3.36% of unlevered asset value, comparable to the
3.8%–4.3% in Korteweg (2010) and the 1.1% reported in van Binsbergen, Graham, and
Yang (2010). Moreover, van Binsbergen, Graham, and Yang (2010) decompose their 1.1%
net gain into a 9.0% gross beneﬁt and a 7.9% cost, which are slightly bigger than the
numbers found in the current estimation, where the model-implied gross tax beneﬁt ranges
from 4.95% (state 1) to 8.30% (state 4) and costs from 2.35% (state 1) to 4.94% (state
4). Counter-cyclicality of the estimated tax beneﬁts may at ﬁrst seem surprising, given
that bankruptcy costs should be higher when the economy is in a downturn, and in fact
they are: bankruptcy costs constitute 2.35% of asset value in state 1 and 4.94% in state
4. However, coupon payments relative to assets are also considerably higher in the low
growth state and that is what causes net tax beneﬁts to be higher, when growth is lower.
Note that this conclusion may be reversed if the model is extended to take a possible loss
of tax shield into account (Leland and Toft (1996), since this will presumably reduce gross
tax beneﬁts more in times of low economic growth.
III.5.4 Optimal capital structure
The tax beneﬁts to issuing debt and the disadvantage in terms of default risk can be
weighted against each other to obtain an optimal trade-oﬀ and hence an optimal choice of
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leverage. While the previous section addressed net beneﬁts at actual leverage, I consider
in this section how much larger beneﬁts would be if leverage was optimally chosen. Here,
I follow existing literature and neglect any costs to issuing debt, and thus the maximal
net beneﬁt to debt may be viewed as an upper bound on the maximum attainable gain
once issuance and reﬁnancing costs are taken into account.
Based on the parameters in Panel A of Table III.4 I plot in Figure III.8 net tax beneﬁts
against leverage for debt maturities of 1, 5, and 10 years, and the ﬁgure shows how longer
maturities make debt less risky and therefore leads to larger beneﬁts (through a higher
coupon C and lower exit levels b). The estimated maximal net beneﬁts of 4.28%–4.48%
for the 1 year maturity and 12.34%–12.84% for the 10 year maturity debt are compatible
with the 1%-10% found by Korteweg (2010) and the 0%–14% in van Binsbergen, Graham,
and Yang (2010). Interestingly, the model implies little state-dependence in the optimal
level of net beneﬁts, which is due to the same mechanism that led to state-invariance of
long-term credit spreads in section III.5.2. The fact that the economy passes through all
four states on a regular basis implies that the optimal leverage ratio is based on a ﬁrm’s
operating conditions in all four states of the business cycle and only pays minor attention
to the current state of the economy. Figure III.8 further shows that the net beneﬁt curves
are almost ﬂat around the maximal beneﬁt, which implies that the maximal debt issuance
gain has a limited sensitivity to leverage. Hence, in the absence of debt restructuring costs
there is a whole range of close-to-optimal capital structures, which is consistent with
the empirical ﬁnding in Leary and Roberts (2005) that leverage is slow-moving because
adjustment costs reduce the incentive to restructure.
A comparison of results for each of the 15 ﬁrms in the estimation shows that the cross-
sectional average maximal net beneﬁts to debt range from 7.2% (state 1) to 9.0% (state 4),
which should be compared to the realized net beneﬁts of 2.60% (state 1) to 3.36% (state 4)
reported in Table III.5. In terms of leverage this corresponds to observed average leverage
ratios of 15.5% (state 1) to 25.5% (state 4) and estimated optimal leverage ratios between
34.1% and 35.7%. These numbers are in line with those reported in Korteweg (2010) for
ﬁrms with interest-bearing debt, where the average observed leverage is 25.9% and the
optimal leverage 32.8%.
While the numbers seem to suggest that the 15 ﬁrms in general are underlevered
according to the model, the conclusion is not that clear-cut. A comparison of actual
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Figure III.8. Optimal leverage
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Model-implied net beneﬁts to debt as function of leverage for average debt maturities of 1, 5,
and 10 years.
and model-implied optimal leverage ratios shows that while most of the ﬁrms (87%) are
underlevered in the high growth state (state 1), this reduces to just over half of the ﬁrms
(60%) in the low growth state (state 4). In other words, although structural credit risk
models traditionally have been known to project unrealistically high optimal leverage
ratios, this does not seem to be the case once business cycle and jump risk is taken into
account.
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III.6 Conclusion
I demonstrate how empirical credit spreads on both investment and speculative grade
corporate bonds vary with the state of the economy as changes in economic growth
induce shifts in both the level of risk and the distribution between short- and long-term
risk. I provide evidence that these movements in short- and long-term risk are linked to
idiosyncratic jump patterns and develop a structural credit risk model that encompasses
both business cycle variation and jump risk.
Corporate credit spreads are low (high) and the credit spread curve upward-sloping
(ﬂat or downward-sloping), when economic growth is high (low), and this implies a
counter-cyclical level and pro-cyclical slope of the credit spread curve. Using an extensive
data set of daily data spanning 45 years I estimate the structural model on a ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm
basis, and show that it replicates the observed variation in both level and slope of the
credit spread curve. As part of the estimation I provide a new procedure for estimation
of idiosyncratic jump risk and show that this approach is consistent with observed shocks
to ﬁrm fundamentals.
The estimated model implies that long-term credit spreads, optimal leverage, and net
beneﬁts to debt all have low sensitivity to the business cycle. This is a natural consequence
of the fact that the model explicitly incorporates expectations about future changes in the
economy, and the current state of the economy therefore has minimal impact on long-term
decisions such as the choice of optimal capital structure.
The results in the paper indicate that the inclusion of either business cycle or jump risk
in existing models is insuﬃcient for an adequate description of corporate credit spreads,
since it is the interaction between the two factors that is crucial for capturing business
cycle variation in short- and medium-term credit spreads. Given that the current model
emphasizes the importance of business cycle variation in jump risk but has some diﬃculties
in explaining the related risk premia, it is an interesting topic for future research to reach
a more detailed description of how jump risk premia move with the business cycle.
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III.A Data description
The analysis of historical corporate bond spreads in section III.2 and the model estimation
in section III.4 are based on the ﬁrm and macroeconomic variables listed below.
III.A.1 Firm variables
The sample consists of all ﬁrms in the S&P500 500 Industrials stock index as of January
1962 for which more than 20 years of data is available. For each ﬁrm information on the
following four variables is collected: market value of equity, book value of debt, ﬁrm payout,
and average debt maturity. Market capitalization is based on daily time series from CRSP
of the number of shares outstanding and the price per share, and the other variables are
computed from quarterly or annual book values from Compustat. Annual values are used
to supplement whenever quarterly values are missing, and the quarterly observations are
converted into a daily time series by linear interpolation as in Ericsson, Jacobs, and Oviedo
(2009). Book value of debt is constructed as the sum of short- (STD) and long-term debt
(LTD), where the former is calculated as the maximum of “debt in current liabilities”
and “debt due in 1 year”, and the latter as the maximum of “total long-term debt” and
“debt maturing in 2–5 years” (DD2+DD3+DD4+DD5). The continuously compounded,
annualized ﬁrm payout rate is determined as the sum of (annualized) “interest expense”
and “common dividends” divided by the sum of market value of equity and book value of
debt. Finally, the average maturity of outstanding debt is calculated as
0.5 · STD + 1.5 ·DD2 + 2.5 ·DD3 + 3.5 ·DD4 + 4.5 ·DD5 + 8.5 · (LTD −∑5i=2 DDi)
STD + LTD
where an average maturity of 8.5 years for debt maturing in more than 5 years is based
on the empirical evidence in Larsen (2006).
III.A.2 Macroeconomic variables
Interest rate
Daily data on the continuously compounded 1-year U.S. Treasury rate is from the Federal
Reserve Board (Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2007)).
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Consumption growth
Monthly data on the real personal consumption growth rate is from the U.S. Department
of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 2.8.1.
Corporate bond yield
Monthly yields to maturity are from the AAA/AA and A/BBB subindices of the Merrill
Lynch U.S. Corporate Investment Grade bond index, and the BB and B subindices of the
Merrill Lynch U.S. Corporate High Yield, Cash Pay bond index. All yields are collected
from Thomson Datastream.
Recovery rate
Recovery rate data from Moody’s Default Risk Service database are used to construct
a 1-year trailing recovery rate. The time series covers the period 1985 to 2006 and
comprises 1,754 corporate bond recovery observations. The recovery rate is measured
as the market value one month after default, and the sample consists of bonds from two
debt classes: “Conv./Exch. Bond/Debenture” (11%), “Regular Bond/Debenture” (89%),
and four debt seniority categories: “Senior Secured” (6%), “Senior Subordinated” (17%),
“Senior Unsecured” (49%), “Subordinated” (28%).
A restriction to only consider recovery rates on regular senior unsecured bonds would
be more in line with the theoretical model in section III.3, but the lack of available data
requires a less restrictive approach to reduce noise and obtain a robust time series of
recovery estimates. Limiting the data set to only contain recovery rates on regular senior
unsecured bonds would reduce the amount of observations from 1,754 to 846, and in
particular cut the number of observations in the period 1984 to 1996 from 700 to just 200.
Moreover, visual inspection of the time series of recovery rates split on either seniority or
debt class suggests that recovery rates are not particularly sensitive to either characteristic
over the sample period.
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All calculations in appendix III.B.1 and III.B.2 are based on the dynamic evolution of the
asset value process Vt under the risk-neutral measure, and the superscript Q is therefore
skipped throughout these sections for notational convenience.
III.B.1 Matrix equations and their solutions
In order to state and solve the matrix equations appearing in Jiang and Pistorius (2008), it
is necessary to ﬁrst introduce some notation, so let Θ and Σ be 3n×3n diagonal matrices
with diagonal elements
Θjj =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1 j = 1, . . . ,n
θj−n j = n + 1, . . . , 2n
−1 j = 2n + 1, . . . , 3n
and
Σjj =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
0 j = 1, . . . ,n
σj−n j = n + 1, . . . , 2n
0 j = 2n + 1, . . . , 3n
and let Π be the 3n× 3n matrix
Π =
⎛⎜⎜⎝
diag(−κ+i ) diag(κ+i ) On
diag(αiλi) Ξ− diag(ri + λi) diag((1− αi)λi)
On diag(κ
−
i ) diag(−κ−i )
⎞⎟⎟⎠
where diag(yi) denotes the n × n diagonal matrix with diagonal elements (y1, . . . , yn),
On′×n′′ is a n′ × n′′ zero matrix, and On′ = On′×n′ . Finally, let In′ denote the n′ × n′
identity matrix.
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Lemma III.B.1 Assume that the 4n× 4n matrix⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
(
(Θ−1Π)ij
)
i=1,...,n
j=1,...,3n
On
On×3n diag
(
2θi
σ2i
)
(
(Θ−1Π)ij
)
i=2n+1,...,3n
j=1,...,3n
On
(−(Θ−1Π)ij)i=n+1,...,2n
j=1,...,3n
diag
(
2θi
σ2i
)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
has exactly 2n eigenvalues e−k with strictly negative real part and 2n eigenvalues e
+
k with
strictly positive real part. Then
(i) a solution (A,B) ∈ Rn×2n × R2n×2n to the matrix equation
O3n×2n =
1
2
Σ2
⎛⎝ I2n
A
⎞⎠B2 −Θ
⎛⎝ I2n
A
⎞⎠B + Π
⎛⎝ I2n
A
⎞⎠ (III.7)
is given by
A =
(
w−1 · · · w−2n
)(
v−1 · · · v−2n
)−1
B =
(
e−1 v
−
1 · · · e−2nv−2n
)(
v−1 · · · v−2n
)−1
where v−k are the ﬁrst 2n elements and w
−
k the next n elements of an eigenvector
corresponding to e−k , k = 1, . . . , 2n.
(ii) a solution (A,B) ∈ Rn×2n × R2n×2n to the matrix equation
O3n×2n =
1
2
Σ2
⎛⎝ A
I2n
⎞⎠B2 + Θ
⎛⎝ A
I2n
⎞⎠B + Π
⎛⎝ A
I2n
⎞⎠ (III.8)
is given by
A =
(
w+1 · · · w+2n
)(
v+1 · · · v+2n
)−1
B = −(e+1 v+1 · · · e+2nv+2n)(v+1 · · · v+2n)−1
where w+k are the ﬁrst n elements and v
+
k the next 2n elements of an eigenvector
corresponding to e+k , k = 1, . . . , 2n.
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Proof. Fix k and let v˜k = (v˜ik)i=1,...,4n denote an eigenvector corresponding to the
eigenvalue e−k . Then⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
e−k (v˜ik)i=n+1,...,2n =
(
2θi
σ2i
v˜3n+i,k
)
i=1,...,n
O3n×1 = Θ−1Π(v˜ik)i=1,...,3n − e−k
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
(v˜ik)i=1,...,n
−(v˜ik)i=3n+1,...,4n
(v˜ik)i=2n+1,...,3n
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠−
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
On×1(
2θi
σ2i
v˜3n+i,k
)
i=1,...,n
On×1
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
which by deﬁnition of v−k and w
−
k reduces to
O3n×1 = Π
⎛⎝ v−k
w−k
⎞⎠− e−k Θ
⎛⎝ v−k
w−k
⎞⎠+ 1
2
(e−k )
2Σ2
⎛⎝ v−k
w−k
⎞⎠ .
Since A(v−1 · · · v−2n) = (w−1 · · · w−2n) and thus⎛⎝ I2n
A
⎞⎠ v−k =
⎛⎝ v−k
w−k
⎞⎠
we can rewrite the equation as
O3n×1 = Π
⎛⎝ I2n
A
⎞⎠ v−k − e−k Θ
⎛⎝ I2n
A
⎞⎠ v−k + 12(e−k )2Σ2
⎛⎝ I2n
A
⎞⎠ v−k .
The deﬁnition of B implies that e−k is also an eigenvalue for B with corresponding
eigenvector v−k , so
O3n×1 = Π
⎛⎝ I2n
A
⎞⎠ v−k −Θ
⎛⎝ I2n
A
⎞⎠Bv−k + 12Σ2
⎛⎝ I2n
A
⎞⎠B2v−k
and hence part (i) follows from the regularity of (v−1 · · · v−2n). Part (ii) follows by similar
arguments. 
The proof of lemma III.B.1 does not per se exploit the partitioning of the eigenvalues
e±k according to the sign of their real part. However, for the matrices solving (III.7) and
(III.8), henceforth denoted A−,B− respectively A+,B+, to be valid in the sequel, it is
necessary to make the additional requirements that each row in A± is a subprobability
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vector and that B± is a subintensity matrix. It is for these characteristics to hold that it
is important to distinguish between the two types of eigenvalues (see Jiang and Pistorius
(2008) theorem 4.2). Although I do not have a proof verifying that the expressions for A±
and B± in lemma III.B.1 automatically satisfy these extra conditions, I have checked in
all of the numerical calculations that this is the case.
Moreover, following Jiang and Pistorius (2008) the solutions to (III.7) and (III.8) will
be unique under suitable parameter restrictions and subject to the additional requirements
of A± having subprobability rows and B± being subintensity. A comparison with results
for similar models (Barlow, Rogers, and Williams (1980), Jacobsen (2005)) indicates that
in this case it may even be possible to show that the 4n × 4n matrix will always have
exactly half of its eigenvalues with strictly negative real part and the other half with
strictly positive real part.
Finally, lemma III.B.1 implicitly assumes that the matrices (v±1 · · · v±2n) of (partial)
eigenvectors are regular. While I have no theoretical justiﬁcation for this, related results
in Jacobsen (2005) suggest that singularity of these matrices is not likely to be of any
concern in numerical implementations, and indeed I have encountered no singularities in
the computations in this paper.
III.B.2 Calculating the expectation
To calculate the expectation in (III.6) I follow Jiang and Pistorius (2008) with a minor
adjustment, see subsection III.B.3 for details. The calculation is based on multiple
applications of lemma III.B.1, so continuing the notation of the previous section, I now
introduce the 3n′ × 3n′ submatrices
Θn′ =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
(Θij)i=1,...,n′
j=1,...,n′
(Θij)i=1,...,n′
j=n+1,...,n+n′
(Θij)i=1,...,n′
j=2n+1,...,2n+n′
(Θij)i=n+1,...,n+n′
j=1,...,n′
(Θij)i=n+1,...,n+n′
j=n+1,...,n+n′
(Θij)i=n+1,...,n+n′
j=2n+1,...,2n+n′
(Θij)i=2n+1,...,2n+n′
j=1,...,n′
(Θij)i=2n+1,...,2n+n′
j=n+1,...,n+n′
(Θij)i=2n+1,...,2n+n′
j=2n+1,...,2n+n′
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
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Σn′ =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
(Σij)i=1,...,n′
j=1,...,n′
(Σij)i=1,...,n′
j=n+1,...,n+n′
(Σij)i=1,...,n′
j=2n+1,...,2n+n′
(Σij)i=n+1,...,n+n′
j=1,...,n′
(Σij)i=n+1,...,n+n′
j=n+1,...,n+n′
(Σij)i=n+1,...,n+n′
j=2n+1,...,2n+n′
(Σij)i=2n+1,...,2n+n′
j=1,...,n′
(Σij)i=2n+1,...,2n+n′
j=n+1,...,n+n′
(Σij)i=2n+1,...,2n+n′
j=2n+1,...,2n+n′
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Πn′ =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
(Πij)i=1,...,n′
j=1,...,n′
(Πij)i=1,...,n′
j=n+1,...,n+n′
(Πij)i=1,...,n′
j=2n+1,...,2n+n′
(Πij)i=n+1,...,n+n′
j=1,...,n′
(Πij)i=n+1,...,n+n′
j=n+1,...,n+n′
(Πij)i=n+1,...,n+n′
j=2n+1,...,2n+n′
(Πij)i=2n+1,...,2n+n′
j=1,...,n′
(Πij)i=2n+1,...,2n+n′
j=n+1,...,n+n′
(Πij)i=2n+1,...,2n+n′
j=2n+1,...,2n+n′
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
for n′ = 1, . . . ,n, and I henceforth use A±n′ and B
±
n′ to denote the matrices resulting from
applying lemma III.B.1 to the triple
(
Θn′ , Σn′ , Πn′
)
. Next, I specify for n′ = 1, . . . ,n− 1
the auxiliary matrices
C−n′ =
⎛⎝ On′ In′
A−n′
⎞⎠ exp(B−n′ log(bn′+1bn′
))
C+n′ =
⎛⎝ A+n′
In′ On′
⎞⎠ exp(B+n′ log(bn′+1bn′
))
D−n′ =
⎛⎝ I2n′
A−n′
⎞⎠
D+n′ =
⎛⎝ A+n′
I2n′
⎞⎠
E−n′ =
(
I2n′ O2n′×n′
)
E+n′ =
(
O2n′×n′ I2n′
)
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and the 3n′ × 3n′ diagonal matrix Fn′ with diagonal elements
(Fn′)jj =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 j = 1, . . . ,n′
n∑
k=n′+1
(Πn)n+j−n′,n+kfk
3n′∑
k=1
(Πn′)jk
j = n′ + 1, . . . , 2n′
0 j = 2n′ + 1, . . . , 3n′
and use these to deﬁne the matrix-valued function
G(v) = D+n exp
(
B+n log
(
v
bn
))
and for n′ = 1, . . . ,n− 1 the functions
H1(v,n
′) =
[
D−n′ exp
(
B−n′ log
(
bn′+1
v
))
−D+n′ exp
(
B+n′ log
(
v
bn′
))
C−n′
]
·
[
I2n′ − C+n′C−n′
]−1
H2(v,n
′) =
[
D+n′ exp
(
B+n′ log
(
v
bn′
))
−D−n′ exp
(
B−n′ log
(
bn′+1
v
))
C+n′
]
·
[
I2n′ − C−n′C+n′
]−1
H3(v,n
′, a) = −
[
vaI3n′ − bn′+1aH1(v,n′)E−n′ − bn′aH2(v,n′)E+n′
]
·
[
a2
2
Σ2n′ + aΘn′ + Πn′
]−1
Fn′Πn′1n′
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with 1n′ a 3n′ × 1 column vector of ones. I can then introduce the real-valued function
E(v, i, a) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
d	n,iG(v)c¯n, when v > bn,
i = 1, . . . , 3n
d	n′,i
[
H1(v,n
′)cn′ + H2(v,n
′)c¯n′ + H3(v,n′, a)
]
,
when bn′ < v ≤ bn′+1,
i = 1, . . . ,n′,
n′ = 1, . . . ,n− 1
d	n′,i−(n−n′)
[
H1(v,n
′)cn′ + H2(v,n
′)c¯n′ + H3(v,n′, a)
]
,
when bn′ < v ≤ bn′+1,
i = n + 1, . . . ,n + n′,
n′ = 1, . . . ,n− 1
d	n′,i−2(n−n′)
[
H1(v,n
′)cn′ + H2(v,n
′)c¯n′ + H3(v,n′, a)
]
,
when bn′ < v ≤ bn′+1,
i = 2n + 1, . . . , 2n + n′
n′ = 1, . . . ,n− 1
vaf(i), otherwise
where dn′,i = (dn′,i,j)j=1,...,3n′ are column vectors with
dn′,i,j =
⎧⎨⎩ 1 i = j0 i = j
and
cn′ =
⎛⎝ (cn′+1,j)j=1,...,n′
(cn′+1,j)j=n+1,...,n+n′
⎞⎠ c¯n′ =
⎛⎝ (cn′,j)j=n+1,...,n+n′
(cn′,j)j=2n+1,...,2n+n′
⎞⎠
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are column vectors of constants cn′,j determined by the linear system⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
cn′,n+n′ = bn′
afn′ for n′=1, . . . ,n
cn′,2n+n′ = bn′
afn′
κ−n′
a + κ−n′
for n′=1, . . . ,n
lim
v→bn′ +
∂
∂v
E(v, i, a) = lim
v→bn′ −
∂
∂v
E(v, i, a) for i=n + 1, . . . ,n + n′ − 1,
n′=2, . . . ,n
lim
v→bn′ +
E(v, i, a) = lim
v→bn′ −
E(v, i, a) for i=1, . . . ,n′ − 1,
2n + 1, . . . , 2n + n′ − 1,
n′=2, . . . ,n
The expectation in (III.6) is now given as
Ev,i
[
e−
∫ τ
0 r(Zs)ds (Vτ )
a f(Zτ )1(τ<∞)
]
= E(v,n + i, a) i = 1, . . . ,n.
III.B.3 A note on Jiang and Pistorius (2008)
The expression for the expectation in (III.6) derived in section III.B.2 exploits the novel
probabilistic results developed in Jiang and Pistorius (2008) (JP). However, in order to
apply these result, I have to correct for an error appearing in one of their main theorems,
theorem 6.1. For clarity of exposition, I deviate in this section from the notation used in
the remainder of the paper and switch instead to the notation employed by JP. Thus, let
ρj = inf{t ≥ 0 | Yt ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1}} j = 2, . . . ,N .
and consider ﬁxed j ∈ {2, . . . ,N}, i ∈ E˜j and kj < x < kj−1. As in JP it follows that
vb,k(x, i) = Ex,i
[
ebAT˜ (k)h(YT˜ (k))1(T˜ (k)<ζ)
]
= Ex,i
[
vb,k(kj−1,Yτkj ,kj−1 )1(τkj ,kj−1<ρj∧ζ, Aτkj ,kj−1=kj−1)
]
+Ex,i
[
vb,k(kj,Yτkj ,kj−1 )1(τkj ,kj−1<ρj∧ζ, Aτkj ,kj−1=kj)
]
+Ex,i
[
ebAρjh(Yρj)1(ρj<ζ, ρj<τkj ,kj−1 )
]
and JP give explicit expressions for all three right-hand-side terms. However, the
expression for the last term is incorrect, and to see this I apply their proposition 5.1
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to get
Ex,i
[
ebAρjh(Yρj)1(ρj<ζ, ρj<τkj ,kj−1 )
]
= Ex,i
[
ebAρj E
[
h(Yρj)1(ρj<ζ, ρj∧ζ<τkj ,kj−1 )
∣∣ F(ρj∧ζ)−]]
= Ex,i
[
ebAρj 1(Y(ρj∧ζ)−∈{j,...,N})
j−1∑
s=1
(Qa)Y(ρj∧ζ)−,s
−(Q(j)a 1)Y(ρj∧ζ)−
h(s)1(ρj∧ζ<τkj ,kj−1 )
]
.
Here, I have exploited the fact that a jump to one of the absorbing states {1, . . . , j−1}∪∂
can only occur when Yt ∈ {j, . . . ,N} (i.e. (Q(j)a 1) = 0 for  ∈ E˜j\{j, . . . ,N}). Thus if I
introduce the |E˜j| × |E˜j| diagonal matrix Rj with diagonal elements
(Rj), =
⎧⎨⎩
∑j−1
s=1(Qa),sh(s)
(Q
(j)
a 1)
 ∈ {j, . . . ,N}
0  ∈ E˜j\{j, . . . ,N}
then I can reapply their proposition 5.1 to express the third term as
Ex,i
[
ebAρjh(Yρj)1(ρj<ζ, ρj<τkj ,kj−1 )
]
= e	i Ψ
◦
j(b,x)RjQ
(j)
a 1
and the correct expression for vb,k(x, i) in their theorem 6.1 therefore reads
vb,k(x, i) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
e	i Φ
−
k1
(x)h−1 x > k1, i ∈ E
e	i
[
Ψ+j (x)h
+
j + Ψ
−
j (x)h
−
j + Ψ
◦
j(b,x)RjQ
(j)
a 1
]
j ≥ 2, kj < x ≤ kj−1, i ∈ E˜j
.
III.B.4 Non-negative jump risk premium
The jump risk premium
ηJ = λ
PζP − λQζQ = λP (ζP − δPζQ)
is non-negative if ζP − δPζQ > 0, and this condition is satisﬁed exactly when γM < 0 as
the following argument shows. Note ﬁrst that
δPαQ =
αPκ+,P
κ+,Q
, δP(1− αQ) = (1− α
P)κ−,P
κ−,Q
which implies
δPζQ = δP
(
αQκ+,Q
κ+,Q − 1 +
(1− αQ)κ−,Q
κ−,Q + 1
− 1
)
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=
αPκ+,P
κ+,P − γM − 1 +
(1− αP)κ−,P
κ−,P + γM + 1
− δP
= αPκ+,P
(
1
κ+,P − γM − 1 −
1
κ+,P − γM
)
+(1− αP)κ−,P
(
1
κ−,P + γM + 1
− 1
κ−,P + γM
)
and hence
∂
∂γM
(
ζP − δPζQ) = −αPκ+,P( 1
(κ+,P − γM − 1)2 −
1
(κ+,P − γM)2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+(1− αP)κ−,P
(
1
(κ−,P + γM + 1)2
− 1
(κ−,P + γM)2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
< 0.
Since δPζQ = ζP if γM = 0 it follows that ζP − δPζQ > 0 when γM < 0.
III.C Estimation details
III.C.1 Macroeconomic states
To estimate the intensity matrix Ξ for the macroeconomic state process (Zt)t≥0, I ﬁrst
calibrate an observed path (ztk)k for (Zt)t≥0 and subsequently apply maximum likelihood
estimation based on (ztk)k.
To infer the n possible states for (Zt)t≥0 I follow Tauchen and Hussey (1991) and apply
n−point Gauss-Legendre quadrature to the monthly time series of consumption growth
rates. This yields quadrature points n < . . . < 1 that I use to deﬁne the end points of
the n intervals ]−∞, n+n−1
2
]
, . . . ,
]
2+1
2
,∞[
numbered n,n−1, . . . , 1. The monthly time series of the state of economy (ztk) now follows
from the time series of observed growth rates by assigning for each month the number of
the interval that contains the corresponding growth rate observation.
Applying the methodology with n = 4 gives the quadrature points 4 = 0.46%, 3 =
2.23%, 2 = 4.55%, 1 = 6.32%, and Figure III.5 shows the observed monthly growth
rates together with the resulting business cycle path (ztk)k. To limit the inﬂuence from
potential outliers, I apply the quadrature rule only to the range of growth rates between
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the 5%– and 95%–percentiles of the empirical growth rate distribution. To further correct
for numerical anomalies, I adjust the calibrated path (ztk)k on the few occasions where
(ztk)k is set to spend only a single month in a given state and then return to its previous
state. Such short-lived jumps back and forth are artifacts of the calibration procedure and
not representative of fundamental macroeconomic changes, and I therefore ignore these
ephemeral jumps.
The state process (Zt)t≥0 is assumed to be an n−state Markov process with intensity
matrix Ξ = (ξij)i,j=1,...,n, which I estimate from (ztk)k by maximizing the log likelihood
function ∑
k
logP (Ztk+1 = ztk+1 |Ztk = ztk).
where each element in the sum is calculated from the approximation
P (Ztk+1 = j |Ztk = i) ≈
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
exp
(
−(tk+1 − tk)
∑
l =i ξil
)
j = i(
1− exp
(
−(tk+1 − tk)
∑
l =i ξil
)) ξij∑
l =i ξil
j = i
.
This corresponds to assuming that (Zt)t≥0 can jump at most once in each interval ]tk, tk+1],
and since the estimation is based on monthly growth rate observations (i.e. tk+1−tk = 112),
I consider this to be a reasonable approximation. Table III.2 gives the estimated intensity
matrix Ξ, and Table III.3 contains the resulting stationary distribution (πi)i=1,...,n and
its ﬁrst four standardized moments.27 These moments are calculated from the n−point
probability distribution that assigns probability πi to observing the quadrature point i
for i = 1, . . . ,n.
III.C.2 Asset value parameters
The asset process parameters (κ+,P,κ−,P, θP,σ, γM) are estimated using an extension of
the iterative procedure presented in Vassalou and Xing (2004):
27Since the estimated intensity matrix Ξ = (ξij) is irreducible, the stationary distribution (πi)i=1,...,n for
(Zt)t≥0 is given as the unique solution to the linear system
n∑
j=1,j =i
πiξij =
n∑
j=1,j =i
πjξji i = 1, . . . ,n
subject to
∑n
i=1 πi = 1 and πi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . ,n (see e.g. Norris (1997)).
136
Credit spreads across the business cycle
(i) Fix initial daily time series of asset value V , debt coupon C, and default boundaries
b.
(ii) Calculate maximum likelihood estimates of (κ+,P,κ−,P, θP,σ, γM) conditional on V ,
C, b based on the likelihood function outlined below.
(iii) Conditional on parameter estimates from (ii) determine for each daily data point
updated values of: asset value V , debt coupon C, and default boundaries b such
that model-implied market value of equity matches observed market capitalization,
model-implied debt equals observed book value of debt, and the n smooth pasting
conditions are satisﬁed.
(iv) Repeat steps (ii)–(iii) until parameter estimates converge.
The likelihood function L in step (ii) is constructed using a transformation approach
(Duan (1994; 2000)) that exploits the tractability of log asset value X = log V 28
logL =
∑
j
logP
(
Xsj+1 = log vsj+1
∣∣ (ztk)k,Fsj)
−
∑
j
log
∂Equity
∂v
(vsj+1 , zsj+1)−
∑
j
log vsj+1
Here, vsj is the market value of assets, zsj the state of the economy, and Fsj the total
information set at time sj. By conditioning on the number of jumps in asset value on a
given day it follows that (Aït-Sahalia (2004))
P
(
Xsj+1 = Xsj + x
∣∣ (ztk)k,Fsj)
=
∞∑
m=0
P
(
θPi Δj + σi(W
P
sj+1
−W Psj) +
m∑
l=1
Yi,l = x
)(λiΔj)m
m!
exp (−λiΔj)
where Δj = sj+1 − sj, and Yi,1,Yi,2, . . . are the jump sizes corresponding to jumps in
(JPi,t)t≥0. Consistent with the jump detection procedure in section III.4.3 I limit the
28Maximum likelihood estimation of a jump-diﬀusion process is complicated by the fact that the likelihood
function may be unbounded at a discrete set of points (Honoré (1998), Craine, Lochstoer, and Syrtveit
(2000)). However, several empirical studies have found that this is mostly a theoretical concern (see e.g.
Jorion (1988), Hamilton (1994, chp. 22), Aït-Sahalia (2004), or the extensive simulation-based evidence
in Tauchen and Zhou (2010)).
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occurrence of jumps to at most one each day, which implies that
P
(
Xsj+1 = Xsj + x
∣∣ (ztk)k,Fsj)
=
1√
2πσ2i Δj
exp
(
−(x− θ
P
i Δj)
2
2σ2i Δj
− λPi Δj
)
+
∫ ∞
0
αPi κ
+,P
i λ
P
i Δj√
2πσ2i Δj
exp
(
−(x− y − θ
P
i Δj)
2
2σ2i Δj
− κ+,Pi y − λPi Δj
)
dy
+
∫ 0
−∞
(1− αPi )κ−,Pi λPi Δj√
2πσ2i Δj
exp
(
−(x− y − θ
P
i Δj)
2
2σ2i Δj
+ κ−,Pi y − λPi Δj
)
dy
The two integrals can be rewritten in terms of incomplete Gamma functions, and this
gives a closed-form expression for the loglikelihood function. While the structural credit
risk model, in principle, requires ﬁrm asset value to be above the default boundary at all
times, I consider it a minor approximation to only check that this condition is satisﬁed
for each of the daily observations during the estimation.
Estimation of structural credit risk models that allow for jump risk are known, for some
ﬁrms, to disproportionally favour jump risk at the expense of the diﬀusion component
(Cremers, Driessen, and Maenhout (2008)). I therefore set the following limits on the
parameters during the estimation based on a subjective assessment of what seems to be
a reasonable degree of jump risk: 0.25 ≤ αP ≤ 0.75, 1/κP ≤ 15%, −15% ≤ ηJ ≤ 15%,
−15% ≤ ηW ≤ 15%, −15% ≤ ηJ + ηW ≤ 15%.
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Conclusion
This thesis contains three essays about correlation in corporate default risk. The essays
document the important role of default correlation in explaining time series behaviour
of both actual default events and prices of credit risky securities. The analyses and
conclusions in each essay are founded on extensive use of mathematical models followed
by detailed empirical studies.
The ﬁrst essay demonstrates the inadequacy of previous literature in detecting default
contagion in intensity-based models of actual defaults. It further gives empirical evidence
in favour of both misspeciﬁcation and default contagion in these models, and it proposes
a new way to test for these eﬀects. The second essay formulates a detailed model
for joint pricing of Credit Default Swap (CDS) and Collateralized Debt Obligation
(CDO) contracts. The model features both idiosyncratic and systematic default risk and
circumvents the restrictive parameter contraints enforced in earlier literature. Estimation
of the model reveals a good ﬁt to observed CDS and CDO spreads. The third and ﬁnal
essay documents substantial business cycle variation in the level and slope of corporate
credit spreads and links this to idiosyncratic jump risk. It develops a structural credit
risk model that incorporates both jump and business cycle risk, and shows by estimation
that the structural model is able to replicate the observed variation in empirical credit
spreads.
The thesis analyses several diﬀerent aspects of default risk correlation, and highlights
a series of theoretical challenges related to proper modelling of default correlation. It
documents that some of these issues can be handled by more careful application of existing
models and techniques, but it also shows that additional work – both theoretical and
empirical – is needed to further increase our understanding of the economic forces that
drive default risk correlation.
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